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Background
Since 2006, the University of Agder (UIA), Norway and Ruhuna University (RU), Sri 
Lanka have collaborated on a study regarding the impact of the Indian Ocean Tsu-
nami (IOT) of 2004 with a particular focus on the Southern province of Sri Lanka. In 
June 2014, ten years after the Tsunami, a group of 20 postgraduate students from 
Asia, Africa, Europe and the USA, attending the international master programme in 
Development Management at the UIA, conducted a field study in the Hambantota 
District in the “Deep South” of Sri Lanka. The study was led by a professor, and got a 
lot of administrative support from the Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce 
(HDCC). The objective of the study was to analyse the impact of the recovery pro-
cess among the local people and communities, and to explore to what degree they 
had managed to rehabilitate and reconstruct their communities ten years after 
this very dramatic event, and the obstacles faced in the rehabilitation process. The 
investigation examined which activities and agencies had functioned well in the 
recovery and rehabilitation process, and which did not function well. The study 
focused on four target groups, the Hambantota fishing community, a local village 
called Kirinda, the tourist industry in Tangalle town, and business people from 
 Hambantota town. According to the findings from the study, the most important 
and well-functioning agents in the direct aftermath of the disaster were the local 
people themselves. The study also revealed a general sentiment among the local 
people that government authorities, both at a national, and local level, had not 
played a very active and progressive role in the reco very process, especially during 
the relief operations following immediately after the tsunami. The role played by 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was, in general, applauded. 
Findings from the study show that today, ten years after the Tsunami, the local peo-
ple have, to a great extent, managed to re-establish the communities, raise new 
houses, build new infrastructure etc., but that the more invisible damages such 
as, for instance, psychological stress have still not healed. Quite importantly, the 
study detects that a lot of disputes and irregularities have hampered the recovery 
process. 
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Public factors
Official name: The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Government: Republic, headed by a president who is both head of government and 
head of state
Capital:  Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte Population: 116,000 (2011)
Main city: Colombo   Population: 753,000 (2011)
Land size:  65,610 Sq.km
(Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, n.d)
Demography
Total population:         20,271,464
Urban population, in percentage:   18.3%
Rural population:    77.3%
Estate Tamils (tea plantation area):  04.4%
Literacy rate:      95.6%
(Source: Department of Census and Statistics – Sri Lanka (2015) 
Ethnic & religious composition:
Sinhala (predominantly Buddhists):    74.9%
Tamils (predominantly Hindus):     11.0%
Estate Tamils (predominantly Hindus):      5.0%
Muslims (Malays and Moors, predominantly Tamil speaking):     9.0% 
Among the Sinhala and Tamils, approximately 6.2 % are Christians
(Source: Kallie, 2015)   
Social and economic data
Average number of children per women above 15 years:    2.6 
Life expectancy at birth:      74.3 years
Expected years of schooling:      13.6 years
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GNI per capita (2011 PPP$):      9.250
(NB: From 1980 to 2013, GNI increased with 273.7 percent)
HDI value:       0.750
(rank 73 out of 187 countries. High Human Development)       
(Source: UNDP, 2015)
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Land area:     2609 Sq. km
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Population Hambantota town:    11.598 
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Sinhala:     579032  97.10 %
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Others (Burgher, Indian Tamil, etc.):        708    0.08 %
Religious composition of Hambantota District
Buddhist:     577284  96.8%
Hindu:          1243    0.2%
Islam:        15163    2.5%
Roman Catholic:       1098    0.2 %
Other Christian:        1511    0.3%
Other:           318    0.1%
(Source: Hambantota District Secretariat, 2011) 
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The relevance of a “Ten Years After” study
Arne Olav Øyhus
In 2006, the University of Agder, Norway, and the University of Ruhuna, 
Sri Lanka embarked on a research project to study the recovery and rehabilita-
tion process of the disaster affected communities along the southern coastline 
of Sri Lanka. As a part of the project, I completed in the summer of 2006, one 
and a half year after the event, I visited several places and interviewed a num-
ber of Tsunami victims living in resettlement camps, or in temporary shelters 
within the destructed communities waiting to be allocated new homes. In some 
cases people had even moved back into their old houses when they had not 
been totally destroyed, doing some renovations on their own. At that time, 
many people were still pauperized and traumatized. I noted, however, another 
sentiment being expressed when talking to people – anger and frustration. This 
sentiment was directed towards the structure and system of relief and assis-
tance rendered to the communities and the individual families. Many people, 
perhaps most of them, were of the opinion that the assistance was misused, 
was unjust and unfair, inefficient, and in many cases, directly corrupt, with 
people benefiting who had not been affected; such as members from the rul-
ing party, persons in important positions, and relatives of influential persons. 
According to Silva (2009), this was not at all a farfetched sentiment. From 
his own post-disaster studies, he concluded that the political regime regularly 
utilized relief aid to strengthen and expand their political influence, with the 
consequence that benefits were given to people who had not been harmed by 
the disaster. In this way, a substantial amount of relief was taken away from 
the real victims in dire need of it (Silva, 2009). Another big problem was that 
people within the same community were treated differently by different organi-
sations and agencies, even if their situation was more or less the same. For 
instance, while some portion of the community was given high standard houses 
that were both nicely designed and robust, and built with first class materials, 
others were given poorly designed, low class houses where, for instance, the rain 
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poured in during rainstorms. The main difference between the “lucky” and the 
“unlucky” portion of the population was mainly related to which NGO had the 
responsibility for the various zones or “colonies” of the village. The lucky ones 
were the clients of NGOs with a lot of means and a strong interest in achieving 
something. The unlucky ones were clients of NGOs with meagre means and 
poor management. This issue brought serious tension into the community as the 
unlucky felt unfairly and unjustly treated. As this study shows, such sentiments 
still exist in the communities, ten years after the event. 
In my 2006 study, I observed that one of the local people’s biggest grievances 
was that they were not heard; that they were sidelined and muted in the deci-
sion-making processes. Although people in general had a stronger trust and belief 
in the NGOs and civilian organisations than in the government and the parastatal 
agencies, none of these agencies listened to the local people when they planned 
and organised the relief and rehabilitation activities. The consequences were a lot 
of sub-standard, even ill-functioning projects. Residential areas were established 
in non-suitable areas: houses that were not fit for the household structure were 
erected: boats, fishing equipment etc. were given to persons who had never been 
fishing, while the fishermen got none. In some fishing communities there were 
no harbours, and they could therefore only use boats that could be pulled ashore. 
However, with some of the donated boats this was not possible, as the boats were 
too heavy, or not at all constructed to be pulled ashore. The problem was some-
times even graver than that. FAO found that in Sri Lanka, nearly 19 percent of the 
new boats were not even seaworthy (FAO, 2006).
In many areas, housing quarters were established far inland from the sea, mak-
ing it both difficult and time consuming for the fishermen to get to work. It was not 
possible to have adequate control over the boat and the gear when they lived at 
such a distance. A big proportion of the local people were of the sincere opinion 
that the government was working against them instead of along with them. 
When we have come to know, not only from this study, but from a whole range 
of studies performed in the aftermath of the Tsunami, that it was the local people 
themselves who were the real relief “heroes”, rescuing the survivors, burying the 
dead, giving first aid, food, water and shelter, clearing the area of debris, moving 
the injured people to safe places, consoling those in shock, taking care of children 
that had lost their parents, or parents that had lost their children, then it is not 
possible to understand, or accept, that they were brushed aside when the relief, 
recovery and rehabilitation operations were planned and organised. This is possi-
bly one of the most important facts that we should take notice of, and learn from, 
when it comes to the Tsunami recovery process, not only from Sri Lanka, but also 
in a more general perspective. If it is an aim to build resilient and robust communi-
ties, the main instrument will be, and has to be, the local people themselves, their 
structures, institutions and knowledge. 
20 Recovering from a disaster
Ten Years After
It is ten years since I conducted this brief post-disaster study in Sri Lanka. Also, the 
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition Reports (Telford et al, 2006) and several other stud-
ies analysing the rehabilitation and recovery process in the aftermath of the Tsu-
nami were undertaken in the first couple of years after the disaster. Reading these 
reports it seems that the Sri Lankan recovery process has been swift on one hand, 
and quite chaotic on the other. Reports flourish of uncoordinated relief activities 
and solutions implemented with little regard to the local context. There are many 
stories about what was done well and where, what was done badly
Now, with a ten years perspective, we felt that it was highly relevant to conduct 
a study of the long-term impacts of the recovery process among the local people 
and communities affected by the Tsunami, and explore to what degree it has been 
possible to rehabilitate and reconstruct these communities after this extremely 
dramatic event. The aim of the study was to learn which activities and which agen-
cies had functioned well in the recovery and rehabilitation process, and which did 
not function so well. It was equally important to explore why/why not they func-
tioned well/not well. Since the study has a broad scope, covering a variety of target 
groups, we feel that the results we can present are valuable lessons for future disas-
ter risk reduction planning, not only in Sri Lanka, but also worldwide. 
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On 26 December 2004 at 6.58 hours (Sri Lanka Time), a massive earthquake 
measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale, with its epicentre 30 km outside the west 
coast of Northern Sumatra, led to movement along a 1,200 km section of the 
sea floor. This generated a series of gigantic waves, tsunamis that killed people 
in 14 countries around the Indian Ocean as they hit the coastlines. Indonesia, 
Sri Lanka, the Maldives, India and Thailand were the hardest hit. In addition to 
the fact that entire coastal zones were destroyed, the waves caused damages up 
to three km inland in some places. This event, later recognised as Indian Ocean 
Tsunami (IOT), killed more than 227,000 people, while some 1.7 million people 
were displaced (Aturkorala and Resosudarmo, 2005; Telford et al., 2006). The 
Tsunami was obviously an extreme, extraordinary event, and several research-
ers dealing with hazards have estimated that the probability for its reoccurrence 
is approximately 200–500 years (Carpenter, 2005). Aturkorala and Resosu-
darmo call it “the world’s first truly global, natural disaster” as it shattered lives 
in more than a dozen countries on two continents (2005: 2). The Tsunami was 
truly a global disaster, but simultaneously regional, national and local. It was 
at the local level, i.e. in the local communities along the Asian coastline that the 
devastating and deadly impact of the disaster could be actually seen and felt. It 
was also at this local level that the most important rescue operations were man-
aged and executed. Just minutes after the last waves had pulled back, survivors 
from the affected communities and their neighbours from surrounding commu-
nities started their rescue and recovery operations using the means at hand. “In 
Sri Lanka and Thailand, it was mostly the public from nearby areas that did 
the life-saving and immediate relief during the first two days. In Indonesia, 91 
percent of those interviewed by the Fritz Institute (2005:3) reported that they 
had been rescued by private individuals, (Cosgrave, 2007: 10).
The intention behind the Ten Years After study
Several scientific reports, for instance the reports from the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) suggest that there will in the future be radical shifts in 
the pattern and intensity of natural disasters due to climate change. A particularly 
adverse effect of these predicted changes is that the impacts of future natural dis-
aster are expected to fall disproportionately on the poor (Haughton et al, 2001: 6). 
This future risk scenario underlines the importance of studies aimed at understand-
ing what happens to people and communities seriously affected by disasters, both 
in a short-, medium- and long-term perspective. We believe that lessons learnt from 
such studies will be of fundamental value for strengthening local capacities to cope 
with disasters, especially among the poor in developing countries. It is of central 
importance to both understand what vulnerability implies for communities and also 
to learn about the adaptive capacity of households and local communities in disas-
ter-prone areas. Vulnerability to disasters can be analysed at different levels, from the 
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individual to the national, even to the international level. The focus of this study is put 
primarily on the local level, including households and local communities. The aim of 
this study is to contribute to the understanding of actual and potential coping strate-
gies at this level, and the importance of enga ging available resources and structures 
in the form of “social capital” and “agency” to increase the robustness and resili ence 
among disaster prone communities. 
The Sri Lanka Case
The 26th of December 2004 was in many ways a special day in Sri Lanka. It was a Sun-
day, and for the Buddhists, who make up the great majority of Sri Lankans, it was also 
a “Poya” day, or Full Moon day, a very important Buddhist holiday, a day when practis-
ing Buddhists visit temples to show their respect to Lord Buddha. Thus, at 8.35 hours, 
less than two hours after the earth quake occurred, when the first gigantic waves hit 
the eastern coast of Sri Lanka, government offices, banks, supermarkets, teashops 
etc. were closed. This was most probably a lucky strike when in the next few minutes 
the waves crushed into the coastline from the east towards the southern and north-
ern parts of Sri Lanka. Several places usually filled with people were now more or less 
empty, and most people living in the coastal villages stayed in their homes or in the 
temples to celebrate the holiday. 
This devastating hazard revealed the enormous vulnerability of the coastal areas of 
Sri Lanka as a huge number of communities along the northern, eastern and southern 
coastlines were completely destroyed by the waves, with about 36.000 dead or miss-
ing, about 21.500 injured, and about 860.000 displaced persons (Birkmann et al., 2006; 
Jayasuriya et al., 2005; Weerakoon et al. 2007; UN-OCHA, 2014). The majority of dead and 
missing were women and children (Jayasuriya et. al., 2005). 
While the Ampara District in the east, including the well-known Arugam Bay, 
was the hardest hit district with more than 10.000 deaths, Hambantota District, 
where this study was conducted, was the second, with more than 4.500 deaths 
(Jayasuriya et al., 2005). The power of the waves was enormous. If a person was 
caught by the waves, the chance of survival was slim. This is reflected in the fact 
that the number of dead was almost double of those injured. 
The worst affected sector was the fisheries. According to a report from TAFREN, 
7.500 fishermen died and one-third of the households affected by the Tsunami 
were engaged in fishing (TAFREN, 2005). It was a human tragedy, but it was not 
only a human tragedy. The economic losses were dramatic with about 16,500 boats 
destroyed, comprising almost 75 per cent of the fishing fleet, in addition to an enor-
mous amount of nets and other fishing gear lost (Weerakon et al., 2007). The sec-
ond most affected sector was tourism (Athurkorala and Resosudarmo, 2005), and 
in particular that part of the sector called “beach tourism”. Almost one out of four 
registered hotels in Sri Lanka was damaged, partly or fully, bringing a big loss to a 
sector that was already in deep trouble after three decades of civil war (Jayasuriya 
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et al., 2005). The heaviest economic losses caused by the waves were connected 
to housing as tens of thousands of houses were demolished. Whole communities 
were, in actual fact, wiped out.
Sri Lanka was not at all prepared for the Tsunami as it had never experienced a 
natural disaster of this magnitude in its recorded history. According to Sri Lanka’s 
local traditions, however, tsunami-like events have taken place several times ear-
lier, in pre-historic times, with the first record dating back more than two thousand 
years, when, according to Mahawamsa, the great chronicle of Sri Lanka, huge waves 
crushed into Kelaniya, more than 40 km from the coast. According to another source, 
Rajavaliya, the saga of the Kings of Sri Lanka, this event destroyed about one hun-
dred seaport towns and almost one thousand fisher men’s villages (Geiger, 1953; 
Suraweera, 2000, cited in Athurkorala & Resosudarmo, 2005: 20). In more recent 
times, administrative records during the Portuguese colonial period (1505-1648) tell 
about an earthquake that made serious damages to Colombo in 1615 (Wimalaratne, 
2005). During modern times, only two serious natural disasters have been witnessed 
in Sri Lanka before the Tsunami, a cyclone sweeping across North-Eastern Sri Lanka 
in 1978, and a flash flood in South-Central Sri Lanka in 2003. From 1975 to 2003, 
natural disasters killed about 1700 people in Sri Lanka (Athurkorala & Resosudarmo, 
2005). 
Sri Lanka had, however, 70 years earlier experienced a health disaster that was even 
more serious than the Tsunami regarding morbidity, namely the Great Malaria Epidemic 
from 1934-35, when more than 80.000 people died, at that time compri sing about one 
per cent of the population (Silva, 2009). According to some estimates, almost half of 
the population in the country became ill with malaria during the epidemic. Also, this 
disaster had a natural foundation as Sri Lanka had experienced a prolonged drought in 
the couple of years preceding the outbreak. Rivers in the affected areas, mostly in the 
interior of the country, had almost dried out, just leaving shallow waters easily heated 
up by the sunlight. This gave rise to environmental conditions very much favourable for 
mosquitoes to breed rapidly (Silva, 2009). 
In addition to the natural foundation of the epidemic, poverty also played its 
part as the prolonged drought resulted in crop failures that for the poorer segment 
of the population led to food scarcity (Silva, 2009). Some of the worst affected com-
munities were lower caste communities, and within them children suffered most 
because of malnutrition and a lower level of immunity (Meyer, cited in Silva, 2009: 
62). Silva finds similarities with the Tsunami, as he, referring to Shanmugaratnam 
(2005), argues that the disaster “mainly affected socially and politically marginal-
ized Muslim and Tamil settlements in the eastern coastal belt and some mainstream 
Sinhala settlements in the south-western coastal belt” (Silva, 2009: 65). Nearly half 
of the people (46%) who were killed by the Tsunami lived in the two neighbour-
ing districts of Ampara and Batticaloa along the eastern coast, both predominantly 
Tamil and Muslim, while the Hambantota and Galle districts along the south-
ern coast, predominantly Sinhala, comprised a little more than one quarter (28%) 
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of the deaths ( Thywissen and Renaud, 2006, cited in Silva 2009: 66). Here, we must add 
that a great proportion of the deaths in Hambantota were Muslim fishermen, a typical 
political and economically marginal community in the district. 
In his article, Kalinga Tudor Silva looks upon the role of the state in the two 
catastrophes, emphasizing the pivotal role of the state during the epidemic in 
securing medical services and relief to the affected people, then rhetorically poses 
a question of high relevance for the Ten Years After study: ”If the serious malaria 
epidemic of the 1930s that occurred in a colonial but decolonizing setting led to 
important endogenous developments and responses such as the development of 
a civil society and formation of a welfare state, why did an even more spectacu-
lar disaster such as the tsunami, which occurred in a far more globalized and a 
post-colonial setting, fail to galvanize similar lasting societal responses from within 
Sri Lanka?” (Silva, 2009: 62). 
Returning now to our study, we might argue that due to what the country 
perceived as a relatively secure position regarding natural hazards of the kind and 
magnitude as that of the Tsunami, the country did not have any national early warn-
ing systems, and it was not part of any regional or international  warning systems, 
such as for instance the Pacific Ocean Tsunami Warning System (TWS), operated 
by the Pacific Tsunami Monitoring Centre (PTMC) (Abbott, 2004). This weakness 
played a big role in the tragedy as the PTMC, originally established by the US gov-
ernment in Honolulu Hawaii in 1946, detected the earthquake only 18 minutes after 
its outbreak. In their communication with the member countries, PTMC informed 
member nations that the earthquake was not a threat to any of them. Later, they 
sent a new message to the members stating that the earthquake could possibly 
be a threat to countries around the Indian Ocean. The PTMC could not, however, 
inform the non-member countries about the actual threat as they did not have the 
contact addresses. And quite possibly, even if the Tsunami affected countries had 
received this information, the situation would perhaps not have been very different 
as these countries did not have effective communication systems for getting this 
crucial information out to the local people (Abbott, 2004). It is, however, a sad fact 
that already in the summer of 2004, half a year before the Tsunami, the UN Intergov-
ernmental Oceanographic Commission gave a warning that the ‘Indian Ocean has a 
significant threat from both local and distant tsunamis’ (Revkin cited in UNDP, 2011: 
6). No notice was taken of this warning – with catastrophic results.
The enormous consequences of the Tsunami were a shock to Sri Lanka. It was 
second only to Indonesia as the most seriously affected country, but proportionally 
the impact was much harder considering, for instance, the death rate of the popula-
tion. In Sri Lanka almost two per thousand, or more accurately 0.184 % of the pop-
ulation was lost to the Tsunami, compared to less than one per thousand, or 0.077 
% for Indonesia. Also, economically, Sri Lanka suffered much more than the other 
countries, except for the Maldives (Telford et al., 2006: 37). 
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A remarkable feature was that although the population of Sri Lanka was 
shocked, it was not at all paralysed. As soon as the waves had receded, and 
the ocean seemed calm again, unharmed people from the affected communities 
and people from surrounding communities less severely damaged by the waves, 
and other volunteers came to rescue. It was “a massive outpouring of courage 
and humanity” (Jayasuriya et al., 2005). In the hours and days that followed, 
these brave people were able to face unbelievable conditions to ensure that the 
surviving victims were moved to safe places, given food, water, shelter and basic 
medical attention. Thousands of people that had not survived the waves were 
buried or cremated. People in shock and grief were comforted to the best of 
the volunteers’ ability. Despite the confusion and the chaos, “there can be little 
doubt that Sri Lanka can be proud of how it responded to the immediate chal-
lenges of the tsunami impact” (Jayasuriya et al., 2005). 
One day after the Tsunami, the government started the preparation of a profes-
sional, but politically independent organisation, with the mandate of supervising 
all reconstruction activities. The organisation was called Task Force for Rebuilding 
the Nation (TAFREN)1, and worked closely with staff from ILO, FAO and the World 
Bank (Kapadia, 2008) TAFREN’s main focus areas were construction of homes, restor-
ing livelihoods, health and education, and infrastructure (TAFREN, 2005). TAFREN’s 
work was based on certain guiding principles, for instance: subsidiarity, recovery 
should be decentralized as much as possible; consultation with local, affected com-
munities; and communication and transparency at all levels. As we will see later, 
these guiding principles did not function very well in actual practice.
Within a week of the disaster, the first national and international agencies and 
organisations had arrived at the scene and established their structures and systems. 
The relief operation after the Tsunami became one of the largest international relief 
operations ever, involving UN agencies, international and local NGOs, local civic organ-
isations, religious groups, private businesses, etc. The UN Humanitarian Information 
Centre (HIC) for Sri Lanka had in January 2005 listed 890 agencies doing post-tsunami 
operations in the country. In addition to the INGOs already active in Sri Lanka before 
the Tsunami, 500 INGOs arrived in Sri Lanka after the Tsunami, a situation that led to an 
intense competition for projects and beneficiaries (Silva, 2009). Many of these organi-
sations had little or no prior knowledge about Sri Lanka, and the cultures and the soci-
eties within which they were going to work; many of them were quite inexperienced 
in doing relief work at all. 
A high priority was given to the building of transitional settlements and shel-
ters for the people who had lost their homes. It was a rush to implement such set-
tlements without considering the connection to permanent homes and commu-
nities, and quite often this sector was managed by inexperienced and non-trained 
1 TAFREN was replaced with Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) in 2006 after 
M. Rajapakse became the president in 2005.
Arne Olav Øyhus / Chapter 2  27
persons as many of the local and international NGOs had little or no experience 
within this field of relief. An issue that aggravated this situation was that the organ-
izations implementing the settlements scheme had strict timelines to spend the 
funds and therefore had to rush the projects, even if the result was poor quality 
housing (Kennedy et al., 2008). The tendency among the NGOs was to build as 
many settlements and shelters as quickly as possible without considering safety 
and security. Although the policy, for the government, the UN agencies and the 
NGOs was to ‘build back better’, the actual situation was that of ‘build back faster’ 
(Kennedy et al., 2008: 28). While reconstructing the Sri Lankan communities, many 
organisations did not perform an environmental impact analysis; neither did they 
consider long-term urban or rural planning in their settlements projects, implying 
that the vulnerabilities exposed by the Tsunami would just continue also into the 
future (Kennedy et al., 2008). 
What we can safely say, however, is that never before had the world witnessed 
such levels of aid and assistance, and the media coverage from the scenes of the 
disaster was unprecedented. The assistance promised from external donors should 
have been more than enough to cover both the costs of immediate relief and for 
long-term reconstruction. By April 2005, four months after the Tsunami, USD 2.7 
billion was committed by the donors for reconstruction activities in Sri Lanka. This 
represent over USD 7000 per person affected in a country where the median annual 
income per income earner was USD 837 in 2003/2004 (Kapadia, 2008). Conse-
quently, people had high, possibly unrealistic, expectations for assistance and sup-
port when they learned about the international community’s promises of aid and 
support. Even in the midst of sorrow and desperation, these promises made people 
in affected communities quite optimistic for the future. In addition to the assistance 
stemming from the international community, remittances from Sri Lankans work-
ing abroad played an important role, especially when it came to re-building the 
homes (Deshingkar and Aheeyarse, 2006). We must add here that on December 
23rd 2007, the optimism regarding international funding diminished as the Sri Lan-
kan Reconstruction and Develop ment Agency (RADA), in a press release disclosed 
that only USD 1.7 billion had been actually committed (Silva, 2009). When Trans-
parency International Sri Lanka then also claimed that out of the USD 1.7 billion of 
international aid actually disbursed to the implementing agencies, USD 500 million 
could not be accounted for, and was perhaps used by the government for other 
purposes, and that no audit has been conducted by the Audit General Department 
since the Audit Report in 2005, we understand why all parties did not approve of 
all the government’s actual involvements in the post-tsunami recovery efforts. 
As indicated by Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL), the distrust between 
the government and the civil organisations was particularly high (TISL, 2007). This 
distrust did not diminish when after a couple of years both TAFREN and its succes-
sor, RADA, had been closed down (Brusset et al., 2009). Very early in the recovery 
process, the Sri Lanka Civil Society Forum in 2005 stated that reconstruction policies 
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were imposed without any dialogue, and that many decisions were made by TAF-
REN, which did not at all represent the affected communities but represented big 
business interests instead, and which had no professional experience on disasters 
matters (Brusset et al., 2009). 
I think it is vital also to add at this juncture that the Tsunami incorporated a 
gender issue, recognised by the fact that it had a tougher impact on women in 
terms of fatalities and losses. Altogether, the Tsunami killed 40.000 to 45.000 more 
women than men (Telford, 2006, p. 70). A household study performed in the two Sri 
Lankan towns of Batticaloa and Galle showed that the number of dead and missing 
females was significantly higher than the number of dead and missing males. In 
Batticaloa, for instance, females accounted for 56 per cent of the dead and missing, 
whereas males accounted for 44 per cent. This tendency was even more striking in 
Galle were dead and missing females were almost twice as many as men, 65 per 
cent females as against 35 per cent men (Birkmann & Fernando, 2007). The indi-
cator ‘dead and missing by gender’ demonstrates that gender played a significant 
role in the likelihood of death caused by the Tsunami. The reasons for this outcome 
are numerous. Men interviewed in the Batticaloa/Galle study reported that when 
they climbed on to the roof of their houses, their wives or daughters were not 
strong and quick enough to follow. Some studies also propose that women were 
more exposed since many of their activities take place in and around the houses. 
Some also pointed to the fact that women, in general, do not know how to swim 
(Birkmann & Fernando, 2007). In addition to gender, age was an important casualty 
factor. Birkmann & Fernando (2007) records from Batticaloa indicate that it was, 
relatively speaking, elderly people (61 years and older) and young people (0–10 
years) who had the highest number of deaths. Now, returning to the gender factor, 
it is interesting to take notice of the fact that the TEC claim-holder survey in Sri 
Lanka indicated that women were less satisfied than their male counterparts with 
the Tsunami response in all phases, feeling that international agencies did less than 
they should have done to protect women, especially in camps (Telford, 2006: 70).
Conclusion
Natural disasters will continue, and most probably with increased frequency and 
strength. As a natural hazard, the Tsunami was unavoidable, but as a disaster, it 
was not. The good thing is that there is a lot that we can learn from it, in regards to 
pre-disaster mitigation and preparedness, pre-disaster management, and post-dis-
aster recovery and rehabilitation policies and activities. Perhaps the most important 
lesson we can learn is that the Tsunami proved the capacity and engagement of 
local people to take charge when needed. In a disaster management perspective, we 
must do everything to strengthen this capacity and avoid everything that can limit 
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it. In this respect, knowledge, information and training based on concrete experi-
ences will be crucial to ensure what we can call on disaster resilient communities.
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Chapter 3 
Interpreting the natural disasters  




In the study of the Indian Ocean Tsunami (IOT) in 2004 and its effects on local peo-
ple and communities, we will use a range of theories and concepts in our analysis. 
In this chapter, we will present and discuss some of the main theories and concepts 
that we believe will give our analysis a greater strength. Among those concepts 
and theories are social capital, social networks, agency, and bonds and bridges.
The disaster and its social implications
Lessons from the Tsunami tell us that natural disasters can have an extreme, almost 
overwhelming effect on local communities. Disasters of this size and intensity destroy 
the lives and livelihoods of a huge number of individuals, families and villages; they 
damage property and infrastructure, and force the survivors to abandon their homes. 
As they destroy livestock, crops and infrastructure, they cause food scarcity, disrupt 
access to water supplies, social services and business activi ties. They increase health 
risks in local communities due to increased exposures to water-borne pathogens, 
insect-borne infections and snakebites (Few, 2003). The prevalence of infections, for 
instance, is critically worsened by environmental challenges such as blockages to 
drainage channels, poor sanitation systems and dumping of solid waste (Cairncross 
and Ouano, 1990). Simultaneously, demolis hed medical facilities and an increased 
need for health resources can reduce people’s access to necessary treatment and 
medicine (Yahmed and Koob, 1996; Rashid, 2000). It is also very important to recog-
nise the potential mental health impacts of disasters resulting from stress (Durkin et 
al., 1993; McMichael et al. 2001), and the impact of inadequate access to nutrition fol-
lowing disruption to incomes and food distribution systems (Blaikie et al., 1994; IPCC, 
2001). Some such effects may not become manifest until long after a disaster event. 
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Related to the theoretical deliberations above, and to see how we can apply 
them in a Sri Lankan context, it can be useful to see how this disaster, as most other 
disasters at this strength and intensity, usually comprise what we may conceive as 
a sequence of hazards. Analysing the Tsunami, the first, and most abrupt and dra-
matic hazard is represented by the waves themselves, causing immediate deaths 
and injuries to tens of thousands of people. The second hazard is represented by 
the damage to homes, communities, roads, hospitals and other important infra-
structure that people need in their everyday life. The “human effect” of this second-
ary hazard was a large number of homeless people, many of whom were not able 
to take care of themselves because they were tormented by adverse physical and 
mental health issues. The third hazard is represented by the destruction of people’s 
means of livelihood: farms, irrigation systems, fishing boats, hotels, businesses, i.e. 
means people depended on in order to re- establish their livelihoods. The effects of 
this third hazard quite often exacerbate and prolong the effects of the two first haz-
ards, and have an accumulative effect on the community level. It is possible also to 
add a forth, but much less conspicuous hazard, recognised by the post-traumatic 
stress syndrome. A substantial number of people in the Tsunami affected commu-
nities in Sri Lanka are still, after ten years, traumatised by the disaster.
Internationally, up to now, we have experienced that most disaster manage-
ment efforts have been connected to effects of the primary hazards, due – most 
probably – to its spectacular and dramatic features. Results from our study indicate 
that the emergency assistance activities conducted in Sri Lanka did have a reason-
ably good impact regarding both the second and third hazard. 
Vulnerability and poverty 
Disasters are first and foremost a major threat to development, and specifically to the 
development of the poorest and most marginalized people in the world. Disasters seek 
out the poor and ensure they stay poor. (Didier Cheripital, Secretary General of the IFRC, 
in “Breaking the Cycle”, 2011).2
Accepting Cheripital’s point of view, we must admit that disaster vulnerability is 
not only caused by poverty. It is a numbers of natural, economic, political and social 
factors in combination that create a vulnerable situation. However, in many devel-
oping countries, Sri Lanka included, it seems that poverty and vulnerability to envi-
ronmental hazards go hand in hand in the sense that the poor, in general, suffer 
more from hazards than the wealthy or not-so-poor (Chan and Parker 1996: 314). 
At a community level, the poor are likely to occupy environments in which the con-
sequences of natural hazards are more serious. According to Skidmore and Toya 
2 http://www.ourplanet.com/imgversn/113/cherp.html
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(2002), major disasters kill on average 140,000 annually worldwide, and among 
those, about 95 per cent of deaths occur in developing countries (Skidmore and 
Toya, 2002: 666). The connections between hazard, vulnerability and poverty are, 
however, complex. Therefore, we have to admit that if poverty itself has an impact 
on vulnerability, vulnerability to disasters has to be seen not only as a product of 
physical location, but also as a product of social conditions (Few, 2003; Cannon 
2000 and 2008). 
That vulnerability must be understood in a social context has been increas-
ingly recognized in disaster studies for some decades now. Cannon (2000) empha-
size this point strongly as he suggests that it is vital to recognise that vulnerabil-
ity should be treated as a condition that derives from people’s political -economic 
position. Cutter (1996: 534) notes that “explanations of the vulnera bility arise from 
underlying social conditions that often are quite remote from the initiating event 
itself”.
A new paradigm in the study of disaster vulnerability
In a paper from 2008, Terry Cannon presents an analytical approach to the study of 
disasters that in many respects represents a paradigm shift in the understanding of 
people’s vulnerability in disasters. Whereas we may argue that political economics 
is a direction within economics that examines the impact of political forces on eco-
nomic policies, and political ecology is a direction within ecologi cal studies which 
study the impact of political, economic and social factors on the environment and 
environmental issues and policies, Cannon’s approach represents a direction in dis-
aster studies that could be called political disaster studies. Cannon looks at to what 
extent political factors, including economic and social factors, have an impact on 
disasters caused by natural hazards. 
Among disaster researchers, there is a general agreement that disasters are 
caused by vulnerable populations that “gets in the way” of a hazard (Pelling, 1999; 
Adger, 1999; Blaikie et al., 1994). Various economic, political and social factors, in 
most instances poverty, have put these people in a vulnerable situation. Thus, dis-
asters can be triggered by hazards, but must be interpreted as products of pro-
cesses involving those political, economic and social factors. Consequently, disas-
ters are socially constructed, and the value of the concept of disaster vulnerability 
will be less if we remove from our analysis the political and social processes that 
generates people’s vulnerability. It is in this context that Cannon brings in a new 
argument: there are different social constructions of vulnerability in disasters. Can-
non considers vulnerability as a spectrum from weak or innocent to strong social 
constructed vulnerability (Cannon, 2008). 
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When he speaks about a relatively weak or innocent social construction of 
disasters, he is arguing that people who live in disaster-risk exposed places live 
there because it gives them some advantages; for instance access to resources that 
their livelihood depends on. They do not live in those dangerous places because 
political forces or power relations forces them to. Thus, certain disasters affect 
people who have not been forced to live in exposed areas based on exploitative 
relationships. People live under risky conditions for reasons that are socially 
and politically “neutral”, implying that their vulnerability is constructed by 
neutral social factors. In order to explain why people expose themselves to risk 
when they are not forced to, we have to understand the cultural and psycho-
logical factors affecting people’s behaviour: for instance social  values, group 
behaviour and religious beliefs. We must understand these cultural and psycho-
logical factors to learn to differentiate between the insiders’ perspective on risk 
compared to the outsiders more rational and politically oriented perspectives. 
Quite often then, we will find that people live in dangerous places due to the 
advantages it gives for their livelihood to live there. Some people choose to live 
in such places because they want to achieve something. There is, therefore, an 
element of choice involved. 
It is exactly this comprehension that represents a paradigm shift in disaster vul-
nerability studies as it claims that people exposed to risk have certain personal char-
acteristics that increases their probability of being exposed to dangers. In the tra-
ditional vulnerability paradigm, these characteristics – propensity to live in danger 
– were connected to poverty and marginalization. In this respect, social vulnerability 
was to a substantial degree connected to economic, social and political factors, or 
what Cannon (2008) calls strong socially constructed vulnerability. The Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans in 2005 was, according to Cannon (2008), an example of 
such strong socially constructed vulnerability. Social conditions forced people to 
live under dangerous and risky conditions. Cannon feels that it is an analytic dan-
ger of using the concept of vulnerability always in this strong sense as it may lead 
to it losing its analytical strength. It will become too vague and imprecise since in 
many instances there are disasters where people are not vulnerable in such a strong 
socially constructed manner (Cannon, 2008). 
There are many cases where people and communities are vulnerable because 
they have chosen to live in dangerous places because this has supported their 
livelihoods. This was also, to a certain extent, the case with the Tsunami affected 
communities in Sri Lanka. The Tsunami was a relatively innocent disaster in that it 
was not strongly socially constructed. It was not based on typical class or exploit-
ative relationships. Therefore, it is difficult to «blame» particular places, or agents 
and authorities to explain this disaster. People belonging for instance to the fishing 
sector or the beach tourism sector were living in coastal communities because they 
depended on the coast for their livelihood, not because they were forced to by 
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exploitative forces. But then, Cannon adds, even if a disaster is innocent in a social 
perspective, it must not at all be looked upon as natural. An innocent disaster is also 
socially constructed, but in a weak way. People have settled down along the coast 
to seek a livelihood despite knowing that these places can be potentially danger-
ous. The fishing communities, for instance, have for ages experienced storms and 
other calamities that have taken lives and destroyed their boats and gear. 
It is, however, possible to argue that the relief and recovery activities follow-
ing in the wake of the Tsunami can be referred to as strong in its social construc-
tion. Quite a number of people saw the assistance given as unjust and unfair, and 
strongly governed by social, political and economic relationships. Consequently, 
it is difficult to claim that the social construction of vulnerability is entirely neutral 
or strong since a great number of social, climatic and cultural factors will have an 
impact on vulnerability. If we, however, think about vulnerability as spectrum, the 
Tsunami will be situated at the innocent (weak) end, while the Hurricane Katarina 
will be situated at the strong end (Cannon, 2008). 
Cannon’s objective with his analysis is to develop a better framework for ana-
lysing the social factors behind disasters. An improved analytical framework can be 
a tool which will make it easier for us to understand what takes place under certain 
disasters, and therefore also to plan what to do to strengthen the vulnerable com-
munities. According to Cannon, what we need are two types of policies that can 
reduce vulnerability: top-down policies and bottom-up poli cies. The first should 
be targeted on the reduction of the political and economic system’s function on 
different groups and their level of vulnerability, i.e. the «strong» constructed vul-
nerability generated by the power system. Policies must be developed which can 
hinder the power system to force people into a vulnerable position. 
The second type of policies concern people’s own organisation. We must 
understand how people think and act, and how the distribution of resources can 
explain why people live in exposed places. We must understand people’s values and 
choices. Since, however, also these «innocent» disasters are socially constructed we 
have to take into consideration the cultural and psychological factors because it will 
be among them that we will find the reasons why people make different priorities. 
To understand group behaviour, why people do what they do, their values and pri-
orities is of fundamental importance in understanding how vulnerability is socially 
constructed and how it can be reduced ( Cannon, 2008). 
Community coping capacity 
One of the main concerns in the “Ten Years After” study was exactly to understand 
how cultural and psychological factors have an impact on the beliefs and behav-
iour among people living in disaster prone areas. One way of approaching this 
concern was to look at what we may call people’s capacities, both at an individ-
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ual and community level. Our study of local communities in Sri Lanka has given 
us good examples on the importance of community capacities when faced with 
disasters. What seems to be an important lesson is that a community’s capacity 
to cope with the impact of a disaster and recover from it depends to a substan-
tial degree on the community’s level of social cohesion and organisation, and its 
perception of disasters (Maskrey, 1999; Misanya and Øyhus, 2015). We may argue 
that the capacity to cope with disasters is the key component of a household, or 
a community’s, level of vulnerability. This must be brought into the picture, for 
instance, regarding disaster risk reduction measures. It is fundamental to identify 
the capacities that exist within societies when designing disaster-related interven-
tions that can lower a society’s vulnerability to disasters (Anderson and Woodrow, 
1998). In this regard, Pelling (1999: 250) identifies what he sees as the three com-
ponents of vulnerability: exposure, resilience and resistance. Whereas exposure 
refers to the risk of a disaster event, resistance and resilience refer to the human 
capacity to minimize the impacts of that event’s impact through some form of 
adaptation. Following Pelling’s arguments, exposure, resilience and resistance are 
components that are simultaneously the products of political and socio-economic 
structures and the capacity of individual actors and social institutions to adapt to 
hazard stress (Pelling, 1999: 250). Adaptation is a key concept here, and house-
holds and communities bring various resources to use in their adaptation to envi-
ronmental hazards and disasters. 
In a Sri Lankan context, the risk of a disaster with the strength and intensity of the 
Tsunami was not foreseen by either the local communities or the national authorities 
as they had not experienced even something similar to this disaster since time imme-
morial. Therefore, the exposure component of vulnerability to such a disaster was not 
in the mind of the population. The resilience component was very much activated, 
and proved that the population, utilizing both bonds and bridges, were able to recu-
perate their livelihoods and community structures within a limited time span. To what 
degree their experiences, the re-established structures, and the availability of new 
resources and measures will enhance their capacity to adapt, and hence minimize the 
impacts of future disasters, remains to be seen. 
The household livelihood approach
One approach for “measuring” the possibility for people to cope with disasters 
is to take the households’ livelihood as a point of departure. In disaster research, 
the household livelihood approach concerns the households’ assets and coping 
strategies. In this framework, Carney (1998) and Sanderson (2000) suggest that 
material and immaterial assets mediate the ability of households to pursue live-
lihood strategies designed to cope with ‘shock’ events (cited in Few, 2003: 53). 
Consequently, intervention efforts designed to build up the assets of the poor to 
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withstand shocks will be increasingly important in reducing the human burden 
from disasters (Sanderson, 2000). To create robust communities, there should be 
support for actions at the local level designed to strengthen the communities’ own 
resistance and resilience to hazards. This support is particularly important in situa-
tions where the management capacity of governmental institutions is weak (Chan, 
1997). Regarding the latter argument, I think there is no question that this was the 
actual situation in Sri Lanka when the Tsunami occurred. 
There seem to be a strong international consensus today that only by har-
nessing the huge and largely untapped potential of vulnerable households and 
communities to manage and reduce risks at the local level, and by providing 
appropriate support to such efforts, will it be possible to look forward to a 
more sustainable future (Maskrey, 1999: 86). In the prolongation of this argu-
ment, we may refer to the second among the three Strategic Goals in the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA) which states the importance of : “The develop-
ment and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities at all levels, 
in particular at the community level, that can systematically contribute to build-
ing resilience to hazards” (UNISDR, 2005: 4). This issue is also raised under 
HFA’s “General Considerations” arguing that “ Both communities and local 
authorities should be empowered to manage and reduce disaster risk by hav-
ing access to the necessary information, resources and authority to implement 
actions for disaster risk reduction (UNISDR, 2005: 5). 
In international disaster research and practice, it is increasingly accepted that 
people do not simply draw on their assets, but possess sophisticated skills in man-
aging them to cope with adversity and take advantage of opportunities. “There 
is a growing recognition that the poor are strategic managers of complex asset 
portfolios” (Moser, 1998: 5). 
Social capital and agency:  
The importance of bonds and bridges in disaster management
In the discourse on sustainable development, the concepts of social capital and 
agency have been important for many years (see for example: Collier, 1998; Evans, 
1996; Harvey 2002; Newman & Dale, 2005). These concepts can also be very usefully 
applied in the study of disaster management. To understand, for instance, the crucial 
role played by local people and local communities during the disaster caused by 
the Tsunami, but also the strength and the weaknesses of the relief and recovery 
activities after the Tsunami, the concepts of social capital and agency give a good 
theoretical insight into interpreting what actually took place. These concepts will 
be treated in more detail later in the chapter, but for the time being we may say 
that social capital is made up of social obligations and resources found in individual 
networks, and that this capital is dependent on the individual’s membership in a 
38 Recovering from a disaster
group. The bigger the network, the more resources will be involved, and thus also 
the greater the size of the capital. The concept of bonds are used to describe rela-
tionships, or ties, within local networks (micro level networks), whereas bridges are 
used to describe relationships, or ties, connecting the local networks into a more 
large-scale network (macro-level network). 
Pierre Bordieu is perhaps the most influential author utilizing social capital in 
his analysis of the functioning of societies. Basically, he looks upon capital as accu-
mulated labour, and he refers to social capital as one among three forms of capital: 
economic, cultural and social. Economic capital, which is immediately and directly 
convertible to money (and to property rights); cultural capital which is, under cer-
tain conditions, convertible to economic capital; and social capital, which is made 
up of social obligations or ‘connections’, and which is also under certain conditions 
convertible into economic capital (Bordieu, 1986). When it comes to the linkages 
between social capital and networks, Bordieu argues that social capital is a per-
son’s aggregate of resources linked to his network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships. Social capital is dependent on a person’s membership within a group 
that supports each of its members with the backing of the group’s collectively 
owned capital. This capital exchanged between members can be both material and 
symbolic. The volume of a person’s social capital depends fundamentally on the 
size of the network of connections he can mobilize, and on the volume of capital 
(economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed by each of those persons to whom he 
is connected (Bordieu, 1986)
Although Bordieu has a rather individualistic approach to social capital, it is pos-
sible to utilize his theories on a societal level by viewing a society as an aggregate of 
individuals. The concept of social capital, in this respect, incorporates a group or soci-
ety’s material and immaterial resources of importance for social improvements and 
economic growth, resources that again can, for instance, be used for disaster man-
agement purposes. Quite possibly as an inheri tance from Bordieu, social capital has 
become to refer to a network of local relationships, norms, values and institutions 
that bind the society together, or as argued by Narayan, “the glue that holds groups 
and societies together” (1999: 1). What differentiates social capital from other forms 
of capital (human, economic, natural) is that social capital is relational, i.e. social cap-
ital can only exist and grow among humans sharing a common structure and acting 
in a network of relationships. 
Bordieu has a rather positive view on social capital, it creates advantages for 
individuals to belong to networks and have access to the social capital embedded 
in the members of the network. Although most of us may intuitively have a posi-
tive image of social capital, i.e. that its utilization will have positive outcomes for the 
society or group, this is according to some authors not always the case (Grano vetter, 
1973; Portes, 1998; Newman and Dale, 2005). Portes (1998) argues that social capital 
may have clear negative outcomes because the ties that bind some people together 
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exclude others. Social networks can restrict access to opportunities; they can restrict 
individual freedom. Here, we may add that for Amartya Sen, restriction on individual 
freedom is a most serious concern as freedom is agency, i.e. freedom is both the pri-
mary and principal means for development (Sen, 2001). 
Returning to Portes’ (1998) more negative view on social capital, his argument 
is taken rather directly from an influential paper published by Mark Grano vetter 
(Granovetter, 1973). According to the exposition in this paper, it was a fundamental 
weakness in sociological theory that it was not able to link interactions at the micro-
level with patterns and structures at the macro-level. Granovetter’s intention with 
his paper was to bridge the micro and macro level in sociological theory, and here 
he took the analysis of interpersonal ties as a point of departure. His argument was 
that the analysis of processes in interpersonal networks would provide the most 
important bridge between micro and macro. Models of interpersonal networks did 
already exist in sociological theories, but they had an inherent weakness due to the 
fact, that most of them dealt only with small, well-defined groups, and the so-called 
“strong” interpersonal ties characterizing these groups. Much less emphasis was 
given to the so-called weak ties characterizing the relationship between groups. 
It is, however, exactly these latter relationships which, according to Granovetter, 
link micro and macro, that are of crucial importance in understanding the diffusion 
of social innovations and, consequently, social development (Granovetter, 1973). 
Obviously, studies of small groups may give us a good insight into what takes place 
at the micro-level, but they cannot give us a proper understanding on how interac-
tion in small groups aggregates into, and generates large-scale phenomena such 
as, for instance, social mobility, political organization, and social cohesion (Grano-
vetter, 1973). These weak ties are of particular importance because they function as 
bridges connecting the strong, local ties into a more holistic large-scale network. 
Why the concept of a bridge? An individual usually has many contact persons 
within his or her local network, but when they interact, they interact on the same 
level of communication. They more or less share the same information. Nothing 
new is brought into the network, or as claimed by Granovetter: “Bridges will not be 
crossed” (1973: 1366). If, however, one person in the local network establishes a con-
tact with one person from another person’s network, information or influence can 
flow between the groups. This can function as a diffusion process between the local 
networks. In a development process when new thoughts, ideas and technologies 
are diffused, the consequence is that whatever it is to be diffused can reach a larger 
number of people and travel at greater social distances when going through weak 
rather than strong ties (Granovetter, 1973: 1366). 
In a disaster perspective, persons with contacts only in local networks will quite 
possibly have limited knowledge and means on how to implement disaster risk, 
reduction measures, how to tackle the three sequential hazards described above 
and how to relate to outside groups both horizontally and vertically. When bridges 
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are constructed, both knowledge, technology and other means can more easily be 
brought into and being by the local communities. 
Granovetter concludes by arguing that micro-macro linkages may generate 
a paradox: While weak ties are indispensable to individuals’ opportunities and to 
their integration into the greater society, as they link members from different small 
groups together, strong ties, due to their importance for local cohesion, tend to be 
concentrated within particular groups and may therefore lead to overall fragmen-
tation on the macro-level (Granovetter, 1973). 
Following in the footsteps of Granovetter, several authors (for example; 
Nayaran, 1999; Newman & Dale, 2005) have used the concept of bonds to describe 
the interpersonal ties on the micro level, and bridges to describe the cross-commu-
nity ties at the macro level. 
We saw earlier that Portes (1998) followed Granovetter in his negative attitude 
to bonds. Also Nayaran is very much of the same opinion, claiming that the impor-
tant bonds within a social group may restrict them from building relationships, or 
bridges, either horizontally to other social groups, or vertically to national or inter-
national authorities and agencies. These bridges, or cross- cutting ties, are essential 
in accessing information, resources and power (Nayaran, 1999). An effect of social 
capital, in the form of social network ties, can be exclusion since ties that bind also 
exclude. In addition, a lack of overlapping networks, or cross-cutting ties, among 
groups may result in unequal opportunities to take part in development activities 
(Narayan, 1999).
A cross-cutting category of ties of particular importance is the relationship 
between the local community and the state. According to O’Donnell, (1993), states 
have a multiplex relationship with their societies. The State is an apparatus, but also 
a set of relations to the societies within a given territory. Perhaps the State’s most 
important task is to contribute to the most important public good, social predict-
ability, law and order. 
In Sri Lanka, we found that the ties between the State and the local communi-
ties both in the immediate period after the Tsunami, and in the years that followed, 
were not very efficient. It was a general sentiment that in Sri Lanka the relief and 
recovery activities reinforced and strengthened central authority at the expense of 
local authorities and organisations. While the donors often wanted to engage the 
local communities, for instance Municipality Councils, to deliver services, this was 
not accepted by the central government. Local government authorities were not 
endowed with adequate capacity and authority (Brusset et al., 2009). This is why we 
may argue that the relationships between the central government and local com-
munities did not function very well as bridges. It was what we could call a lack of 
synergy between these actors. We must at this juncture add that based both on 
our study, and also on others, the people did not have a high trust in local gov-
ernment authorities. According to Brusset et al. (2007), less that 5 percent of the 
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Tsunami affected people expressed trust in the local government, far less than the 
central government. In a ten years perspective, we do however experience that an 
increasing synergy between the State and the local communities has developed, 
new bridges have been built. In the period after the first shock, it was, however, the 
bridges between international voluntary organisations and local communities that 
were of greatest importance. 
Newman and Dale (2005) in line with Granovetter, question the importance of 
social capital for sustainable development at a community level since social capital 
can constrain development efforts. They make a division between two forms of social 
capital that is, to a large extent, connected to the “bonds and bridges” approach. 
Bonding social capital comprises the strong network ties that may include social 
norms, and that can have a constraining effect on innovative (positive) changes: 
bridging social capital composed of weak network ties allowing actors to engage in 
social change processes. It is, according to the authors, possible to define social cap-
ital as the combination of bonding and bridging ties found in a network of actors. 
Although Putnam’s definition of social capital does not include bonding and bridg-
ing ties, it resembles Newman and Dale’s definition when he defines social capital 
as “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them” (Putnam, 2000: 20). 
Newman and Dale, are very close to Bordieu (1986) when they argue that there 
is a close relationship between networks and social capital, even to the degree that 
networks are referred to as social capital, and consequently, that an increase in the 
size and density of a network is an increase in the amount of social capital. It will 
have a positive outcome for a community’s development if there is an increase in 
networks among its members (Newman and Dale, 2005: 478). According to New-
man and Dale, the two forms of social capital will have different effects within a 
network. Whereas bonding social capital is needed to bring people together, it can 
also function as a break in innovation by preventing actors from receiving impor-
tant information, for instance by enforcing social norms that function as obstacles, 
or by rejecting the acceptance of outsiders. On the positive side, bonding capital 
leads to reciprocity and trust that are important ingredients for social relationship 
to function. As we can see, bonding social capital can therefore play a role that is 
both a contribution and a constraint to community development. 
Also bridging social capital can play both a positive and negative role in 
development. On the positive side, it can supply actors with new information and 
knowledge, and help the actors overcome social norms constraining their activ-
ities. On the negative side, bridging capital can overrule local norms and values, 
and make initiatives and efforts that may have a negative, although unforeseen, 
effect on local community development. The history of aid is full of examples 
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where strong outside forces have had a negative effect on local develop ment. 
Reading reports from the Tsunami, we will also find many examples of the same.3 
Then, to enhance the strength of the social capital concept, Newman and Dale 
make an analytical twist by introducing the concept of agency; a concept focusing 
on the possibility for individuals or groups to actively engage in develop ment activ-
ities by increasing their access to critical resources. Being particularly interested in 
local community development, the authors argue that communities can achieve 
agency by efficiently utilizing “a dynamic mix of bonding and bridging ties”, and 
where agency is an indicator on how a community is able to respond and identify 
solutions to development challenges (Newman and Dale, 2005: 477/481). There is 
a close connection between social capital and social agency in the sense that social 
capital is dependent on agency. Agency is actually the force behind social action 
performed by actors within the social network. The authors refer to Krishna (2001) 
who argues that social capital as the potential; agency activates it (Newman and 
Dale, 2005: 481). 
Returning to the bonding and bridging ties, the authors write that lessons from 
development research imply that agency can be stimulated by a mix of bonding 
and bridging ties; for instance, by diffusing new information and knowledge, and 
by establishing new horizontal and vertical connections between groups. What the 
authors do not discuss, however, is to what degree the role and value of bonding 
and bridging ties are dependent on the context, or the actual situation. From my 
own working experience in remote and fragile areas of Africa, I have observed rather 
directly how people in such marginal and isolated areas are very much dependent 
on each other both in their daily lives, and in a long-term perspective. A sustainable 
livelihood, although at a low material level, can only be secured by bonding ties. 
Poor and marginal people’s tendency for risk avoidance is often related to the fact 
that the bridging social capital is not as safe and secure as bonding social capital. 
When hunger and famine is a more or less permanent threat, you rely on the inter-
personal ties of close, local networks. Under such circumstances, it is quite often 
not at all an option to invest your resources in bridging ties as they are a too weak, 
unreliable, or even absent. In these situations, bonding ties are often a matter of life 
and death. 
The relative importance of bonding and bridges can shift, sometimes rather 
abruptly, due, for instance, to a crisis, natural or social. My experience is that bond-
ing ties will usually be the most important in the first phase of a crisis, as a first aid 
arrangement. Agency – the power to act (or react) – will be enacted by those in the 
immediate surroundings. After a while, the bridging ties may increase in importance 
as the local community becomes bridgeable, and/or the local agency is exhausted 
by lack of resources or fatigue. Then, we may have instances when the bridging 
3 See e.g. the Telford et al., 2006.
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ties take on an overarching role, overruling the bonding ties, and taking on func-
tions that they do not have the knowledge, authority or  capacity to fill. The worst 
situations are when the bonding ties are broken, even to the extent that there is 
almost nothing that the bridging ties can be connected to, where the bridges have 
difficulties finding functional anchoring point(s) “on the other side”. This can be the 
situation during intense crises caused by hot, violent conflicts (e.g. the Rwanda gen-
ocide of 1994), or by natural disasters completely destroying social structures (e.g. 
the Haiti earthquake of 2010). 
The concepts of bonds and bridges can, according to my opinion, be impor-
tant analytical tools when studying the disaster management activities in connec-
tion with the Tsunami, in particular the relief and emergency activities following 
directly in the wake of the waves. The empirical findings from our study, and what 
we have learnt from several reports on the Tsunami, prove the value of the bonds, 
especially in the few minutes, hours and days after the waves struck the commu-
nities along the Sri Lankan coast. We are in no doubt that the interpersonal ties at 
the local level, the bonds, saved the communities for a much greater trauma. What 
we may call horizontal bridges between neighbouring communities were also of 
invaluable importance in the direct aftermath of the disaster. Here we should add 
that such horizontal bridges between neighbouring communities have character-
istics that are very close to what we would call bonds, as the interpersonal ties 
between individuals from neighbouring communities are often very close. The 
vertical bridges to external agencies and authorities, for instance in the form of 
emergency aid, were not really crossed until several days after the event took place, 
when the aid started to pour into the local communities. But a problem emerged 
when these bridges started to function, since they sometimes inhibited the effi-
ciency and strength of the existing bonds, perhaps to the extent that the recovery 
process was hampered by the weakening of the local structures. We may say that 
the bridges in certain instances made the bonds more or less irrelevant, as they 
were disregarded. 
There are some shortcomings regarding how the concepts of bonds and 
bridges have been used by various authors, for instance both Newman and Dale 
(2005) and Nayaran (1999), namely where to draw the line? Where do the bonding 
ties end and the bridging ties start? Even within small, local communities there can 
be some ties that have a more bridging character, for instance the tie to the local 
owner of the fishing vessel, the local shop owner, or the local head of police. It is 
sometime possible to observe that some people, perhaps based on their status 
and position, are marginal in the local, social network. On the other hand, some 
interpersonal ties with a bridging character can function as bonding ties. Several 
hoteliers with their hotels demolished by the Tsunami told us that some custom-
ers that had stayed at their hotels regularly did whatever they could to help them 
when disaster struck, both with practical work and money. 
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Disasters and the role of governance
In much literature on disaster and disaster management, the role of governance is 
a core issue. As will be seen later in this report, the role of the governance system 
in Sri Lanka was heavily criticised by many of the victims of the Tsunami. For the 
purpose of this study we might add that Sri Lanka has been described as having a 
particularly centralized, bureaucratic and non-effective governance structure (see 
e.g. Asian Development Bank, 2011). 
 Ahrens and Rudolph (2006) emphasize the relationship between under-
development and the susceptibility to disasters, arguing that only if the gover-
nance structure of a country makes it possible to implement and enforce policies 
that are conductive to socio-economic development can sustainable livelihoods 
and reduced risk of disasters be achieved. They identify what they consider to 
be the four most essential features of a governance structure: (1) accountabil-
ity, i.e. that politicians and bureaucrats both at the national and local level are 
held accountable for their actions; (2) participation, i.e. secure the participa-
tion of individuals, groups and organisations, the civil society, in the policy 
making, planning and implementation processes; (3) predictability, i.e. ensure 
that a rule based system binding both public and private actors exists; and 
(4)  transparency. Transparency is needed for several reasons, e.g. to hold pol-
icy makers accountable, to prevent corruption, and to secure the information 
flow between actors to facilitate the coordination of both development and dis-
aster efforts. The two authors pay particular importance on decentralisation 
of administrative power and stronger community participation as features for 
securing a functioning governance structure (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006). In 
this regard, Sri Lanka is not a good example. As argued by Shelton Wanasinghe: 
“The country’s citizenry at the level of their local communities remain divorced 
from the processes of governance. This has over the post-Independence decades 
contributed, in no small measure, to the absence of transparency and accounta-
bility in governance” (Wanasinghe, 1999). 
Albeit appreciating Ahrens and Rudolph’s analysis, their description of the core 
issue, the governance structure, is a little difficult to utilize in practical research. 
Leaning heavily on Douglas North (1995) and his institutional economic approach, 
they define the governance structure to be the institutional matrix where indi-
vidual actors, firms, social groups, civic organisations and policy makers interact. 
When they argue that susceptibility to disaster can be interpreted as a result of fail-
ing institutions, and that institution building with the aim of improving the quality 
of governance is important for disaster risk reduction, it is difficult to discern where 
to start, and what will be the most important point to attack in the governance 
structure as each and any actor in the society is a part of this structure. Perhaps it 
would be easier to study disaster management and risk reduction measures if we 
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here distinguish between the various categories of actors, the actual public system 
(government structure and administrative apparatus), firms, and the civic society 
(organisations and formal and informal social groups)?
Disasters and economic development
It may seem obvious that major natural disasters must have an adverse effect 
on economic development, but we have to ask, what are the actual short and 
long-term effects of great disasters on economic and social development? Quite 
interestingly, some economists raising this issue are questioning the opinion that 
natural disasters necessarily have a negative impact on economic growth, even 
arguing that disasters can have a positive economic impact (see e.g. Benson and 
Clay, 2005). Their argument is that the eventual net macro-economic impact 
of some disasters triggers a construction-led boom, very much in line with a 
Schumpeterian process of creative destruction (Benson and Clay, 2005: 3). 
Along this line of thought, Mark Skidmore and Hideki Toya (2002) use 
empirical findings from a great number of studies to investigate the relationship 
between disasters and long-term economic growth. Using regression analysis 
based on a great sample of disasters occurring in the period from 1960-1990, 
they use statistics to present a number of interesting results. Perhaps the most 
spectacular finding is that it is “a robust correlation between disasters and long-
run economic growth” (Skidmore and Toya, 2002: 674). Discussing this find-
ing, they believe that as disaster prone areas most likely use resources for disas-
ter management, a higher level of investment is expected. In addition, there is 
usually a rebuilding process in the direct aftermath of a disaster increasing the 
investment of physical capital (e.g. land, fishing equipment, houses and infra-
structure). Not only that but natural disasters may also have a positive effect 
on long-term economic growth since disasters may trigger the adoption of new 
technologies. Disasters provide opportunities to modernize the stock of capital 
and adopt new technologies. Besides this, there can be cultural or psychological 
reasons for adopting new technologies more readily when living under disaster 
risk since this may instigate people to utilize technologies that will reduce disas-
ter risk. According to Skidmore and Toya (2002), there is, however, an impor-
tant nuance to the conclusion that natural disasters play an important role in 
macro-economic development: whereas climatic disasters (e.g. floods and hur-
ricanes) are positively correlated with economic growth, geologic disasters (e.g. 
earthquakes and volcano eruptions) are not (Skidmore and Toya, 2002: 671). 
The authors infer that the positive relationship between climatic disasters and 
growth is led by improvements in technology and investments in human capital, 
inducing a higher GDP growth rate. On the other hand, geologic disasters more 
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often result in a greater loss of human life, i.e. a destruction of human capital, 
combined with a destruction of physical capital, resulting in a negative rela-
tionship between geologic disasters and economic growth (Skidmore and Toya, 
2002). When the authors argue that GDP, in general, increases in the period 
directly following a natural disaster that damages physical capital and goods, 
they explain this by reminding us that a country’s stock of capital is not meas-
ured in GDP, but that replacing the stock of capital after a disaster is measured 
in GDP. This implies that the damage of physical capital is neutral to the GDP, 
whereas replacing it is positive to GDP.
The connection between disasters and  
economic development, the case of Sri Lanka
What connection can we conceive between the Tsunami, a typical geologic disaster, 
and economic development in Sri Lanka? Several reports point to the fact that the Tsu-
nami actually had a significant positive effect, not because it was a geologic disaster, 
but mainly because of the impact of international assistance. The Tsunami occurred 
at a time when there was a deterioration of the Sri Lanka macro -economic environ-
ment. The GDP growth was slowing down, inflation pressure was high, external cur-
rent account deficits were growing, and the currency was depreciating. In this context, 
the Tsunami assistance brought a greater degree of stability to an economy that had 
been struggling for a long time with macroeconomic imbalances (Weerakoon et al., 
2007). Not only for Sri Lanka, but also for several of the Tsunami affected countries 
receiving international aid, the promised assistance was more than enough to cover 
the full cost of both immediate relief measures and mid- to long-term reconstruction 
activities. In actual fact, the inflow of foreign capital made it possible for Sri Lanka to 
avoid an imminent currency crisis. For the period 2005-2006, expenditures for relief 
and reconstruction activities meant an annual average GDP growth of 6.7 per cent 
(Weerakoon et al. 2007: 1).
Jayasuriya et al. (2005) present an interesting study arguing that recon-
struction spending in Sri Lanka after the Tsunami produced a particular type of 
‘Dutch Disease’, spending with construction costs increasing between 40-60 per 
cent (Jayasuriya et al., 2005: 2). The external assistance “produced, for a while, an 
almost euphoric national mood” (Jayasuriya et al., 2005: 6). The government of Sri 
Lanka (GOSL) reported that the emergency relief given to Sri Lanka represented an 
unprecedented outpouring of private and institutional generosity to the affected 
people, meeting their immediate needs.4 According to an assessment made in late 
January 2005 by the Asian Development Bank (AdB), the Japan Bank for Interna-
4 http://www.erd.gov.lk/devforum/Executive%20summary%20final.htm (accessed 16 Sep-
tember 2015)
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tional Cooperation (JIBC), and the World Bank (WB), Sri Lanka had suffered dam-
ages on assets at around USD 1 billion (4.5 per cent of GDP), and that the medi-
um-term financial needs (including relief) was around USD 1.5-1.6 billion (7.5 per 
cent of GDP). The GOSL’s own estimate from May 2005 was that the total invest-
ment needs, including relief, was USD 2 billion (Jayasuriya et al., 2005: 13). Sri Lan-
ka’s request for assistance met a very positive response at the first meeting in the 
Sri Lanka Development Forum with international donors, multilateral, bilateral and 
private, in May Sri Lanka 2005. A total of USD 2.2 billion was pledged over the next 
couple of years, covering both relief and reconstruction activities. This amount was 
even more than GOSL had asked for (Jayasuriya et al., 2005: 16). Therefore, it seems 
fair that we draw the conclusion that the disaster triggered an economic boom in 
Sri Lanka through the heavy funding activities from the international donor com-
munity. As we will see in the empirical part of this report, many communities expe-
rienced what they conceived as an economic boost, stemming mainly from the 
international assistance received after the Tsunami. 
A new disaster research agenda
An international shift has occurred in disaster management studies where the analyt-
ical focus has shifted from assessing the impacts of disasters to assessing responses 
to disasters, including understanding better how people make decisions about the 
risks they face. It has been widely accepted that both the international research com-
munity and the agencies engaged in development interventions have to get a better 
understanding of the means to strengthen resistance and/or resili ence of the poor 
against the impacts of environmental hazards. An increased understanding of local 
adaptation and coping strategies is “one of the most important research issues within 
the area of global environmental change” (Adger, 1999: 250). Twigg et al. (2000) 
express a need for more case studies of disaster mitigation and disaster preparedness 
projects, but also of disaster-related components of broader projects. Bhatt (1999) 
calls for further development of tools and information sharing for vulnerability reduc-
tion, citing the successes of existing regional networks in South Asia and Latin Amer-
ica. A key means to enhance community capacity to reduce vulnerability to disasters 
is to foster South-South and North-South exchange of information and experience 
between communities. 
Further theoretical and applied research is important in order to understand 
the nature of impacts, people’s perceptions of the risks, their responses and the 
means to strengthen their coping capacity to deal with disasters. We must ask 
questions like: “What resources and assets do people draw on to cope with dis-
asters? What is the role of social capital and under what conditions is it effective? 
What forms of community-based action are likely to be effective? Which coping 
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mechanisms function, and which fail? Which indigenous capacities, for instance, 
knowledge or structures/organizations are effective, and which are not effective? 
What is the difference between disaster hazards happening in rural and urban 
areas? Do differences in urban and rural contexts have an impact on vulnerability 
patterns and coping strategies?”
The leading idea behind this theoretical approach to the research on vulnera-
bility, risk and coping strategies is that there is a need to put greater attention on 
building policies and interventions on the evidence-base of household and local 
communities (Few, 2003). We strongly believe that our study corresponds to this 
approach.
Linking emergencies and development
Simultaneously, there has been a shift of attention in the international aid com-
munity. Up to quite recently there has been a strong tendency to separate disaster 
management operations from conventional development work. In the last decade 
or so, a new consensus has developed among multilateral organi sations, national 
governments and NGOs clearly expressing the importance to see risk reduction 
and sustainable development as part of the same process (Lewis, 1999; Winches-
ter, 2000; IFRC, 2001; UNISDR, 2005). There is today a rather clear vision that, for 
instance, poverty eradication policies can go far towards disaster risk reduction 
because they raise people’s capacity for reco very. Therefore, actions to counter 
vulnerability to hazards should work hand in hand with action to reduce poverty 
and promote sustainability (Chan and Parker, 1996).
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Hambantota Case Studies 
Chapter 4 
Introducing the case studies
Arne Olav Øyhus
Introduction
Ten years after the Tsunami the research partners at the University of Agder (UIA) 
and University of Ruhuna (UR) felt that more knowledge was needed in order to 
understand the situation and condition among the Tsunami affected people and 
communities in a longer-term perspective. We would like to know more about 
what local people had done to overcome the effects of the disaster, what type of 
assistance they had received, which type of assistance functioned and which did 
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not, how they look upon their future of disaster risk situation, what means and 
measures had been installed to mitigate future disaster, and so on. The Tsunami 
was by all means an extremely harmful event, but it is possible to draw some “pos-
itive” effects from it if we are able to learn what people did to survive and recover 
it, how they utilized social capital in the form of internal networks (“bonds“), indig-
enous knowledge and other local resources both in the emergency situation, and 
also for reconstruction. In addition to understanding the role played by local com-
munity structures and resources, we wanted to understand the role played by out-
side agencies, governmental or non-governmental, in a successful, or not so suc-
cessful, recovery process. In this regard, it is an interesting fact that quite regularly 
we learned that Western experts on disasters did not recognise, or perhaps accept, 
that the local people quite often played the most important part in the post-disas-
ter emergency situation. This might be because of the experts’ “ethnocentric” per-
ceptions, but can also be explained by the fact that local people have “invisible” 
knowledge, institutions and structures that are put into action when there is a des-
perate need. We are talking here about the aspect of social agency.
Ten years after the disaster, we may expect that the situation has stabilised, 
and that most recovery activities have been terminated. The time was therefore 
ripe to learn the key lessons from the Tsunami recovery process, and what could 
be abstracted from it so that Sri Lanka could be better prepared to deal with future 
disasters of this magnitude. 
To gain an understanding of the ten year’s long recovery and reconstruction 
process, and how it has led up to the present situation among disaster affected 
communities, an international group of post-graduate students from the master 
programme in Development Management at the UIA conducted a social study 
in the form of field work in the Hambantota District, Southern Province of Sri 
Lanka, in May/June 2014. Social analysis is a valuable instrument to under-
stand both the role of the social fabric in such recovery process, and visa versa, 
the impact of the recovery process on the social fabric. The research method 
used was based on a qualitative approach where data and information was col-
lected through individual interviews and focus group discussions. Hambantota, 
in this regard, was an “ideal” case as it was one of the most severely affected 
districts in Sri Lanka.
The students prepared and conducted four different studies in Hambantota 
District, presented in the four next chapters. The first is called: An Act of God? 
A study of the Tsunami recovery process in the Hambantota fishing commu-
nity. The Hambantota fishermen represent, perhaps, the poorest segment of the 
Hambantota community. Being Muslim, they can also be considered a minority 
population in the district. The purpose of this case study was to reveal how the 
Tsunami affected the fishing community, to what extent the local fishing com-
munity has benefited from aid provided by both national and international aid 
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agencies, how the recovery process has been experienced by people, and what 
their main challenges are today.
The next chapter is titled: The Golden Wave? The impact of the Tsunami 
recovery process in the Kirinda Community, Hambantota District. Kirinda is a 
predominantly Muslim community with a substantial Buddhist minority popu-
lation. Much of the infrastructure, residential areas, commercial and transpor-
tation sector, fisheries, tourism industry, and other businesses located in Kirinda 
were heavily affected by the Tsunami. The village was to a large extent demo-
lished by the waves, but today roads, schools, medical facilities, etc. have been 
rebuilt, to the degree that some people in the village even call the Tsunami’ the 
Golden Wave’.
The third chapter, Bonds and Bridges: The Case of the Tourist Industry in 
Tangalle, Hambantota District is based on fieldwork conducted mainly among 
the hoteliers in the town of Tangalle, the main beach tourism area in Hambantota 
district. The main objective of the study was to analyse the ten years reco very 
process of the tourism sector in Tangalle and identify obstacles that the sector 
has experienced. Quite interestingly, the end of the civil war in 2009 had a much 
more positive outcome on the tourism sector than the five first years of recovery 
after the Tsunami, indicating that tourists fear war more than natural disasters.
Chapter four, the last in this study, is called: Back to business: The Case 
of Hambantota Businesspeople ten years later after the Tsunami. This study, 
focusing on the business community in Hambantota town, describes several 
interesting findings from the ten years of recovery for the business community 
of Hambantota, for instance that the government sponsored mega projects (the 
seaport, the airport, roads, etc.) have had more negative impacts on the business 
community than the Tsunami, and that the lack of investment capital has been 
a continuous challenge throughout the whole recovery process. On the positive 
side, the study shows the positive roles played by NGOs and the civil society in 
getting people back in business. 
It is hoped that the result from these four case studies can be valuable not 
only in understanding the recovery and reconstruction process after the Tsu-
nami, but also in a more general sense. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, IPCC, argues that there are good reasons to believe that the level of 
natural calamities will increase both in a short and medium time perspective, 
mainly due to environmental factors such as deforestation, global warming, 
human encroachment into vulnerable areas, etc. It is a sad fact that both the 
natural and the man-made disasters have the worst effects on the poor people 
in the poor regions of the world (Haughton et al, 2001). Therefore, the lessons 
from the Tsunami recovery can be valuable in order to both prepare societies 
for future disasters by improved disaster risk, reduction strategies, but also to 
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see how recovery activities could be managed more efficiently, for instance by a 
closer collaboration between local communities and outside agencies. 
Research is cumulative. By performing this post-disaster and recovery study, 
we will hopefully contribute with knowledge about the potential capacities and 
structures existing in communities in order to enhance the communities’ resili ence 
and resistance to possible future disasters. This will also provide important knowl-
edge when planning and implementing actions and interventions aimed at reduc-
ing the consequences of a disaster. Moreover, we feel assured that know ledge from 
a special occurrence in a particular disaster may have importance and validity on a 
more general level.
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Chapter 5 
The Disaster – an Act of God?
A study of the Tsunami recovery process  
in the Hambantota fishing community
Kerenina Dansholm Kezarides, Susann Midling, Kitty Monostory, 
and Wopara Goodness Ruhuoma, in association with Thuwan 
Zulfikar Ali (HDCC co-ordinator)
Abstract
This report intends to contribute to the studies and research on disaster mana-
gement and its effectiveness in developing countries. Our research site was Ham-
bantota town, and the fishing community was our target group as well as our main 
information source. The purpose of our study was to analyse to what extent the 
local fishing community has benefited from aid provided by both national and 
international aid agencies and what the main challenges are today. This is particu-
larly important to find out in order to enhance the effectiveness of disaster man-
agement on a local level, and to make communities more resilient to natural disas-
ters in a long-term perspective. This case study reveals certain failures and mistakes 
when it comes to the distribution of grants and services provided by aid agencies 
to the local fishing community.
Introduction
Hambantota was one of the worst Tsunami affected towns in Sri Lanka, and within 
Hambantota, the fishing community living close to the sea was hit the hardest. 
Ten years after the waves crashed down on the town, we believe that it is of great 
interest to examine and analyse to what extent the efforts and investments of local 
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authorities and international NGOs and the fishermen themselves had managed 
to rehabilitate the fishing community. As the fishermen and their families were the 
hardest hit group both physically and economically, it is important for them that 
an adequate, future disaster risk reduction strategy can be implemented. In this 
regard, it is relevant to address and analyse the problems that the fishing commu-
nity faced in the aftermath of the Tsunami, and learn from them. To gain an insight 
into the fishing community, and understand its main challenges and main expe-
riences during the last ten years, we conducted a study where we interviewed 20 
fishermen and civic leaders. The main objective of this study was to gain knowledge 
about the main challenges, failures and successes related to short and long-term 
recovery of the fishing community.
Research Questions:
1. To what extent has the recovery process been successful in rehabilitating the 
Hambantota fishing community?
2. What are the main lessons learned from the recovery process?
3. What are the main challenges the fishing community are facing today?
4. To what extent has any disaster management system been established in 
order to mitigate and prepare for future hazards and disasters?
The majority of the interviewees in our study were Muslims. This also reflects 
the religious composition of the Hambantota fishing community. Interviewing 
different categories of respondents enabled us to analyse our research topic from 
different angles. Our empirical findings confirmed to a great extent what key 
findings from earlier studies closer in time to the event had revealed; for instance 
that there had been an unequal distribution of both boats and fishing equipment 
provided to the fishermen by different agencies. Our informants told us that it 
was, in general, administrative failures that were the main reason behind the ine-
quality in resource allocations. These failures have had serious implications for 
the recovery and rehabilitation process. According to the interviewees, the qua-
lity and duration of the recovery process varied from household to household. 
When the fishermen were asked to what degree they were prepared for a possible 
future natural disaster of this nature, most of them told us that they were not 
more prepared now than what they had been before the Tsunami. Here we disco-
vered a feature in their attitude to disaster preparedness that is fundamentally 
connected to their faith: you cannot really prepare for disasters since they happen 
according to Allah’s will. Disasters are fundamentally acts of God (Allah).
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Background 
One particular reason why Hambantota suffered a high number of casualties was 
the Sunday market that took place close to the beach when the Tsunami struck. It 
is estimated that up to 2,000 people died in this town alone. While in Sri Lanka up 
to 16,500 boats were lost or damaged by the Tsunami, in Hambantota alone, civic 
leaders estimate the number of lost boats to be over 100. There was a great range 
of agencies and organisations engaged in the relief and recovery process: national 
and international NGOs, Sri Lankan government authorities, civilian and military 
forces. There were also several private initia tives, for instance among merchants, 
who contributed with aid to the fishing community. In addition to that, many inter-
national volunteers and humanitarian aid workers arrived on the scene to help 
with the immediate relief work (Mulligan & Shaw, 2007, p.66).
Sri Lanka did not have a proper disaster management strategy before the Tsu-
nami hit the country, but this has now, to some degree, been dealt with. When it 
comes to future disaster risk reduction activities, perhaps the most important gov-
ernment initiative for disaster mitigation is the establishment of the Centre for 
National Operations (CNO) (Jirasinghe, 2007, p.25). In regards to short-term disaster 
recovery, it is claimed that the Sri Lankan government has made remarkable efforts 
to strengthen their mitigation policies (Jayasurija, Steele et al., 2005). 
A lot of discussions regarding relief and recovery activities have taken place 
in the aftermath of the Tsunami. According to a study by Jayasurija, Steele et al, 
(2005, p. 19-20) NGOs failed to provide the right equipment necessary to Tsuna-
mi-affected fishermen. This can be attributed to miscommunication and/or lack of 
communication between NGOs and the fishing community. Another problem was 
the disorganized delivery of aid, caused by, among other things, administrative 
failures, which resulted in unequal distribution of boats and other fishing equip-
ment (Jirasinghe, 2007, p.52). This definitely caused delays in the recovery process 
in Hambantota.
“While the macroeconomic impact of the tsunami is limited, the localized effects are 
severe. Catastrophic human and asset losses and disruption to markets and social 
networks have sharply reduced employment and output. Human suffering has been 
exacerbated by delays, inequities and inefficiencies in housing and livelihood reha-
bilitation processes which have increased poverty and threatened social stability 
(Mulligan & Shaw, 2007, p.69).
An example of administrative failure was the lack of inadequate data bases regard-
ing the number of boats and fishermen in the fishing industry (Jirasinghe, 2007, 
p.50). Before the Tsunami, the fishermen’s houses where situated on a strip of land 
within the area of the Hambantota fishing harbour. These houses were destroyed 
by the Tsunami, and fishermen and their families were relocated to a distant area 
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– a newly constructed Tsunami village. This created several challenges for the fish-
ermen, as they had to travel a much further distance to reach boats and gear. This 
represented both a practical problem, a time problem, and an economic problem, 
as they had to use a lot of time and pay for transportation from their new houses to 
the sites by the sea where they had their boats and equipment. The interviewees 
gave us the impression that this issue was one of the biggest grievances among 
the fishermen. They felt that these new settlements had a negative impact on their 
livelihoods. Fishermen located in the new houses on land claimed from the sur-
rounding jungle area, are also exposed to other dangers, for example attacks from 
wild elephants, a common creature in the Sri Lankan fauna (Liyanage, 2012).
Methodology 
We applied a qualitative methodological approach in the data collection for this 
study. Both primary and secondary data sources have been used: primary data 
from interviewees, and secondary data from previous studies done in the Ham-
bantota District. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner. We 
were using a local interpreter to assist us. He worked very seriously to translate the 
information conveyed to him. We conducted twenty interviews altogether; nine 
with adult, married fishermen, two with young, unmarried fisher men, three with 
women related to the fishermen as wives or mothers, and six with civic leaders. 
With some few exceptions, the interviewees from the fishing community were 
Muslim. It is important to note here that the Hambantota fishing community is 
largely comprised of Muslims, quite often with a Malayan language and cultural 
origin. This group of Muslim fishermen was particularly affected by the Tsunami, 
as the day of the Tsunami was a Buddhist Poya-day, implying that Buddhist fisher-
men, in general, were not fishing that day. 
A relevant feature that should be mentioned in this connection is that Sri Lanka 
is still today, to a certain degree, a cast society. The casts are generally occupational 
casts with the landowning cast at the peak. Traditionally, the casts are endemic, 
i.e. people marry within their own cast, but this is not a strong feature nowadays, 
except perhaps for the lower casts. The fishing cast belong to the lower part of 
the cast system, and is as such not held in a high esteem. Consequently, being 
both belonging to a low cast, and Muslim, implies that the fishermen rarely get the 
highest priority from the government authorities. This has led to a situation where 
the fishermen are rather sceptical of the government, perhaps more so than other 
categories of Sri Lankan residents. 
All interviews with the fishermen and their relatives were conducted within 
their local community, often in the yard outside their houses. An interesting con-
sequence of this was that some interviews turned into group meetings or informal 
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focus group discussions as neighbours and friends joined in. It could be argued 
that this was positive in the sense that it gave us a certain, albeit utterly limited, 
possibility to do participant observation. Through the interviewing process, we felt 
that we gained a good grasp of what challenges the fishermen face, both today, 
and during the recovery process after the Tsunami. Our study has been checked 
and complemented with previous studies from the district.
Findings
The recovery process and its main challenges
Interviews with representatives from the fishing community
As our study reveals, the fishing community suffered extremely high losses in 
both personnel and fishing equipment, like boats, nets, storage facilities, and 
houses. According to the fishermen, immediate emergency assistance from indi-
viduals in nearby villages arrived within hours after the disaster in the form 
of medical care, food, clothes and temporary shelter. Assistance from NGOs, 
religious organisations and government agencies arrived within the first couple 
of weeks up to a few months after the disaster.
The fishermen explained that it took from a few months up to several years 
before they were able to overcome the fears, worries and traumas associated with 
the disaster, and be able to return to their profession. Today, ten years after, quite 
a number of fishermen are still suffering from the effects of the disaster. Although 
we are most certainly not experts in mental health problems, we believe that what 
these mental issues that they were talking about would fall under the diagnosis 
“post-traumatic stress disorder” (PTSD).
When discussing the assistance they received after the Tsunami, they mentioned 
that family members from nearby villages, government agencies, the National Devel-
opment Bank, and local and international NGOs, including the Hambantota District 
Chamber of Commerce (HDCC) have all been instrumental in the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction process of the fishing industry. The most often and positively men-
tioned NGOs were the Red Cross, Caritas and World Vision.
The recovery and rehabilitation process took time and was very challenging 
due to factors ranging from institutional failures, to short-comings connected to 
the management of human and technical resources. Such factors were identified 
both by the fishermen and the leaders of the fishing industry. According to the fish-
ermen, the NGOs’ reconstruction efforts were not properly co-ordinated, caused 
mainly by the incompetence of certain individuals engaged by the NGOs and gov-
ernment agencies. These individuals acted as interpreters and coordinators, and 
they distributed money, boats and fishing equipment to the affected fishermen. 
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The interviewed fishermen believed that there was a high degree of corruption, 
and that goods were distributed unfairly; for instance that individu als working for 
NGOs, and staff from government agencies, distributed goods to friends, relatives, 
and supporters of the ruling party. The civic leaders also acknowledged that some 
affected people did not receive nets, boats and other fishing equipment as soon 
as they should have had in order to enable them to quickly resume their fishing 
activities.
Actually, many fishermen were of the opinion that non-affected people bene-
fited more from the relief distribution than affected people. What they had experi-
enced was that some people had lied and taken advantages of the situation to grab 
provisions for themselves. As a result, whereas some people got two or even more 
boats and a lot of fishing equipment, others received nothing at all.
The respondents felt frustration because the NGOs did not consult them 
directly to discover their needs and demands, for instance regarding the speci-
fications of the type of boat suitable for their local marine conditions, fishing styles 
and capacities. Some boats were therefore inappropriate and substan dard, and 
some boats were damaged and unusable within two weeks. 
The fishermen also expressed their lack of confidence in the Fishing Associa-
tion that they felt was not cohesive, strong and purposeful, and lacked the capac-
ity to protect their interests. Regarding this issue, it was difficult for us to deter-
mine whether they were referring to both the current Fishing Association and the 
one that was in operation right before and after the Tsunami. Another issue often 
mentioned was that currently they cannot determine or even influence the prices 
of their produce in the market due to government price regulations. This causes 
them to incur debts as they buy expensive fuel to power their boats but receive 
a low price for the catch. This is compounded by the fact they quite often come 
back from the sea with a small catch, even sometimes no fish at all. This implies a 
serious loss for a poor fisherman. Consequently, it is difficult to make a living out 
of their fishing activities. The leaders of the Fishing Association confirmed these 
allegations, expressing their helplessness against the decisions of the government. 
The fishermen also argued that the government authorities had not at all lis-
tened to their needs and demands when carrying out post-tsunami development 
projects. Some of these projects did even have adverse effect. One example often 
mentioned was the dysfunctional stone barrier (mole) in the harbour that the 
government had constructed to function as a wave breaker. This had caused sev-
eral accidents and led to the death of three anglers. The fishermen claimed that 
the opening was too narrow, which makes the navigation through it difficult and 
dangerous. The housing situation, in which the government relocated their new 
houses from two-five kilometres away from the sea made it difficult for them to 
access their work place, was often mentioned. What rather clearly appeared during 
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the interviews was that the fishermen lacked trust and confidence in the govern-
ment, both at a local and national level.
When comparing their situation today with the situation before the Tsunami, it 
was a general opinion among the fishermen that their standard of living was worse 
today. This was due to several factors; high inflation rate, expensive fuel used to 
power their boats, higher electricity and water bills coupled with poorer catches 
and lower prices on their produce. As a consequence, they were not able to build 
up savings or investments that could act as buffer funds – funds that could func-
tion as a future disaster risk reduction measure.
Through our study, we did get a certain impression that the fishermen were not 
particularly eager to prepare for future disasters. It was rarely mentioned during the 
interviews that it was important for the community to give a priority to establish risk, 
reduction measures. Perhaps the most important reason why the fishermen did not 
see a strong need to prepare for future disasters is their faith in Allah, as they believe 
that natural disasters are acts of God (Allah). As human beings, there is nothing much 
you can do except to accept a disaster as the will of God. The fishermen expressed a 
strong belief in the fact that they can only depend on God to protect them and their 
loved ones. However, when discussing more practical risk reduction activities, they 
mentioned that an alarm system had been installed by the government in the local 
police station. This system was meant to be a warning measure in case of a future 
tsunami which could help them escape future occurrences, unlike the 2004 Tsunami 
that caught them totally unaware.
Interviews with civic leaders
The interviews with local, civic leaders, as for instance local government officials, 
revealed some agreements and some disagreements with the arguments raised by 
the fishermen. The civic leaders agreed with the fishermen that the government’s 
plan to make Hambantota a major tourist destination could have negative impacts 
on the livelihood of the fishermen. However, according to their arguments, even 
though some of the post-tsunami development projects and disaster prevention 
measures in Hambantota would not favour the fishermen, they were planned for 
the overall benefit of the Hambantota population. They had also a more positive 
attitude toward the mole constructed at the sea entrance to the Hambantota har-
bour. Their opinion was that that the mole would help in breaking the waves, and 
make the harbour area safer. They were also positive to the role of the harbour 
officers stationed at the fishing harbour with the task to regulate the fishermen’s 
activities. It was a part of their duty to ensure that the fishermen had the required 
identity cards and that they signed the register before going out to sea. In this way, 
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the government was responsible for the fishermen’s safety. If the fishermen had 
registered before going to sea, the government could give compensation in case 
of accidents or deaths.
The civic leaders also argued that the government, through the Hambantota 
Chamber of Commerce (HDCC) and other NGOs, did their best after the Tsunami 
to rehabilitate the livelihood of the fishermen. For example, an NGO called Pan-
Lanka donated LKR (Sri Lanka Rupee)5 500,000 that was given as a loan of 5000 
rupee to individual members of the Fishing Association. The government also gave 
financial assistance of 5000 rupees in three instalments to affected fishermen. They 
also mentioned that the HDCC provided 25 boats as part of the effort to restore the 
livelihoods of the fishermen.
Regarding the unfair distribution of disaster aid, the civic leaders explained 
that one reason for this was that some people took advantage of the aid coming 
in to gain more for themselves. In hindsight, they saw that while some community 
members were aggressive in gaining access to goods, others, who were possibly 
the most adversely affected, did not have the emotional stamina to compete. In 
addition, relevant information was not effectively gathered prior to the distribu-
tion of aid. One survey was distributed where people were asked to report their 
losses and also obtain a police report in order to verify this information. However, 
several fishermen for some reason ignored the call to report. In general, relief items 
were distributed according to the survey data collected. The problem was that as 
the survey was not very coherent, also non-affected people got relief items. Some 
even got more than they required. 
Regarding future disaster management plans, the civic leaders listed the 
following priorities: life vests and GPS for the fishing boats. They pointed to the 
important fact that a Disaster Management Ministry had already been established 
by the government. This agency was meant to carry out awareness programs. Here, 
teachers and students were to undergo training on what to do in natural disaster 
situations. Teachers were, for instance, taught how to evacuate the students in case 
of emergencies. In addition, the general public were given information on disaster 
preparedness at particular events arranged at the open, communal playgrounds. 
Also religious institutions were active in post-tsunami work as they offered faith-
based psychological assistance to their members.
Lessons learnt
A recurrent topic of criticism from the fishermen was that the NGOs should have 
come directly to them to recognise their needs. This would, to a great extent, have 
5 In May 2014, one USD was about 130 LKR
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avoided the problem of goods going to non-affected people. The civic leader, how-
ever, pointed to the fact that a major challenge to the entire distribution process 
was the lack of relevant data to facilitate the process.
One civic leader explained that the Red Cross’ first priority of operation was to 
go from house to house to distribute forms to families where they could declare 
their losses as well as supplying basic family information. Many families did not 
understand the importance of this data collection process and therefore did not fill 
the forms. Another civic leader said that they did not cooperate with the Red Cross 
at all, implying that even if relevant data had been available, it would not have 
been properly utilised.
It is obvious that collecting accurate data in the midst of the post-tsunami may-
hem must have been quite a daunting undertaking. Therefore, an important lesson 
learnt was that establishing and maintaining community databases is imperative. 
A civic leader emphasized that this was a process they were performing right now. 
He said that this was a priority, and that they should collect as much relevant infor-
mation on the local population as possible. In this regard, they used several ave-
nues, such as the fishing associations, schools, local police, and municipality offices.
The role of the fishing association
An important issue that rather clearly appeared from analysing the collected 
data was that at the time of the Tsunami, the local fishing association was very 
weak. According to one leader, the fishing association had only 35 members at 
the time of the Tsunami. The person who was selected as a leader three months 
after the Tsunami went to visit each fisherman personally. He collected data on 
their situation and invited fishermen to join the association. This leader managed 
to strengthen the association, building up an organisation with 500 members. This 
lasted for about two years. After two years, there were some internal tensions and 
political intrigues, after which the association was closed down. The short-lived 
associational strength did not seem to be sufficient to see the fishing community 
through the recovery process. For the local community it took five years before it 
was back on its feet. During the ten years after the Tsunami, there were many years 
when there was no fishing association at all in the area. In 2010, however, a new 
fishing association was established on the initiative of the Ministry of Fishery. This 
fishing association is not independent from the authorities, and many fishermen 
did not think it was strong enough to represent their needs and demands. The cur-
rent fishing association has a fund from which it provides grants for funerals and 
loans for weddings. It has attempted to bring issues to the Ministry of Fishery, but 
has not received any definitive response on these issues.
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Fishermen’s complaints
A recurring complaint among the fishermen was the poor quality of some of the 
donated items, such as boats and equipment, and also the houses built for those 
who lost their homes in the Tsunami. In general, funding was not a problem as 
plenty of assistance was coming in. Management competence in the planning and 
execution process was the main bottleneck. Two examples can be given. The first 
regards an institution that wanted to donate assistance for a certain number of 
boats. As the regular boat manufacturers did not have the required boats availa-
ble, the job of manufacturing the boats was given to another company. The boats 
produced by them were quite inferior and not at all useful for local fishermen. The 
other example regards the new homes built for those who had lost their houses 
under the Tsunami. As insufficient investigations were done regarding the needs 
and preferences of those who would receive the houses, many houses were com-
pletely inadequate. In addition, as the government had acquired land for the re-set-
tlement housing project much further inland than where the fishermen previously 
had been located, a transport problem for the fishermen emerged. To live inland, 
but have the working site at the sea is no easy task. Who will guard the boats and 
the equipment? Fishing quite regularly takes place at late night and early morning, 
a time when public transport is not operating. How then to access the site of work? 
Regarding aid distribution after possible future disaster situations, a civic leader 
suggested there should be a group meeting with the local community to seek an 
agreement with those affected how aid could be distributed, for instance, equally 
or according to proportion of loss. As a civic leader also highlighted the importance 
of having a member of the relevant community to head the disbursement of aid to 
that community.
Institutional failures, for example, in the form of inadequate management, left 
room for corruption. This generated a fair amount of grievance among the fisher-
men. Obviously, it is not possible to please everyone and there will usually be some 
who are disgruntled and view things as unfair. However, careful management can 
help diminish the degree of grievance.
Preparedness 
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is a very important part of the development pro-
cess as it is a way to prevent future hazards turning into big disasters (Ahrens 
& Rudolph, 2006, p. 217). Therefore, it was important for this study to see if 
the fishermen of Hambantota district have done anything to reduce the risk of 
future hazards. When conducting the interviews for this study, it was found that 
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the views of the fishermen and the civic leaders were quite different from each 
other on this issue. 
Fishermen’s perception on future hazards
“I have faith, and it’s God’s choice; we have to accept whatever He gives us.” 
– Fisherman, who lost many members of his family in the Tsunami.
The above statement is a typical example of the fishermen’s response to the 
question about their perception on future disasters in a post-tsunami perspec-
tive. Almost all fishermen interviewed gave this, or a similar answer.
Although some also mentioned the importance of the alarm system located 
at the police station in Hambantota, the prevailing sentiment is that their belief in 
Allah is their main “security” precaution, and that they will accept whatever hazard 
comes their way as His will. This belief also played an important role in the mental 
recovery process of the fishermen. A civic leader said that mullahs came to talk with 
the affected people to provide psychological help to them, mainly by discussing 
the hazard as Allah’s will.
One of the interviewed fishermen mentioned a discussion that took place in 
the mosque on the day prior to the Tsunami. Their reading of the Koran seemed to 
give them an indication of a coming catastrophic event. When the waves rolled in, 
his first thought was that this was what they had read in the Koran and discussed 
in the mosque the day before. He felt that the waves were sent by God to teach the 
people not to be corrupt. Now, he says he is quite often  astonished that people 
have already forgotten about the Tsunami and the lessons he felt Allah was trying 
to teach them through it. According to him, people in Hambantota are still corrupt 
and are still doing bad things, including himself. 
“People are fearful of another Tsunami, but they did not learn anything after the 
Tsunami, their behaviour is the same.”
As this theme was repeated continuously, we understood the importance of reli-
gion in their understanding of disasters, and also the role of religion in disaster 
preparedness.
“We got everything from the sea, and the sea took everything away,” a young fis-
herman explained.
When asked: “What have you done to prepare yourself for a possibly future disaster 
like this?” most fishermen stated that it was out of their power. They could not pre-
pare for a future disaster since their destiny was in the hands of Allah. We should 
add that this attitude was combined with the frustration of the present situation 
signified by a prolonged period with very low fishing yields and higher prices of 
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petrol and fishing gear. The great majority of fishermen are surviving on a day-to-
day basis, implying that they have meagre means to prepare for future disasters.
Civic leaders’ opinions
The civic leaders presented other views and opinions on the present situation and 
the preparedness issue. They focused on what had positively been done, such as 
training provided to teachers and students, fishermen, women and ordinary villag-
ers; the new alarm system installed at the police station which was tested periodi-
cally; the distribution of life vests; the stone wall – mole – that secured the harbour 
and the entrance to it, and thus the fishing boats, giving them their own harbour 
area. A Disaster Management Department in the Hambantota District was also an 
important preparedness precaution. It seemed to us that not much of this informa-
tion and training were noticed and used by the public. None of the fishermen men-
tioned anything about any disaster training given. There was also much disagree-
ment about the mole. The fishermen saw it as a dangerous construction with too 
small an entrance that endangers the boats coming in from the sea, quite contrary 
to the civic leaders who saw it as an important protection from the sea, not only for 
the fishermen, but also for the town of Hambantota.
It was mentioned by some civic leaders that data availability has been improved 
and that they now have a much better information base about the households and 
the local community. This will, they believed, make it possible to operate more effi-
ciently in future emergencies in the area. In addition, it will eliminate much of the 
corruption and false information that caused unfair distribution of aid ten years 
ago.
Even though most civic leaders promoted the preparations that have been 
done by the authorities, changes they were happy for, there were also a couple of 
them that stated that despite these preparations, disasters cannot be avoided: if 
Allah decides to cause a disaster, it will not be possible for them to stop the dam-
ages that Allah has decided for them.
Conclusion
During the fieldwork, and through our observations, conversations and interviews 
with local people, we gained a certain insight into people’s individual experiences 
and perceptions about the recovery process after the Tsunami. What we learned 
was that both the quality and the duration of the recovery process varied a lot from 
household to household in the fishing community due to both external and internal 
factors. It was obvious, from their perception and experiences that there had been 
an unfair distribution of fishing equipment and boats. This had seriously impeded 
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the recovery process, as many fishermen lacked the necessary equipment for being 
able to recover their livelihoods after the Tsunami.
The political context cannot be ignored when analysing the ten-year period 
after the Tsunami. Politics both at the national and local government level bene-
fited some, e.g. party members, relatives etc. whereas others were neglected. 
Based on our empirical findings, we can see that there were several factors that had 
implications on who benefited from grants and contributions from, for instance, 
the different NGOs. The fishing association was particularly weak both at the time 
of the Tsunami, and in a long period of the ten years recovery process. At the time 
of the Tsunami the fishing association had few members and played a minor role in 
local politics. Later, there had been a five-year suspension of the fishing association 
during the ten-year recovery period. That many fishermen lost their houses in the 
Hambantota harbour area and were displaced to areas distant from the seafront 
has also had serious implications on their present livelihood situation. Last, but not 
least, religious fatalism has, without any doubt, played an important role regarding 
preparedness, or more precisely – lack thereof – in the fishing community. Com-
bined with poverty, i.e. lack of means to improve their situation, the fishermen are 
still in a precarious situation in a case of future hazards from the sea.
References 
Ahrens, J. and P.M. Rudolph (2006) ‘The importance of Governance in Risk 
Reduction and Disaster Management.’ Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 14(4) pp. 207–220 
Bryman, A. (2012) Social Research Methods, (4th edition). Oxford University Press 
Inc., New York
Jayasinghe C.R (2007) Annual Report 12/13. Hambantota: Hambantota District Chamber 
of Commerce: http://www.hdcc.lk/Arep/HDCC%20AR%20ENGLISH% 
202012.pdf (accessed 14 December 2015)
Jayasuriya, S., Steele, P., Weerakoon, D., Knight-John, M., and N. Arunatilake (2005) Post-
tsunami recovery: issues and challenges in Sri Lanka. ADB Institute Research Paper. 
Asian Development Bank Institute: 
http://www.adbi.org/files/2005.10.dp39.tsunami.recovery.srilanka.pdf (accessed  
15 December 2015)
Liyanage A.W. (2012). The possibility for developing a sustainable strategy to solve 
the conflict between local people and Elephants in Hambantota District,  
Sri Lanka. Master Thesis. Kristiansand, University Of Agder
Mulligan M., & Shaw J. (2007) ‘What the World can learn from Sri Lanka’s post-
tsunami experiences’. IJAPS, 3(2). IJAPS: http://web.usm.my/ijaps/articles/3_
Mulligan_(65-91).pdf (accessed: 02 June 2014)
 Chapter 6  71
Chapter 6 
The Golden Wave?
The impact of the Tsunami recovery process  
in the Kirinda Community, Hambantota District
Sanaa Talha, Schola Busingye, Sehrish Noor,  
and Anne Lie Nordberg, in association with  
Rimzana Shazin (HDCC coordinator)
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce (HDCC) 
for making it possible for us to conduct this study. Among other things, HDCC 
provided us with an excellent coordinator and interpreter, Mrs. Rimzana Shazin. 
Not only did she do an amazing job helping us find respon dents, but she and her 
entire family also hosted us with the greatest hospitality. We would also like to 
give a special thanks to Mr. B. Jalaldeen, the former principal at Kirinda Muslim 
Maha Vidyalaya School who provided us with both valuable information and 
informants. Last, but not least, we want to give our appreciation to all the fam-
ilies who welcomed us, invited us into their homes and took time to share their 
stories and points of view. Without their openness and hospitality, this study 
could never have been conducted. 
Abstract
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami left devastating impacts on the coastal regions of 
Sri Lanka. Much of the infrastructure, residential areas, commercial and transpor-
tation sector, fisheries, tourism industry, and other businesses located along the 
coast were heavily affected. Amongst the most damaged areas was Hambantota 
District in the far south. It suffered serious destructions in almost all communities 
along the shore. Kirinda village, in the Tissamaharama munici pality, was to a large 
extent demolished. Kirinda, a predominantly Muslim community with a substan-
tial Buddhist minority, was the site for the study we performed in May/June 2014.
Kirinda is, like most coastal communities in Sri Lanka, a fishing community, and 
it was precisely these fishermen and their households that were the worst affected 
group in the village. The aim of our study was to analyse the recovery process of the 
community in general, and the households in particular. Our findings point to the 
fact that most families lost almost everything to the devastating waves, and had 
to rebuild their lives from scratch. One positive aspect of the Tsunami was that the 
global community came together in a time of unmatched adversity to give them the 
relief and assistance they desperately needed. It is possible to argue that the many 
national and international organizations that came to the rescue in many respects 
compensated the traumatized people for their material losses. Our findings indicate 
that there were two different sides to the recovery process; one generally positive 
side, and one side that was more negative. Today, ten years after, several fishermen 
and community leaders point to the positive development projects that are the 
results of the aid and assistance rendered to the community when in great need. 
Some even talk about the Tsunami as a “Golden wave”. 
Introduction
In December 2004, Sri Lanka experienced one of the greatest disasters of all time, 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami. This disaster resulted in an enormous destruction in the 
form of loss of lives, wounded and traumatized people, destroyed homes, ruined 
businesses, destroyed boats and fishing gear, and grave damages to the environ-
ment and infrastructure. Having said that, it was possibly also a great moment in 
human history as states, corporations, NGOs, civil societies, private people etc. 
around the world came together to give a support and assistance of unprece-
dented magnitude to those in need (Jayasuriya et al., 2005; Weerakoon et al., 2007). 
Kirinda, located in Hambantota district in the “Deep South” (Southern Province) 
of Sri Lanka is a coastal, fishing village that was heavily affected by the calamity. 
Against the backdrop that it is ten years since the disaster struck the village, we 
wanted to study and analyse the recovery process among the local households in 
Kirinda, and how the people perceived their present situation. 
We conducted altogether 22 semi-structured interviews, using a qualitative 
methodological approach. The respondents represented families directly affected 
by the Tsunami, community authorities and village leaders, and government offi-
cials. 
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Research Objectives
Before starting the empirical survey, we defined that our main research objective 
was to find out how the local community households in Kirinda perceived the 
recovery-process that has taken place in the ten-year period after the Tsunami. 
Research Questions
To concretize the main objective, we identified five research questions:
1. How does the Kirinda community perceive the role and importance of “bonds 
and bridges”, i.e. internal networks and structures (bonds), and external assis-
tance (bridges), in the aftermath of the Tsunami?
2. What were, according to their own perception, the factors of success or fai-
lure?
3. How do community members perceive the present situation?




In the study, we applied basically a qualitative research approach to find answers 
to the research questions. The choice to use a qualitative approach was influ-
enced by our quest to “see through the eyes of the people being studied” (Bry-
man 2008:285), and thus aim at capturing the respondents own perceptions. 
As qualitative research strategy focuses on words and meanings rather than 
numbers in the collection and analysis of data, we found this strategy to be the 
most suitable to cover our main objective and research questions. Our assump-
tion was that in order to cover our research objective, the local people of Kirinda 
were the most appropriate respondents to explain their perceptions of the recov-
ery-process. 
Data Collection, Sources and Methods
The interview is probably the most widely employed method in qualitative 
research, often applied in an unstructured or semi-structured form (Bryman, 
2012, p, 469). This form of interview was employed as the main tool for data 
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collection in this study. The interviews were conducted in Kirinda during late 
May and early June 2014, and with the necessary assistance from an interpreter 
cum coordinator. Respondents were representatives from families directly 
affected by the Tsunami, community authorities and village leaders, and gov-
ernment officials. We conducted, in total, 22 semi-structured interviews.
Before starting the actual interviewing, we developed an interview guide. This 
guide was not a list of rigid questions as flexibility is important to vary the order 
of questions, following up leads, and discovering inconsistencies in answers. Con-
sequently, our original guide was after some few interviews revised based on the 
responses and follow-up questions. 
We discussed the issue of informed consent with the interpreter, and agreed on 
how we were to ensure this. We also raised this issue with the respondents before 
starting the interviews. All respondents were also informed that they would remain 
anonymous.
Sampling
All sampling for this research was non-probability sampling. The choice of 
respondents was based on convenience sampling, and purposive sampling. For 
most of the interviews, our coordinator had already secured appointments with 
the respondents based on convenience sampling. Finally, some respondents were 
sampled based on the purposive approach since we assumed that certain target 
respondents had particular knowledge regarding the recovery process of local 
community households that would be of great relevance for the study.
The target group for this study was local community households. We therefore 
conducted interviews with families directly affected by the Tsunami. To broaden 
our data bases, we also interviewed community authorities, and local government 
officials. Our sample comprised 19 household members from three different areas 
within the Kirinda village. Among them, nine were females, usually housewives, 
and ten were males, usually heads of households. The age range was from 29-59 
years. The other interviewees were one former government official, one former 
principal of the community school who was responsible for the collaboration with 
government authorities and NGOs in the first few days and weeks after the Tsu-
nami, and as such, an important community leader. Lastly, we interviewed a local 
businessman involved in the village fishing industry, and very much involved in the 
distribution of emergency aid after the Tsunami. 
Challenges
We faced several challenges during the fieldwork. One challenge was the language 
barrier. As we were dependent on an interpreter for most of the interviews, we had 
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to trust her skills and abilities. As there were some instances where the interpreter 
took over the role as respondent, it was sometimes felt that we had problems cap-
turing the actual respondent’s own perceptions.
As most of our interviews took place within the respondents’ homes, there 
were quite regularly small children present, sometimes making it hard for both 
interviewer and interviewee to stay focused on the topic. 
The issue of time was also a constraint during the research process. With only 
a limited period to do the interviews and also limited time to analyse the data, the 
degree to which we were able to complete our main objective and answer the 
research questions thoroughly became problematic. Finally, we are aware that the 
identification and selection of the respondents made it difficult to come up with a 
representative sample of the entire population. Cultural issues and language barri-
ers limited our possibilities to select our own sample for this study, which opens the 
possibility that we were not being able to grasp the full picture. We feel, however, 
confident that we have understood the basic features of the recovery process, as we 
have presented our findings for a wider audience of Sri Lankans, and also by com-
paring our results with results from other studies. 
Findings
Our field study generated some very interesting facts relating to the people’s own 
perception of recovery from the disaster. The following sections discuss our main 
findings and analysis, and present a few case studies to illustrate key issues. 
Local perceptions regarding bonds and bridges  
in relation to the recovery process
In this section, we discuss the internal and external structures, resources and net-
works that were employed in Kirinda during the emergency situation directly after 
the disaster, and in the ten-year recovery and reconstruction period after the Tsu-
nami. Internal assistance refers to the engagement of local network ties, or “bonds”, 
comprising members from the community or adjacent communities, relatives and 
other closely related persons or groups. The role of external relationships, “bridges” 
refer to “outside”, extra-communal, national and international agencies, such as 
NGOs, external, informal support groups, government authorities, etc. that con-
tributed with various resources, mostly of a financial type, to the local people (New-
man and Dale, 2005).
Already at this early stage of the presentation, it is important to note the fact 
that almost all of the respondents emphasized that the immediate emergency 
assistance, i.e. the assistance that appeared on the scene only minutes and hours 
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after the waves, came from relatives, other community members, or people from 
surrounding communities, for instance from the close by town of Tissamaharama. 
As an example, several of those who were caught by the waves and taken by the 
sea, were rescued from drowning by their relatives or neighbours. The secondary 
role in the immediate emergency situation was played by local, religious organisa-
tions. Government bodies, like the police and the army, were also, to some degree, 
involved in rescue operations and in ensuring the delivery of victims to nearby hos-
pitals for medical attention. Relatives and other local community members were 
invaluable in the identification of deceased people, tracing of missing members, 
and re-unification of family members. Several mothers and fathers were separated 
from their children when the waves struck, but many were successfully reunited.
About one to two days after the waves crashed in, some local opinion lead-
ers formed a coordination committee. The principal of the local school took the 
responsibility for the overall coordination between the supporting groups that 
came to rescue and the local community. This was of crucial importance in generat-
ing an orderly and organised flow of external assistance to the people, i.e. bridging 
activities. The committee made a list of all affected people, a list that was used for 
the distribution of assistance. The committee also became the consulting body for 
most of the external aid organisations, through which also community needs were 
identified. For example, initial discussions regarding resettlement plans were done 
with this committee.
The assistance generated from within the community was considered as abso-
lutely crucial in building coherent activities regarding the psychosocial recovery 
process. The respondents talked about how living together in the  refugee camps 
and temporary houses helped them to talk about their traumas and reduce their 
feelings of fears, worries and anxieties regarding the situation they were in, and 
about their concerns for the future. 
Their religious bonds, among both Muslims and Buddhists, served as sources 
of intrinsic power to overcome the fears of present and future challenges. The Mus-
lim community in Kirinda received support from people from Colombo, Tissama-
harama and overseas diaspora Sri Lankans in the form of food, groceries and other 
types of material support to assist the victims. This help was brought and delivered 
to the community through the coordination committee that ensured the distribu-
tion to the affected people. 
An important bridge was the external assistance that came in the form of 
material and psychosocial support from NGOs like the World Vision, USAID, 
CARE international, Goal, ASPIC, and Collier International. All respondents 
reported that they had received material support from either one or several 
of these organisations. Both the administrative head of the village, the Grama 
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Sevaka (GS), 6 and the coordinator of the committee confirmed that they had 
been working closely with these organisations. Materials received from the 
NGOs included food, household items, resettlement houses and economic live-
lihood support. Regarding resettlement housing, World Vision, GOAL, and 
Collier International constructed and allocated houses to affected families.
People resettled by World Vision were moved to new plots, but they retained 
the ownership of land where they had resided before the Tsunami. People under the 
Collier International housing scheme were resettled at the plots where they lived 
before the Tsunami. The people resettled by GOAL had originally been part of the 
ASPIC scheme, but since this scheme did not materialise, GOAL took over in order 
to finish the construction plan and resettle the families. The variation between the 
various NGO schemes where substantial. For instance, the clients under the GOAL 
scheme were not at all happy with their situation. As one of the respondents under 
this scheme argued, their houses were poorly constructed and the roof leaked 
whenever it rained. In addition, although the roads within the GOAL scheme were 
upgraded with tarmac, they were not properly maintained. 
Psychosocial support by NGOs included activities like professional health work-
ers talking with affected people, especially those who had lost their loved ones. 
They also organised entertainment for school pupils to cater for their mental wel-
fare. Children were given toys to ease their minds, and also a huge children’s park 
was constructed by CARE International near the World Vision colony. However, this 
park was abandoned and is now covered by shrubs. The leader of the coordination 
committee explained that he had recommended a different location for the con-
struction of this park, namely close to the beach were people before the Tsunami 
used to bring their children to play, but the NGO had ignored the advice. 
Successes and Failures
Obviously, the Tsunami left a significant impact on the household community in 
Kirinda. According to numbers provided by a village leader, 68 people lost their 
lives in the Kirinda village. Other than the loss of human lives, the waves devastated 
a huge number of houses and boats, and a lot of fishing and business equipment. 
Most of what was destroyed has been replaced, either by the government or the 
aid agencies. Approximately two years after the disaster, most of those who had 
lost their homes were settled in new houses. The majority of boat owners who had 
lost their boats were provided with new ones within a year or two. Other items, 
6 A Grama Sevaka, GS, (Gama Niladhari in the Sinhala language) or “village leader”, is a 
public official appointed by the government to carry out administrative duties in his/her 
area of jurisdiction, which is a subunit under the district headed by the District Secre-
tary. The GS is both an administrative and judicial position, but not (formally) political.
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like furniture, kitchen appliances, clothes etc. lost in the waves were also either 
replaced or repaired. However, our findings from the Kirinda field study reveals 
varying opinions among the households and officials about which efforts were 
considered successful, and which were considered as failure, during the recovery 
process.
The recovery process after the Tsunami has left many positive footprints in the 
Kirinda villages despite some flaws in the planning and implementation of the 
recovery process. In general, the respondents expressed positive feelings regard-
ing the reception of permanent houses. Most of the people explained that they 
received what was necessary during their two to three year’s stay in temporary 
shelters. Still, the respondents expressed mixed feelings when it comes to what was 
happening during the first years of the recovery process. This can, at least partly, 
be explained by the fact that there were several NGOs, private donors, and govern-
ment organizations in operation within a huge number of development activities, 
but there was a great variation between the various agencies. Due to limited time, 
our study group covered only three major resettlement areas, or colonies, in and 
around the Kirinda village, respectively restructured by World Vision, Collier Inter-
national and ASPIC International.
What we found in the World Vision colony was that most of the residents did 
not complain about quality of houses. Their major source of criticism was regard-
ing dishonesty in the distribution of houses, the size of the houses and the sani-
tation conditions. However, the majority of our respondents acknowledged that 
they received basic and timely recovery assistance from World Vision. They account 
their feelings of security to the location of the new colony. 
In the other two sectors or colonies we visited, with houses provided by ASPIC/
GOAL and Collier International, we found that the respondents revealed severe 
discontent because of what they considered to be fake promises, the quality of 
the houses, and also the structure and the dishonesty in the implementation of 
the recovery process. Consequently, most of the respondents in the Collier Interna-
tional and ASPIC/GOAL colonies expressed varying degrees of discontent with the 
resettlement process. Neither the government authorities, nor the international 
NGO’s had included them in the planning process, and most of time these agencies 
deceived the locals and gave false promises. 
According to residents of Collier International colony, and the leader of 
the coordination committee, the first sample houses were very nice, impressive 
even. They were designed by a famous Japanese architect who visited the area 
to learn about local ways of constructing houses before starting the construc-
tion work. Because of the design and the use of local materials, they even won 
a prize for construction of the best tsunami houses. The affected people, there-
fore, agreed on Collier’s implementation plans, but in reality, what actually 
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happened was that not even a single house was built according to the sample. 
Instead, second-class construction materials were used, and the houses were of 
a poor quality. 
Another issue raised by the respondents was neglect of the religious values of 
the Muslim community, for instance that the entrance to the washroom and toilet 
was located in the living-room area, so that anybody could watch people entering 
or leaving the washroom/toilet room, something which is completely unaccept-
able to Muslims. The same feature was also found in certain World Vision houses. 
The respondents also explained that the District Secretary7 came to Kirinda 
together with the local community leader, Grama Sevaka (GS), and suggested 
a relocation plan for them. According to the plan, the local people were not 
allowed to build a new house on the same site as that of the old house. If they 
did, that land would be confiscated by the government. If, however, they chose 
to build a new house on the land allocated to them by the authorities, they 
would be given a grant of 250,000 rupees to improve their standard of living in 
addition to a new house. This “rule” was, however, never implemented by the 
authorities. Some respondents claimed that there was a hidden political agenda 
behind this plan, namely that politicians tried to exploit the situation and use 
the relocation plan for their own advantage. Only a few people were really 
interested in re-building their houses on the old site, but some of them wanted 
to sell the property to private, business persons to be used, for instance, as sites 
for hotels. To stop this, the politicians wanted to purchase this land by the 
beach for themselves to do business, for instance building hotels, or selling it to 
potential hotel builders. 
To complement the interviews conducted with the households, we also inter-
viewed the present Grama Sevaka, GS, (village leader) and the former Grama 
Sevaka (who was in charge at the time of the disaster). According to the present GS, 
the discontent that was revealed regarding the quality of the houses was mainly 
connected to government authorities and contractors hired by the Collier Interna-
tional. The government and Collier International did not have adequate supervision 
of the construction process, and allowed the NGOs to make fragile houses using 
sub-standard materials. The GS explained that he raised his concerns about con-
struction issues with the director of Collier International, but his concerns were not 
taken into consideration. However, as compensation for the building failures, and 
in order to settle the complaints, Collier International gave the residents that were 
reconstructing their houses an additional amount of 50,000 rupees to make nec-
essary repairs and renovation of the structure. The former GS explained that one 
responsible government minister had made false promises to the innocent villagers 
when he promised to give them 250,000 rupees if they moved to the site allocated 
by the government. This promise was only used as a tactic to discourage members 
7 The administrative head of Hambantota District, appointed by the government.
80 Recovering from a disaster
from settling at the former housing area that was situated close to the sea. Despite 
these fake promises, people insisted anyway on settling down and rebuilding their 
houses at the places they had lived before the Tsunami, even if these sites were 
exposed to risks.
When it comes to the Portuguese Association for Cancer Research (ASPIC) 
International’s role in building homes for the Buddhist part of the population, the 
management of ASPIC consulted the residents regarding the location for resettle-
ment. Initially they came to an agreement, deciding to build at a certain site. This 
agreement was, however, changed largely due to government decisions. Accord-
ing to the GS, these residents were neglected by the government regarding facil-
ities because they opposed government regulations and instead trusted ASPIC 
international. In some respects, the locals found themselves in a crossfire between 
the government and ASPIC. Therefore, the project was stopped because it became 
too controversial. As a result, ASPIC did not complete their project of 50 houses. 
They left after building just 16 unfinished houses. After that, GOAL International 
selected 11 of these houses in the ASPIC sector and completed them.
Most of the affected people revealed that they sensed injustice regarding the 
distribution of assistance in the recovery period. The majority expressed the opin-
ion that they did not feel that aid had been distributed according to the merits of 
being deserving, or undeserving. The general opinion was that distribution was 
governed on the basis of political gains or on the basis of personal friendships and 
relations. However, despite this sense of injustice and unfairness, people admitted 
that the majority got a fair financial assistance but only for a short period. Due to 
unfair distribution of relief means, most of the directly affected people claimed 
that they had faced severe economic challenges. When we raised this issue with 
the community leader, GS, he explained that there had been cases of unfair dis-
tribution of houses and material goods and supplies, but he claimed this had not 
happened at the cost of the affected people. The majority of affected people got all 
essentials necessary to sustain both their livelihood and businesses.
Ten years after the Tsunami Kirinda appears to have totally changed. Broken 
and worn-down roads have been replaced by tarmac roads. The old and worn-
down local Muslim school received 120 million rupees in aid from UNICEF, and with 
this changed to become a front-runner school with enhanced facilities that have, 
for instance, attracted new and better teachers. Before the Tsunami, the people of 
Kirinda had to travel 16 km to get to the hospital. Today, there is a fully furnished, 
modern hospital within the village. Positive changes have also reached the fishing 
industry that sustains the livelihood of the majority of people in the community. 
Before the Tsunami, there were 50 motor boats in Kirinda, today there are approx-
imately 200. Overall, the respondents, the village leader, and government officials 
seem pleased with the post-tsunami reconstruction of Kirinda. 
Despite all the facts and complaints from the affected households presented to 
him, the former GS was generally satisfied with the recovery process. According to 
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him, 80% of the houses are successfully completed. He considered that the recov-
ery process progressed smoothly, except for some few blemishes that he claimed 
were due to government negligence. Like the present community leader, he also 
perceives the Tsunami as “the Golden Waves” for the Kirinda community.
Evaluating the Present Status Quo
In this section, we take a closer look at people’s general perception of the pres-
ent status quo looking at the social situation, the educational situation, health 
situation, and other important topics. Despite the fact that the overall response 
from the interviewed people regarding their general satisfaction with the present 
situation was positive, everyone expressed that for different reasons their liveli-
hood situation was better before the Tsunami struck. 
The Social Situation
Socially, people said that Kirinda was a better community before the Tsunami, as 
it was more integrated with people more closely knit together (stronger bonds). 
After the Tsunami, there was still unity among the people, but people in general 
had become more “private” and individualistic, busier in building their own lives. 
Furthermore, religion played an important role in the reco very process. Immedi-
ately after the disaster struck, people turned their attention to the religious cen-
tres for prayers and observance. In so doing, a strong sense of unity and solidar-
ity was created among people. This sentiment is not so strong anymore. People 
seem to have forgotten the important role of God (Allah). 
The Educational Situation
The educational system is perceived to be far better at present than before the 
Tsunami. The reason mostly quoted is the establishment of the new school with 
many facilities that were not available before. This has also attracted new and bet-
ter teachers to the community. UNICEF not only sponsored a new school building, 
but also supplied the school with facilities like, for instance, computer labs. This was 
considered to be a great improvement as children and people in Kirinda before the 
Tsunami did not know how to use a computer or the internet. This was also made 
possible because of improved telecommunications infrastructure that enabled the 
school to provide computer training for the students. The general opinion among 
community authorities was that most of the Kirinda people now own a mobile 
phone with data usage facilities. 
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The Health Situation
Before the Tsunami, there was no hospital in Kirinda, and the people had to go to 
other towns to get medical attention and treatment. The nearest hospital was 16 
km from Kirinda. After the Tsunami, a modern, well-equipped hospital was built. 
This makes people feel safer, and it has improved the health condition among the 
people.
Some of the people who suffered a mental trauma have received professional 
help at the hospital. This, together with strong community ties, has made it possi-
ble to overcome the adversities raised in their hearts and minds due to the disaster. 
Infrastructure and transport
The infrastructure and transportation to and from the village have improved radically 
after the Tsunami. The roads are often tarmacked, and there can now be observed a 
huge number of three-wheeler vehicles that are used as a mode of transportation. 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has sponsored the main road into Kirinda. This 
has really improved the local businesses, especially the fisheries.
Perceptions regarding disaster preparedness 
The local leaders and people themselves explained that an alarm system has been 
installed at the village school as an early warning mechanism. The community lead-
ers also mentioned that several drills have been organised (three in the last 10 years) 
to prepare people in case of another disaster. However, there were mixed responses 
regarding the importance and the attendance to these drills. For instance, some 
respondents from the World Vision colony said that since this colony was based on 
the premise that the location should be secure in case of storms or floods, there 
would be no need for them to escape from their homes in case of emergencies; 
therefore, they did not need to attend the drills. On the issue of future prepared-
ness, most people were of the opinion that what happened once will never happen 
again, and if it did, then it was the will of God. Because of their strong religious 
beliefs, most of the people were also very adamant in the fact that if they are meant 
to survive another disaster they will, if they are meant to die, they will. In many 
respects, Karma was to the Buddhist, what Allah was to the Muslims: you cannot 
escape your destiny in an emergency situation.
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Conclusion
When analysing the relief and recovery assistance and the long term impacts 
of this assistance, we found that the respondents in general praised the role 
played by the local community, but that they also appreciated what the NGO’s 
had done for them. The respondents had, however mixed feelings, and more 
negative than positive feelings, regarding the role played by national and local 
government authorities. According to the respondents’ views, the government 
did not use a penny out of its own pocket to relieve the affected, and that the 
external aid coming in via the Government was distributed without taking into 
account who deserved it, and who did not. Therefore, the recovery process 
could have been far better and far smoother if the distribution process had been 
more accurate and fair. To a large extent, they blamed government authorities 
for weaknesses and shortcomings during the recovery process. 
We also looked at some successful and some not so successful efforts dur-
ing the recovery process, including the delivery of houses and replacement of 
business and occupational resources which could have provided an important 
starting point to improve the people’s livelihood situation. Some had however 
received financial aid from the government and/or NGOs that made it possible 
for them to jumpstart some normalcy into their lives. Describing their present 
conditions, the majority of the respondents were satisfied with the state of social 
affairs. They praised the situation in their neighbourhoods and communities, 
emphasizing the social ties between people. Although the Tsunami had somehow 
disrupted the social network in the wake of the disaster, they felt that this network 
it was by now repaired. They also claimed that the health and educational situa-
tion was better than ever with a new and modern school and hospital catering for 
the needs of the locals. Both infrastructure and transportation services had been 
improved compared with the situation before the disaster. There was one aspect 
where the respondents were not entirely satisfied with the present situation: they 
felt that the general economic situation had deteriorated in the last few years due 
to an overall rise in the cost of living. They appreciated that this has nothing to do 
with Tsunami. However, it was a common sentiment among the majority of the 
interviewees that they their individual economic situ ation was worse today as a 
direct impact of what they lost in the Tsunami. 
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Appendix 1:  
Case studies of the Tsunami recovery process in Kirinda Community
In order to give a more detailed picture on how local people from Kirinda perceived 
the recovery process from the Tsunami, some case studies are presented here. 
Case No. 1; Interview with woman in World Vision house
When the Tsunami hit this family it comprised of a husband, wife and 
two sons; aged eight and six. As the waves approached, the children 
were put into a vehicle and sent to safety. The husband and wife started 
running to higher ground, along with a servant woman and an 11-year-
old female neighbour. Despite their efforts to escape, the small group 
was caught in the waves, struggling for about 20 minutes until they got 
on a slab for safety. They then discovered that the servant had disap-
peared. When they were rescued, they were taken for medical care by 
members of the local community. The wife had severe injuries to her 
head, but she survived. The Tsunami cost the family their dream home, 
built only two years prior to the disaster. The husband worked in a 
govern ment organization, but on the side, he had also started a diving 
and sea shell business. Several oxygen tanks and other equipment from 
this business were either lost or stolen during the event. 
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After receiving proper medical attention at a medical centre, the family 
was set up in a Government run refugee camp. They did not stay here for 
long, and moved in with the wife’s family. One month later, they moved to 
the temporary houses provided by the Red Cross where they received free 
electricity, water, food, clothes, home appliances, furniture and other mis-
cellaneous items from several different NGOs. Two years later World Vision 
Foundation built permanent houses for them.
Since the husband was a government servant, the family received the 
monthly LKR 5000 assigned by the government for relief to such families. 
Four of the oxygen tanks lost were replaced by the HDCC. Other than that 
the family did not receive any other financial aid, but the wife and children 
received six months of psychological counselling from the NGOs. 
The family said that they have received some compensation, but not as 
much as they lost. They are, anyway, thankful for the relief and assistance 
provided to them. The wife commented that it took them two to three 
years to be settled back into their normal life routine. The children started 
schooling within two to three months after the disaster, getting busy with 
school activities. The husband’s diving and sea shell business took off after 
some years and he has moved to the Qatar-Middle East to extend the busi-
ness. She said that now the family is doing better economically, but also 
socially as most of her old neighbours were located in the same vicinity as 
well. However, the wife still misses her old house, the house of her dreams, 
which they lost to the waves. 
We observed that the family lived very near to her extended family i.e. the 
wife’s parents, sisters and brothers were located in the same vici nity (but in 
a non-affected area). This helped them psychologically, and today, no one 
in the family has mental problems. Furthermore, strong family bonds aided 
the husband to get back on his feet and start the business again. They are 
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living in a very comfortable environment surrounded by their loved ones 
and seemed to do well in most aspects.
Case No. 2: Woman in World Vision House accused of getting a 
house without being directly affected by the Tsunami
At the time of Tsunami, this family consisted of a husband, wife, five 
months pregnant, and one son, who had moved from Colombo to 
Kirinda shortly before the Tsunami. The husband did not have a specific, 
fixed occupation, but they had opened a small hotel on land belonging 
to the wife’s father, who originally came from Kirinda. When the wave 
struck, the wife were caught and was slightly injured. Although both the 
hotel business and the buildings where they were living were affected, 
no lives were lost. 
The wife was immediately taken to the hospital for medical assistance, 
and then taken to a refugee camp. As she was pregnant, she was given all 
the necessary supplies to cater for a newborn baby, just in case. They only 
spent five days in the refugee camp before they moved to a temporary 
house set up by Care Foundation. About one and half to two years later, 
the family was able to move into a permanent house provided by World 
Vision. The permanent house they now live in actually belongs to the wife’s 
father, as he was a permanent resident of Kirinda, and thus entitled to a 
house. This situation has created a lot of discontent in the local commu-
nity, as it was felt that the house was given to the family unfairly as they 
recently had moved into the community. The woman mentioned that her 
father owned a piece of land in the area where  Collier International set up 
Tsunami houses and because of that, her father actually received a house 
from Collier International as well. Additio nally, her father lost a boat in the 
Tsunami, which was also replaced by one of the NGOs. 
On top of that, the family received much financial assistance. First, 
they received LKR 3,000/- per month from the Red Cross (she did not 
remember the duration of this stipend). Then the husband obtained a 
grant of LKR 5,000/- and a loan of LKR 10,000/- from an NGO (she 
did not remember the name) to buy a tuk-tuk (three-wheel taxi) to gene-
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rate a livelihood. She herself obtained a loan of LKR 15,000/- from Brac 
Foundation to buy a sewing machine to start a small business on her 
own. 
The wife was very grateful for all the assistance the family had received. 
She said that before the disaster, her life was not settled, and her husband 
could not find a fixed occupation. After the Tsunami, they received a house, 
initial monthly stipend, loans to start business and get a job. Therefore, her 
family is living in a much better condition than before the disaster. Today, 
they have a very stable economy. All the children attend school, and she 
is happy with their progress. Overall, she is very pleased with the family’s 
progress and recovery after the Tsunami.
What we could observe was that this family, unlike many others we had 
interviewed, received a lot more relief assistance. They were not entitled 
to obtain a new house as they lived in a rented place before the Tsunami, 
but the wife’s father gave them his house in the World Vision colony. At 
the same time, the father got another house built by the Collier inter-
national. This meant that the father received two houses as a result of 
the Tsunami when he lost only one. Furthermore, the family received 
a lot of financial assistance, again unlike most other families, to buy 
equipment to start earning. Other families only got replacements for the 
items they had lost, and some did not even receive that. 
Case No. 3; Interview with woman with family still living in a 
temporary house
This case came up as a very important turning point in our research 
as it seems to be highly controversial. There are two opposing views 
regarding this case, presented to us by two opposing parties. The first 
perspective is represented by a family living in the temporary house, the 
other from the retired Population Control Officer (who was serving at 
the time of the Tsunami). We have included his comments to see the case 
from both sides.
When the disaster struck, the family consisted of a husband and wife living 
together with the husband’s parents and his brothers and sisters in a joint 
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extended family structure. According to Sri Lankan law, every newly mar-
ried couple must register themselves as a separate family after marriage, 
even if they live in a joint family household. The wife said that they got 
married in 2003, but they were not registered. The extended family lost 
six members and their house in the disaster. Her husband was a farmer 
and a day labourer, but they also lost their family farmland in the disaster. 
When the waves hit, the neighbours came to the rescue, and they were 
taken to the refugee camp where they stayed for three weeks. In some 
parts of Kirinda; for instance the Andra Gasiya division; the temporary 
houses were in fact tents. The family was given one tent that they shared 
with the husband’s parents. They stayed in the tent for two years after 
which they were given a temporary house in the ASPIC colony. It was only 
the foundation and one foot of the building made out of bricks, the rest 
was also made out of tent material, tarpaulin. Another two years later, in 
2008, the husband’s parents were also given a house in the ASPIC colony. 
The parents received the LKR 5,000/- per month allowance from the Gov-
ernment for six months. Other than that, no financial assistance was given. 
Since 2008, when the husband’s parents moved to the permanent house, 
her family has not received any support or assistance except for some med-
ical assistance. Some counselling was also given for one year as she had 
been in shock and is still afraid of the sea. Some supplies were given by the 
GOAL Foundation, but other than that, not much help was extended to the 
family. According to her, the couple registered as married in 2009 at which 
time some houses were still vacant, but the couple was not considered for 
allocation, and the houses were given to some undeserving people. 
According to the women, the family has not recovered from the impact of 
the Tsunami. They now have a disabled daughter, almost five years of age. 
The husband does some cultivation on government land, which he can be 
forced to vacate at any time. Some governmental officials even came and 
told the family to vacate the current impermanent house. However, after 
observing their situation the Government officer gave a signed letter say-
ing that the family could live on this land and house indefinitely. But they 
do not have a deed and the land still belongs to the government. The house 
does not have an electricity or water connection, but some non-function-
ing taps and wires could be seen in the house. The house is in a poor state 
with walls of old tarpaulin material, which can be seen through, the roof 
is rusted iron sheets with holes all over, and there is no rear door. There is 
no bathroom or latrine inside the house, just an outdoor toilet without a 
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door. Considering all the problems they are facing, the women said that 
there has been no reco very for them after the Tsunami, and the living con-
ditions have gone from bad to worse. The situation is precarious since they 
also have to take their daughter to Colombo for medical check-ups once 
every month, which is very expensive. According to her, the family is in a far 
worse condition now than before the disaster. 
The GS officer serving at the time of Tsunami was contacted for informa-
tion. When enquiring from him regarding the situation of the  seemingly 
neglected family, still residing in the temporary house made out of tent 
material, the GS replied that he knew the family and their condition well. 
He said that no doubt the family is in dire need of help and support from 
the government and the local community. However, he explained, their 
current situation is not the result of the Tsunami. He explained that it was 
not a question of being registered as a family or not, but that the couple in 
question were not married at the time of the Tsunami. Both the man and 
woman were living with their respective parents at the time of the Tsunami, 
and got married after the disaster. Because they could not afford a house 
of their own, they stayed in the temporary house originally donated to the 
husband’s parents. He said that according to government rules they had no 
formal claim to a permanent house built by any of the NGO’s. Several peo-
ple had fought for the couple and given them all the help they could, but 
to no avail. Also, he knew that the man was now farming on government 
land and in such cases, after a while such lands will be allotted to those 
cultivating it. So in reality, they are not in such a bad condition.
Here, we see separate views on an issue concerning the recovery process. 
On the one hand, we observed a family living in misery. The woman looked 
malnourished with a sick child on her lap, the house was breaking down, 
the toilet had no door, and there was no electricity or water connection, a 
situation caused by the fact, according to the woman, that the couple had 
not registered as a separate family. Therefore, they were not entitled to a 
house. For the woman and her family it was important to prove they were 
wrongfully neglected and not given the help they so desperately needed. 
On the other hand, according to the GS officer they were not entitled to 
get a separate house, as they did not fulfil the formal requirements, as they 
were not even married at the time of the Tsunami. We cannot say what are 
the actual facts here, but it is a pity that the family does not get the help 
they need, Tsunami or not. 
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Abstract
Sri Lanka was the second worst affected country by the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
on December 26th 2004, with between 30 to40.000 deaths, tens of thousands 
wounded, and approximately half a million people made homeless. Overall, the 
Tsunami affected two-thirds of the coastline of Sri Lanka. One of the hardest hit 
sites was the tourist areas in Tangalle, a town of about 10,500 people in the Ham-
bantota District. In Hambantota District, approximately ten per cent of the popula-
tion depends on tourism for their livelihood, with Tangalle as the most important 
tourist town in the district. The main objective of this study has been to expand 
our understanding and knowledge of the recovery process that has taken place 
in the tourist sector in Tangalle in the ten years after the Tsunami, and to identify 
both the successful and the not so successful activities and endeavours during this 
process, seen mainly from the affected population’s point of view. In our study, we 
have used the concepts of “bonds” and “bridges” to analyse the role of the internal 
ties and networks (bonds) and the relationships (bridges) between Tangalle and 
external agencies and institutions in the recovery process. The main finding from 
our study is that, although challenges still exist, the tourist industry in Tangalle has 
generally recovered from the Tsunami. Quite interestingly, the people interviewed 
were of the opinion that the civil war, lasting for thirty years, and ending with a 
total defeat for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009, was a stronger 
strain on the tourist industry than the Tsunami. The end of the civil war had had a 
remarkable effect on the growth of the tourism sector in Tangalle. Most hoteliers 
interviewed were therefore positive regarding the future of their businesses. 
Introduction
Sri Lanka was the second worst affected country of the Tsunami December 26th 
2004, with between 30 to 40.000 deaths, tens of thousands seriously wounded, 
and approximately half a million people made homeless. Overall, the Tsunami 
affected two-thirds of the coastline of Sri Lanka, where the eastern, north- eastern 
and south-eastern coast of Sri Lanka were particularly affected. As tourism was sus-
pended at the height of its peak season, many people working in coastal hotels 
and guest houses were affected (UNDP, 2005). 
According to the Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce (HDCC, 2005; 
HDCC, 2006), one of the hardest hit sectors within the Hambantota district was the 
tourist industry in the town of Tangalle, with a death toll of about 400 people. Also 
according to the HDCC (2005), around ten percent of Hambantota district’s pop-
ulation depends on tourism for their livelihood, with Tangalle as the most impor-
tant centre for tourism. Based on our findings, the number of people engaged in 
this industry is steadily increasing. The main objective of this study is to expand 
our understanding and knowledge about the tourist sector in Tangalle’s recovery 
process in the ten years after the Tsunami. Further, we seek to identify any spe-
cific obstacles that may have occurred during this time. In order to evaluate the 
success of the recovery process, we have found it necessary to address the tripar-
tite relationship between local government authorities, national and international 
non-governmental organizations (NGO and INGO), and the local people. 
In our analysis we use the terms of “bonds” and “bridges” (Nayaran, 1999; New-
man and Dale, 2005), where bonds describe the local relationships and networks 
used in the recovery process, and bridges describe the relationship to “external” 
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organisations and agencies, such as government authorities and institutions, and 
NGOs and INGOs, but also to other voluntary commitments, for instance from tour-
ists or outside businesspeople. 
Our study was based on a qualitative methodology with a specific focus on 
the role and function of aid and assistance during the ten years after the Tsunami. 
Through in-depth interviews with members of the local tourist industry, consisting 
of Hotel and Restaurant Owners (HRO), tourist shops, local businesses (suppliers), 
NGOs, banks, and local governmental authorities, we have been able to the iden-
tify post-disaster experiences of the local people, more specifically the obstacles in 
regards to the recovery process. Our specific research questions were the following:
1. What was the impact of the Tsunami on the tourist sector in Tangalle?
2. How did the affected businesses manage to recover? (What resources were 
made available and by whom?)
3. What have been the main challenges and constraints for the tourist sector in 
Tangalle during the recovery process?
4. What are the future prospects of the tourism sector in Tangalle?
Methodology
Since the research objective was to understand how people working in the tourist 
industry in Tangalle were affected by the Tsunami, and how they have managed 
to recover, we felt it was sensible to use a qualitative approach (Bryman, 2012). 
In order also to obtain an in-depth understanding of how disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) programmes may have had an effect on tourism, we believed it was impor-
tant that the informants could speak freely and present their pers pectives and per-
ceptions in their own words. 
In order to understand people’s perceptions, and to compare the various con-
ditions and experiences of what took place during the recovery process, we visi ted 
different sites in Tangalle, including eight small and medium size hotels (both inland 
and at the beach), one bakery that supplied baked goods to hotels, one local NGO, 
a local branch of the People’s Bank, a government institution and a transport and 
rental company. The selection of respondents for our interviews was based primarily 
on contacts made by our coordinator Mr. Damith Priyantha, who also functioned as 
an interpreter. We applied semi-structured interviews, meaning that the topics and 
questions were prepared beforehand in the form of an interview guide. The sequence 
and importance of questions were determined during the interview according to the 
situation and the person being interviewed. Flexibility was important, as the inter-
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viewer must be able to relate questions to each individual interviewee. We used the 
same interview guide for all interviews. 
During the study, we conducted 17 in-depth interviews with 19 different 
respondents comprising 13 men and six women. Each interview lasted for up to 
one hour. Some of the informants interviewed expressed concerns regarding the 
sensitivity of information. They feared losing their jobs and/or getting in trouble 
with the government. We explained that anonymity was a basic concern for this 
study. Interestingly, however, most of our respondents expressed that they would 
have no problem being named in the study report. 
Findings
Limitations and challenges 
When doing a field study for the first time in a foreign, cultural context, the chal-
lenges are many. The researchers’ own background, including such factors as gen-
der, age, educational level and cultural norms not only affect the way we position 
ourselves during the fieldwork, but also the way local people perceive us. Luck-
ily, all informants seemed very interested to talk with us, and to share their sto-
ries with us. Nevertheless, the fact that we were sometimes as many as six people 
conducting an interview may obviously affect the quality of the data received, as 
the respondents may have felt uncomfortable talking to so many foreigners at the 
same time. They never, however, expressed that this was a problem for them.
The language barrier was another challenge we encountered in the field. Over-
coming this obstacle required that we had to use an interpreter in some of the 
interviews. We are aware of the fact that it may have implications when sensitive 
information goes through a third person. This might have led to misunderstand-
ings and loss of important details. This was an issue we discussed with the inter-
preter. We should also mention that none of the respondents was acquainted with 
the concept of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), a fact that limi ted the data collection 
on this topic. 
Understanding the recovery process – Bonds and bridges
The disaster: Day 1 and the following days
Almost all the participants in this study were themselves directly affected by 
the Tsunami, with only two indirectly affected. The information gathered is 
thus based on an eyewitness account of the disaster. This section focuses on the 
initial phase, i.e. from the actual event when the Tsunami occurred and the few 
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following days and weeks. It is actually an account of the force of the wave, the 
experiences of the survival victims, and how the rescue operations and emer-
gency assistance took place.
The information gathered about the first impacts of the disaster is dominated by 
the narrative on how the gigantic waves cracked down on them with an immense 
power, and then the subsequent effects on the communities and the tourist sector 
(see Appendix, Case 1). It starts from their recollection of some strange movements 
in the sea, continued with gigantic waves appearing as a surprising force coming 
from the sea, and then to the destruction of the environment, properties and busi-
nesses. This dramatic event led to an immediate collapse of the Tangalle tourist 
industry. When the waves struck, none of the respondents knew what a tsunami 
was, or how to react in such a situation. Everyone was taken by surprise. The only 
thing to do was to try to escape. Many of the respondents managed to escape but 
lost family members as well as all or most of their belongings and businesses. The 
tourist industry was almost totally crushed by one blow as the tourists fled the area 
and all attractions, nature, hotels and restaurants were damaged.
The respondents reacted different to the Tsunami, and also told different sto-
ries from the day when the Tsunami struck. Some of them were carried almost 
three kilometres inland by the waves, some managed to hang on to a roof, while 
others were able to climb a palm tree. The majority of the people took to their 
heels and were able to run to higher lying areas. After the shock, some took refuge 
in various institutions and places of worship. Those who had gone to the morning 
markets inland now tried to return to their properties to see what was left and what 
damage was inflicted. It was a sad day for all. This deep sadness was accentuated 
by the fact that there was no warning systems or secure places to hide. «The same 
night was a sleepless night» (male HRO). 
There was a common perception among the respondents regarding the initial 
assistance and where it came from. Except for those that were indirectly affected 
(see Appendix, Case 2), the rest were assisted by local people from the same area, 
or people from the inland. Some also got help from tourists. The first days after the 
Tsunami was characterised by friends and relatives helping each other out. Some 
temples provided food, clothes and shelter for those who took refuge and were 
open for anyone who wanted help irrespective of religion. Affected people even 
started to provide self-help by organizing themselves into cooking groups collect-
ing money and preparing food for those in need. Government aid did not come 
during the first days of the disaster. When they were asked what they believed 
was the reason for the government’s absence, some answered that it might have 
been due to the logistics that were required before a massive aid operation could 
be organised. However, some INGOs and NGOs were able to move in with emer-
gency aid packages during the initial phase. The victims’ immediate needs were 
food, clothes, shelter and medicines. These items were provided as soon as roads 
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were cleared of debris and the infrastructure was functioning. The distribution 
of food and other basic stuff to the affected people was improved from day to 
day as many INGOs, NGOs and other agencies moved in to help. The assistance 
from INGOs and NGOs was, however, a delicate issue. While some respondents 
expressed a gratitude for the help they received from them, others blamed the 
organisations for being corrupt, spending money in improper ways, and  taking 
advantage of the situation. 
The recovery process and future prospect
It was now 10 years since the Tsunami struck the shores of Sri Lanka; leav-
ing memories, breeding bonds, building bridges and presenting a new life 
ahead. This section presents our findings and analysis of the time period from 
a few weeks after the Tsunami, the following ten years, but also the future 
prospects.
The rebuilding process
Among those hoteliers and restaurant owners directly affected by the Tsunami, 
the timeframe for rebuilding their businesses differ from one to six years, with 
most of the respondents saying they had completed the rebuilding around 2007. 
One hotel stands out from the others as it was fully rebuilt and back in business 
after only ten months. A possible reason behind this extraordinary case might be 
that the hotelier (HRO) had political influence and important connections, but 
obviously, he was also an efficient entrepreneur. This hotelier was staying at the 
restaurant the day the Tsunami struck, and was carried three kilometres into the 
interior with the second wave. Unconscious, he was brought to the hospital but 
after a week, he was back on his feet. He wanted to start the rebuilding imme-
diately but explained that he could not do it due to restrictions from the govern-
ment. Instead, he went to the bank where he got a loan. He also got financial 
donations from some individual tourists, and good help from the HDCC, friends 
and family. Another challenge for him – which was also mentioned by all of our 
respondents – was the lack of infrastructure after the tsunami. The beach area 
was damaged, with blocked roads, mud, debris and lack of electricity. Together 
with friends and family, the hotelier carried all the necessary building materials 
to the site, and started the rebuilding process after only one and a half months. 
Though this case differs from the others in terms of the rebuilding timeframe, it 
also shares a common feature with several other cases, namely that it was rebuilt 
on the exact same spot as it had been located before the Tsunami. 
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The role of the government
Prior to the Tsunami, the government had set up a buffer zone of 30 meters 
from the shore, implying that no buildings were allowed closer than 30 metres 
from the shore. This zone was not a security zone, but a zone to ensure that the 
hotels should not close the access along the sea. This buffer zone was extended 
to 100 meters after the Tsunami for security measures. With one exception, all 
the hotels belonging to the interviewed hoteliers were rebuilt and located at 
the beach limit of 30 metres, clearly ignoring the 100-meter buffer zone policy. 
The respondents told us that the major reason for this was connected to the 
ownership of the land where their hotels and restaurants were located. They did 
not own the land situated 100 meter from the shore. Several HROs expressed 
anger towards government restrictions, as they were threatened by the govern-
ment to have their hotels torn down if they built them at the old site. When 
asked about the risk of getting his hotel demolished by the government, another 
HRO responded: “I don’t care anymore. If they (ed. note the government) 
comes and destroy it, then let them. There is always a risk because you never 
know with those guys”. He was very dissatisfied with the government’s role in 
the entire recovery process. One specific example he brought up was that the 
government first announced through public media that the electricity and water 
should be distributed for free during the rebuilding process, but later they told 
the citizens to bring their bills for payment: “How could we do that when roads 
were blocked and everything was damaged?”
These two mentioned respondents expressed a deep dissatisfaction with the 
government. Whereas one of them received financial support from the NGO, 
Adopt Sri Lanka, none of them got any help from the government during the 
recovery process. Most of the other HROs interviewed said that they received 
5000 rupee per month for one year in addition to necessary food and clothes. 
They also got Tsunami loans. These were loans with low interest (9% instead 
of 15 to 16%) aimed at Tsunami affected businesses where the biggest group of 
recipients in Tangalle was the tourist businesses. All respondents who had taken 
this loan said that it was a great contribution to the rebuilding of the hotels, 
though not enough for full recovery. An HRO (male) said: “The government 
did their best. It was not good enough but they did the best they could” and 
followed up with “we are not satisfied with the government’s assistance now 
– ten years after – we need skilled labour and training programmes: the govern-
ment can solve this problem, but they don’t. They only take persons from the 
street and ask them to work.”
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The role of NGOs and INGOs
An important finding is that most respondents felt that INGOs and NGOs con-
tributed more to the recovery process than the government, both in scope and 
scale. The INGOs and NGOs built temporarily houses, provided food, clothes 
and grants, and, most importantly, filled up the non-damaged hotels when they 
arrived on the scene. An anonymous (female) owner of a small home-stay near 
the beach told us that “some people were very poor before the Tsunami, and 
became rich after” due to the help given by NGOs. According to another guest-
house owner “there was improvement with my business after the Tsunami and 
that is why I have gotten my own license now”. While some expanded the 
number of rooms in the rebuilding process, others rebuilt with more durable 
materials. 
In spite of this positive attitude to the INGOs and NGOs, there are a few 
cases where respondents expressed mistrust towards them, and blamed them 
for corruption. A male hotel employee said that “the NGO workers had a great 
time, drinking wine and spending a lot of money that I don’t think was their 
own. We couldn’t do anything, but accept what we were given, because these 
were the people that came to help us.” 
A “beachman” (i.e. a man selling souvenirs etc. to tourists on the beach) 
described something similar. He thought the NGOs’ aid and assistance was 
not very transparent because most of what they brought was not really useful. 
Due to limited time, we were not able elaborate on this issue. Therefore, it is 
important to stress that even though there might have been corruptive prac-
tices, the views presented above are these respondents’ own perceptions and not 
necessarily the truth. As the head of the NGO ‘Business Creation’ in Tangalle 
(Appendix, Case 2) made us aware of, the attitude of people was often coloured 
by unrealistic demands or desires for what the INGOs, NGOs and government 
authorities could provide them with. This may be an important cause for the 
accusations about corruptive practices among aid organisations. 
Lack of synergy between the public and the private sphere 
Based on the findings from the above sections, we may draw the conclusion that 
there was a rather weak social relationship, or lack of synergy, between individu als 
in the tourist industry and government authorities. This can be experienced by the 
fact that, at one side, the individuals expect certain things from the government, 
while they, on the other side, ignore governmental restrictions. Despite this lack of 
synergy, the manager of Tangalle People’s Bank informed us that the governmental 
Tsunami loans were successfully repaid, with an almost 100% repayment rate after 
five years. Both the local government, NGOs (aiding with business creations), and 
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the HRO agreed that loans and support received during the early recovery stages 
have been successfully repaid. Based on our findings, we assume that this success-
ful repayment story is, largely, due to increased tourism in the aftermath of the 
Tsunami (and the civil war), with subsequent higher income to the hotels.
A male hotel owner expressed the role of the Tsunami in this manner: The 
Tsunami was both a good thing and a bad thing”. While the Tsunami caused 
both short and long-term negative effects, such as loss of friends and family and 
destruction of businesses, there were also some positive impacts, such as, for 
instance, an expansion and upgrading of hotels and restaurants. Economically, 
all respondents except for one (see Appendix, Case 3) informed us that things 
are more or less back to normal, and that the tourist industry has improved 
after the Tsunami. Based on our findings, it seems to be a tendency that bridges 
rather than bonds have been most important in the long-term recovery process. 
It is, however, important to stress that since we are dealing with the tourist 
industry as a business sector, bridges have been a more important factor since 
access to capital was of such a vital concern.
The end of the war
Contrary to our initial idea that an immediate and successful post-tsunami 
recovery process would have a substantial impact on the tourist industry, it was 
interesting to note that the majority of our respondents believed that it was the 
end of the civil war in 2009 that has been the main reason for the success of 
the hotel industry in the recent years. Several respondents stated that tourists 
had forgotten about the Tsunami a short while after it happened, but that they 
were afraid of the war. Thus, it was after 2009 that tourism had this remarkable 
growth. An hotelier told us that “the tourism is very good now, full rooms in 
the high seasons, and we also have a restaurant so we have many guests. It is a 
family hotel. I think it is going to be better in the future also as the tourist is not 
afraid.” 
A female hotelier emphasised the importance of beautiful nature and long, 
white and clean beaches for tourists. This demand for “paradise” may also be a 
possible explanation why hotels were rebuilt close to shore. Those who started 
up their business before the end of the war in 2009, say that the same number of 
tourists came back right after they had re-opened their hotels and shops. How-
ever, the first two years after the Tsunami were very quiet due to the damaged 
hotels and restaurants. 
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Data gap 2006–2009
Regarding the recovery process, there seems to be a kind of gap in our data 
for the period between 2006 and the end of the war. None of our respondents 
actually mentioned any big challenges, developments or specific situations dur-
ing this time. The reason for this data gap is most probably that people felt 
that when they had rebuilt their hotels after a couple of years, they received 
approximately the same number of tourists as before the Tsunami. So, the most 
substantial change they experienced was when the war ended in 2009. The most 
important challenges they have faced during the last decade, even after 2009, 
was mostly connected to lack of infrastructure, and the unwillingness of the 
government to listen to their claims and demands. 
Disaster risk reduction
When studying the disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities organized by the gov-
ernment within the first months and years after the Tsunami, we found that little 
or no training has been carried out in recent years. This does not only go for DRR 
activities. The government’s role in the recovery process decreased, almost seized 
up, after the first year. As one HRO told us: “The government provided food and 
some money monthly that we used on essential needs. However, they stopped 
after one year. Ten years after, we do not receive any help from the government”.
There was also diverging responses between the local government and 
HROs in regards to DRR training. While many HROs argued that the disaster 
training organized by the government after the Tsunami was no longer in opera-
tion, the local government secretary in an interview maintained that the training 
was organised once every year. 
There are various opinions regarding the feeling of safety among the local peo-
ple. To a certain degree, there seems to be a gender difference here. Women tended 
to answer that they were still afraid of the Tsunami, while men did not express any 
specific concerns in this regard. A female owner of a small hotel explained that 
she was especially worried when there is a rough sea, and that she was still afraid 
of going to sleep. Another female owner of a home-stay mentioned that she got 
afraid of the sound when big rocks crashed into each other, a sound that today 
comes from the building of wave break constructions – a governmental project. 
Some respondents were sceptical of this project when they said that it had already 
started causing environmental challenges such as noise pollution and beach 
removal. But also here the responses are ambivalent. Although the constructions 
are making the area safer, most respondents feared that the project could have 
negative long-term effects on the environment as well as the tourist industry.
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When asked about emergency training as part of disaster management pro-
grammes, none of our respondents was aware of any taking place. We were 
often answered with a contra-question: “What training do you mean?” This 
strengthened our earlier findings that it has been due to a lack of government 
presence after the first year. The general response we were given was that there 
were no specific training programs for disaster preparedness other than an 
alarm system, which two of our respondents said they could not even hear. The 
rest gave quite different responses in regards to when and how the alarm system 
functioned as a drill. Other than this, one respondent said that they had received 
some training from the Navy Camp staff four or five times right after the Tsu-
nami, but training ended a long time ago. It seems that the only drills taking 
place were between family and friends, a training based on the experiences from 
those who survived the Tsunami. 
According to the local government Assistant Secretary, the 100-meter buffer 
zone regulation has now been amended to 60 meters in order to meet the demands 
of the tourist industry, while still maintaining some level of security. It was, how-
ever, clear from our observations that several hotels and restaurants were situated 
much less than 60 meters from the sea. 
Whilst discussing with our respondents, we noticed that all respondents had 
a plan in mind of what they would do in case of a disaster, e.g. climbing a coconut 
tree or running to a higher ground, indicating that there was still a high conscious-
ness about the possibility for future disasters. Some respondents, mostly female, 
were, quite clearly still very much afraid of future disaster.
The role of religion
An interesting finding from our study was the people’s religious perceptions. 
The respondents from the study in Tangalle are Buddhists, and they demon-
strated a high level of religious faith during the Tsunami events. This is also 
reflected in the answers we received in our interviews. Although the respondents 
in general considered the Tsunami in itself to be a natural phenomenon, the 
majority of them said that they and their families had been protected by Lord 
Buddha during the disaster. Some referred to the temples and Buddhist (or even 
Christian) statues, either in the hotels or at home, that were not damaged by 
the waves. They were proofs of the protection from Lord Buddha. A female 
hotelier referred to the importance of Karma by saying “Every morning I clean 
the beach, so I take care of the environment and by doing so, the environment 
is taking care of me”. This task gave her a good Karma.
A man who lost his daughter insisted that the death of his daughter did not 
alter his perception about Lord Buddha’s role in his life: Buddha must have had his 
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own plans for the destiny of this family. Similarly, a female respondent (see Appen-
dix, Case 3) displayed the same belief and courage in Lord Buddha, despite the fact 
that the disaster had destroyed both her business and marriage, and put her in a 
constant dispute with the authority in Sri Lanka. She still believed that it was Lord 
Buddha who saved the life of her ex-husband who was severely injured.
From the responses, it seems fair to claim that the victims’ religious faith pro-
vided answers to their daily problems and the hardships encountered in life as well 
as a being a refuge to unanswered questions about the purpose in life. 
Future prospects
Considering the current situation, all respondents, except for one (see Appendix, 
Case 3), were optimistic for the future of the tourist industry. Many had plans and 
initiated efforts to increase the business capacity (more rooms, more land, and more 
workers) in anticipation of an increasing number of tourists in the future. A couple 
that owns a small bakery providing the hotels with fresh breads and pastries, told 
us that their future plan was to relocate their bakery to a bigger premises in town, 
instead of inland where they are now located. A female home-stay owner wanted 
to renovate the rooms and build a new bathroom. A female hotelier and her father 
were hoping to build a new kitchen. The owners of small hotels and souvenir shops 
believed that the competition from newer and bigger hotels would give a posi-
tive impact on their businesses. Though they were hopeful and positive about the 
future of tourism, some also expressed a concern regarding the preservation of the 
natural environment. Others argued that Tangalle needs new attractions such as a 
better nightlife to attract more tourists. The government, for its part, has a goal of 
attracting 2.5 million tourists to Sri Lanka by 2016. Specific development projects 
are planned for Tangalle, such as a botanical garden, bird watching places and a 
blowhole-viewing place. As part of the big national enterprise plan, huge infra-
structure development projects are going on across the country and some of the 
biggest in Hambantota district. In this regard, the future looks bright for the tourist 
industry in Tangalle.
Conclusion
The 2004 Tsunami had a massive impact on tourism in Tangalle. Most of the hotels, 
restaurants and attractions were completely destroyed, with beaches filled with 
mud and debris, leaving no place for tourists to stay and enjoy beach life. However, 
most HROs were able to rebuild their businesses, with even more rooms and more 
durable material, within two years, mostly due to contributions from various NGOs, 
INGOs, and with Tsunami loans from the local state owned bank. Although these 
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loans made a great contribution to the recovery process, most respondents stated 
that it was the NGOs and INGOs who contributed most to the recovery process, 
both in scope and scale. 
Some of the most important constraints during the recovery process have 
been restrictions from the government, e.g. the 100 metres buffer zone, and lack of 
infrastructure and electricity. Additionally, there were a few cases where respond-
ents expressed mistrust towards the INGOs and NGOs, and blamed them for cor-
ruption. These latter respondents were workers in the hotel industry, not owners. 
Nevertheless, it is important to underpin that these are the perceptions of some 
respondents, and not stated facts. Unrealistic demands and desires for what the 
INGOs and NGOs could provide might have coloured their opinions. We also found 
that the relationship, or synergy, between the tourist industry and the government 
was rather weak, almost absent. This situation is not necessarily a consequence of 
the Tsunami and the recovery activities, but rather a general mistrust and dissatis-
faction with the government. 
Overall, the tourism industry seems to have recovered well after the Tsu-
nami. The fact that the Tsunami loans had been successfully repaid, and that 
most respondents have expanded their businesses point in this direction. Most 
hotels were back in business after two years, but it was only after the end of 
the civil war in 2009 that tourism had a substantial growth. Consequently, 
it may seem that it was the war more than the Tsunami that had constrained 
the develop ment of the tourist industry. As stated by one of the respondents: 
“ Tourists are not afraid of the Tsunami, but they are afraid of the war”.
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Appendix II: Case studies regarding the tourist industry in Tangalle
Case 1: We lived through it
Informants: A father and daughter, owners of guest house and restau-
rant’, Medaketiya Beach, Tangalle
Early on the 26th of December 2004, the male informant – a fisherman 
and a hotel owner in Tangalle -went down to his two guests to ask if 
they wanted something to eat for breakfast. He registered quickly that 
something had changed in the sea as the water had elevated. He politely 
asked his guests to come with him further up the hill, away from the 
shore. Less than ten minutes later, the big wave came. His intuitions res-
cued his family and two guests that day. He says: “The wave came very 
slowly at first, with elevated water 5 km into shore. Then it went back 
before the big wave came back ten minutes later”.
This is his daughter’s story of the recovery process of the family run guest-
house in Tangalle: Because our guesthouse was part of our home, we lost 
not only our business, we also lost our home. We therefore had to stay in 
a temple situated inland the following week. We did not receive any help 
and had to rely on our family for help. After one week, we moved into my 
grandmother’s house and from there we started cleaning up the property. 
During the two first years after the Tsunami, we received some aid to 
manage our basic expenses and medicine. Adopt Sri Lanka, a local 
NGO, gave us monthly grants and the Government gave us a tempo-
rary home and a new boat so that my father could work as a fisherman. 
Adopt Sri Lanka also gave us LKR 500 000 to rebuild our house and 
guesthouse. The NGOs provided more help than the government. The 
government provided food and some money monthly that we used on 
essential needs. However, they stopped after one year. Ten years after, 
we do not receive any help from the government. 
After two years, we also managed to open up a new and improved 
guesthouse, situated at the exact place as before, even though the Gov-
ernment put a 100-meter buffer zone It is my father’s land, and I grew 
up here, it is also good for business being so close to the beach as it is 
what tourists want.
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Ten years later, we divide living in the guesthouse and the house provided 
by the government, depending on the season. Our main income is still tour-
ism, and we have managed to increase our business with a bigger guest-
house. Because of the war, the demand was still not too big before 2009. 
The war affected the tourism more than the Tsunami. My father is still a 
fisherman, supporting our income and he supplies the guesthouse with 
fish. We have built a new restaurant and I hope to build a new kitchen that 
is closer to the restaurant. I am very hopeful for the future, the tourism is 
very good now, full rooms in the high seasons, and we also have a restau-
rant so we have many guests. I think it is going to be better in the future 
also as the tourist is not afraid of a new disaster, but I am still afraid.
Case 2: How we managed
Informant: Head of the NGO ‘Business Creation’ in Tangalle
On the 26th of December, the informant was at the local Sunday market 
inland to buy some products for his house, when people around him 
started acting scared. He did not understand the seriousness of the situ-
ation before he saw the elevated water coming, and reacted by running 
away. On that particular day, he was lucky and lost only his car. He tells:
Following the disaster, I did everything I could to assist the people that 
were impacted by the tsunami, and I was involved with a local rescue 
group of volunteers, helping injured people, and collecting dead bodies. 
I also received many phone calls from friends in need that day, so I did 
my best to provide medicine and food for them as well.
During the two first years after the Tsunami, I also expanded my busi-
ness to include disaster relief programs, and I worked closely with inter-
national and local NGOs, including World Vision Sri Lanka, Child 
Found, Chamber of Commerce, UNDP and Caritas. I provided the 
NGOs with internet services and local information about the area. In 
addition to this, I was functioning as a local contact mediator between 
the areas’ NGOs and the people affected in regards to loans and grants. 
To be able to provide what was needed, I visited the people affected 
individually to hear their stories. During the first year, I helped around 
60 individuals to rebuild their businesses.
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The main challenge of the recovery process for my business, but also 
in general, has been to change the mind-set of the directly affected peo-
ple in regards to bad attitude. My organization experienced that many 
affected people were displeased with the help provided by the NGOs, in 
the way that they always compared what they received in grants, loans 
and help with other people. For example if one person got two boats 
from the government or the NGOs, and another person got a fishing 
rod, the person who got the fishing rod was displeased as he or she 
did not take into account the fact that people had lost different things 
with different values. In my opinion, the NGOs did their best to return 
the things that people actually had lost, regardless of what the people 
wanted in grants and equipment. However, this was not easy to explain 
for those who had lost everything, as they wanted the same treatment 
and donations. We also had some challenges attached to limited funds, 
information on how to get back in business, technology to make the 
process go faster and information, regarding how to reduce the risk 
of future disasters. The last challenge is also evident today, as the only 
preparedness tool we have is an alarm system.
Despite these challenges, the people and their businesses recovered very 
fast in Tangalle. This may be because of international aid, and the fact that 
we opened up our doors for foreigners very fast. Personally, I believe that 
80 per cent of the help came from the local NGOs and international help. 
However, local people and tourists also made an effort. Only 10 per cent 
of the help came from the government, and only in the first year.
Today, I see a bright future for the tourism sector here in Tangalle. 
Costumer care and service training is, however, a big challenge in this 
area and the main barrier to attracting tourists, and to make them come 
back again. 
Case 3: No assistance
In comparison to the majority of the cases from the tourist industry in 
Tangalle discussed in this report, the following case represents a dif-
ferent perspective on the recovery process. While the majority of the 
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informants received a varying amount of aid after the disaster and expe-
rienced a general increase in income, the following case represents an 
interesting exception
Informant: Female owner of a guest house and restaurant, Medaketiya 
Beach, Tangalle
The small guesthouse is located directly at the Madeketiya Beach in Tan-
galle. The place is owned and managed by the informant, and was built in 
1979, being the first guesthouse in the area. In the events of the Tsunami 
2004 that especially hit the Eastern beach side in Tangalle, the property 
was completely destroyed.
On the day of the Tsunami in December 2004, the informant was not in Tan-
galle. She was in Germany with her two sons where she now lives. She was 
immediately informed about the Tsunami disaster in Sri Lanka via phone 
by a friend in Colombo: “Sri Lanka is under water”. Her then German hus-
band was at the guesthouse at that time and was seriously injured under 
the impact of the wave, but managed to climb on the roof of the building, 
which saved his life. The informant managed to come to Tangalle one month 
after the Tsunami, where she was able to see the entire impact of the disaster 
on her property. In the meantime, her husband at the time stayed with her 
family, a bit further inland. Since everybody in the area was directly affected, 
it was difficult to help and support each other in the local community. Most 
crucial, therefore, in the first days was self-help, but also the emergency help 
received from other villages inland. Due to the delayed arrival of the owner 
and the severe injury of her former husband, they were not able to apply 
for assistance from NGOs and the government until a month after the Tsu-
nami. The applications were rejected, based on the arguments of the delay, 
the German citizenship of the husband and the fact that the owner and her 
children permanently reside in Germany. Another factor was that the guest-
house was registered as a business building, and not a private home, which 
made it unfitted for aid programs targeting the recovery of private house-
holds.
The family owned a private house nearby, but due to the low stand-
ard and other difficulties, it was unsuitable for them to live in. As a 
result, they used a small annex to the guesthouse. Accordingly, the 
only assistance the family received was a grant from the government 
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(LKR 250.000) to rebuild the foundation of a private house. Apart 
from this one-time payment, which was heavily delayed, the family 
and their tourist business neither received any further assistance from 
NGOs or the government, nor loans from banks in the aftermath of 
the Tsunami.
Instead, they were expected to use private savings in order to clean up the 
property and rebuild the house and the business. In addition, they tried 
to collect donations (NGOs, church and private people) in  Germany. 
This was not successful, because of the general wish to donate to the 
country, not to give individual assistance, and the overwhelming pres-
ence of media charity events in German media at that time.
The rebuilding process started in 2006 and was mostly finished one year 
later, in 2007. Nonetheless, according to the informant, there are still 
many parts of the building that are under construction, incomplete or of 
a temporary nature (e.g. kitchen). Regarding the overall recovery pro-
cess, there has been little progress and mostly challenges in the years 
after the Tsunami. She is very frustrated and disappointed about the 
unfair distribution of resources by the government and NGOs. While 
most neighbouring places are better off after the disaster and managed 
to improve buildings and business, adjusting to the rising tourist num-
bers, business at her guesthouse is still significantly weakened after the 
Tsunami, facing an unsure future.
Ten years after the Tsunami, the informant still feels disadvantaged and 
neglected in the recovery process: “The Tsunami destroyed our busi-
ness, and the money went in the wrong hands, the government didn’t 
distribute the money in a fair way, so the rich became richer.” “We were 
the first place here, there were only huts here before the Tsunami, now 
everybody has nice houses and are rich, and we have nothing.”
In addition, she experiences challenges connected to the general/global 
economic development (with ups and downs), which is reflected in the 
tourist industry (i.e. tourist numbers and prices). However, the greatest 
challenge is seen in the government’s restrictions to tourism (prices for 
water and electricity, beer sale, taxes). Moreover, there were ‘punish-
ment’ payments resulting from a court case on property issues. As busi-
ness payments (e.g. water, electricity) are more expensive than for pri-
vate homes, many places engaged in tourism use the private registration 
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for the business as well, saving a considerable amount of payments. 
As the guesthouse is registered as a business building, even though the 
 family also lives there when they are in the country, they pay business 
prices also for private usage.
The current economic and social situation of the family business is quite 
difficult. Tourism has always been the main income for the family, but 
the former husband is now old and permanently unable to work after 
the Tsunami injuries; he only receives a small pension. As the business 
does not generate much income, it is difficult to accumulate new savings, 
since all private savings were used for rebuilding the house. In order to 
finance the sons’ education, the owner has to take up low-paid part-
time jobs in Germany. The children have German citizenship, and do 
not visit Sri Lanka so often (due to costs and visa problems). The social 
network, including family bonds, is quite weak, as the family is spread 
over two countries/cultures. They would all like to live at the beach in 
Sri Lanka, but see many problems (e.g. health, education, infrastructure, 
government, traumatic experience). Therefore, the owner is interested in 
partnership and other investors in the business. Due to all the various 
factors and challenges, she perceived the future of the business as uncer-
tain. She is even considering selling the place in order to pay for her 
sons’ higher education in Germany, which she clearly prioritizes: “My 
children have a bright future” [in Germany].
Concerning environmental issues influencing business after the Tsunami, 
the guesthouse owner mentions the value of the beach for tourism: “The 
beach is our source of income, like an insurance.” There is a construc-
tion of a large breakwater rock-structure at the beach right in front of 
the guesthouse. The construction is connected to a considerable amount 
of disturbance for the tourist business (i.e. noise and dust, interruption 
of long beach). Even though she did not mention the constructions in 
the interview, one might predict the possible impact of these large break-
water structures for tourism in the future.
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Chapter 8 
Back to business? 
The Case of Hambantota Business people  
ten years after the Tsunami
Brennan Purtzer, Didier Nduwayo, Harald Bang-Braaten Thoresen, 
Suman Nepal, and Thorbjørn Waal Lundsgaard  
in association with Kumara Kaldera (HDCC coordinator)
Abstract
This study was conducted to explore the ten years of recovery for the business 
community of Hambantota after the 2004 Tsunami. Twenty-one interviews 
were conducted during this study. The study reveals three interesting find-
ings. Firstly, that the government’s approach to establish a mega infrastructure 
development project in the Hambantota district has negatively impacted on the 
business community. Secondly, that the lack of investment capital has been the 
most significant challenge throughout the recovery process. Some business peo-
ple experienced problems finding loan guarantees, while low interest rates and 
longer repayment periods were found to be helpful, the researchers found the 
financial infrastructure to be inadequate. Thirdly, that the roles of NGOs and 
civil society were encouraging and supportive in the recovery process, despite 
some mismanagement of databases and irregular distribution of resources. The 
study found that the business community of Hambantota has still not fully 
recovered. 
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Introduction
The role played by the business community is vital anywhere in the world. 
Therefore, to examine how, and to what degree, the business community has 
responded and recovered from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami it is of para-
mount importance to learn from mistakes and develop more accurate responses 
to disasters in the future. 
This study examines the economic impact of the Tsunami on the business 
community in Hambantota, as well as its recovery from it during the last ten 
years. The recovery and development of the business sector will be mapped in 
the light of economic growth and other impacting factors that can be said to 
have a direct effect on the business community e.g. social and cultural elements. 
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Micro, small, and medium enterprises have always been the core of Hamban-
tota’s business community. Farming and fishing are the main economic activi-
ties. Similarly, retail trading, wholesale trading, salt production and the service 
industry together constitute the business activities of the city.
Further, the study looks at business community measures taken to limit future 
impacts on business activity from disasters. Ten years comprises a rational span of 
time to investigate the recovery efforts undertaken and the current status of the 
business community. A decade is a sufficient time window for institutions, the gov-
ernment, NGOs and other relevant bodies in the post-tsunami recovery to re-mo-
bilize and focus their efforts where needed. Considering the above, this report asks 
how well the business sector in Hambantota has recovered.
Research Questions 
1. What are the main factors that have influenced the business recovery?
2. What have been the main challenges in this process?
3. What are the current challenges?
4. To what extent has the business sector fully recovered from the Tsunami?
The report is based on findings from an intensive fieldwork where five researchers 
in two groups carried out a total of 21 in-depth interviews. The respondents were 
small business owners affected by the Tsunami, and several relevant stakeholders 
based on a locally-assisted stakeholder-mapping study. 
This report proceeds as follows: 1) The methodology used to collect, vali-
date and verify data is briefly presented together with a reflection on relevant 
ethical issues and challenges based on group discussions held throughout 
the research process, 2) data is presented and tied to the research questions, 
and 3) based on the findings, an analysis focuses on the investigation of factors 
that repeatedly surfaced amongst data subjects.
Methodology
It is a challenge to acquire an adequate understanding of the overall business sector 
in Hambantota, both in regards to its general structure, and when mapping the 
development of the business sector through the last ten years after the 2004 Tsu-
nami. In order to meet this challenge, this report – and the data it presents – was 
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based on qualitative methodology. The data needed was gathered mainly through 
semi-structured interviews, and by analysing existing literature on the topic8.
Qualitative Interview
Interviews are recognised as the most important and widely used qualitative 
method (Ryen 2002: 15). The main purpose behind an interview is to get thorough 
and comprehensive information about how people perceive their life, and the 
views and perspectives they have on topics that are addressed in the interview 
situation (Thagaard 1998: 87). In order to create a report on the state of the local 
business sector, the researchers had to make direct contact with a wide range of 
different business owners, trade association- and political representatives, as well 
as local bank- and insurance companies. In this context, interviewing is an ade-
quate way of addressing issues that would be difficult to observe directly (Bryman 
2012: 494). Through these interviews, we received valuable information about the 
experiences, thoughts and feelings amongst the local business community. 
The interviews used in this report are semi-structured. As Bryman (2012: 470) 
explains – a semi-structured interview has a determined theme in advance, but the 
order of the questions can be changed along the way. This enables a more flexible 
interview process, which helps to build trust between the interviewee and inter-
viewer, which again leads to a more open and honest interview. 
Literature Review 
In addition to interviews, this report utilized previous HDCC reports on the topic, 
as well as indicative articles and reports from both scholars and governmental 
authorities. This enabled us to get an overall understanding of the local business 
sector, the severe impacts of the Tsunami, and the recovery process throughout 
the ten years since the disaster. 
Reliability and Validity 
After collecting data and analysing our findings, we immediately started to tri-
angulate the information in order to cross-reference and validate it, and secure 
that we all agreed about what results our data revealed. We codified and oper-
ationalized all the issues raised by respondents in the interviews into quantified 
and measurable data, in order to enable quick identification by counting repeat-
edly raised elements. This, in an effective manner, gave us solid information 
8 See literature review.
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about the similarities and differences in our findings, and in effect was used for 
guiding the main focus of this report. 
Limitations and Ethical Considerations
Conducting research in a foreign country will always involve process limitations. 
Most prominent was the limited time we had to collect data and finalize this report. 
So, in order to adapt to this factor, we had to divide our group and plan our research 
approach accordingly. Luckily, we had an experienced local coordinator, who was 
helpful in putting us in contact with various businesses and other informants.
We also encountered a language barrier. Many Sri Lankans speak very good Eng-
lish, but due to, among other things, Hambantota’s relatively low exposure to for-
eigners, many of the city’s older population have limited English vocabularies. Com-
municating via a local translator effectively solved this. Regardless of the research 
area and research topic, one should always take ethical aspects into consideration. 
In this report, we have continuously gathered data bearing in mind the four aspects 
presented by Diener and Crandall (in Bryman 2012, p.135):
• Whether there is harm to participants;
• Whether there is a lack of informed consent;
• Whether there is an invasion of privacy;
• Whether deception is involved.
By conducting the research in accordance with these considerations, the chances 
for breaking ethical principles became significantly smaller. We have done so by 
carefully explaining what our agenda has been, and why, to the interviewees. The 
interviews this report is based on are all the result of voluntary participation, and 
the interviewees remain anonymous. 
Findings
Neglecting small businesses 
One single factor was clearly visible throughout the 21 interviews conducted; 
the small business owners, insurance company and local politician all had the 
impression that the government neglected small businesses in the process of 
identifying needs, and taking action in general. Eleven out of the 21 subjects 
cited this directly. In particular, the closure of the Old Tangalle Road (which 
resulted in significantly less customer exposure) was highlighted; 11 mentioned 
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this, thus representing the lack of weak-local stakeholder engagement as one of 
the major findings in this report. This notion is also supported by a government 
official respondent, who stated: “There were no feedback sessions to assess 
community interests on this matter” (pers. comment).
Several different replies to this question can be interpreted in support of this 
notion. For example, a typical response to the question was: “New shops after Tsu-
nami was torn down by government to make room for the seashore development 
project. We were given no compensation”.9 This indirectly confirms the above ten-
dency to neglect small stakeholder interests.
On the other hand, five respondents interpreted the urban development pro-
ject as a positive long-term project, and nine have a positive outlook on the future, 
despite their weak involvement in the development and recovery process. Another 
element that repeatedly surfaced was the small number of businesses that have 
fully recovered. Only six of 17 business owners claim to have fully recovered. 
Bank loans
During our interview with a representative from the Bank of Ceylon (BoC), a 
major government-owned commercial bank, we learned that the Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka instructed banks to give out loans, including micro loans, to peo-
ple affected by the Tsunami. These loans had a 6% interest rate, lower than the 
standard 10% at the time, with six months or a one-year grace period, paya-
ble over a three to four years’ time period, with a maximum loan amount of 
400,000 rupees. However, the Central Bank did not guarantee the loans, and 
so approval was at the discretion of the individual banks. The individual banks 
evaluated applicants by their personal means to repay, including bank relation-
ships, credit history, etc. 
In our interviews of 17 business managers from Hambantota, we found that 
four had been denied loans to rebuild their businesses. Five people chose, for var-
ious reasons, not to apply for a loan through banks, while seven chose to do so. 
In addition to this, three persons borrowed money from friends or family. Two of 
these were among the four that had been denied commercial loans. 
We were also informed through our interview with an experienced insurance 
manager that all Sri Lankan insurance companies decided to pay out 100% to all 
affected policyholders – even though Tsunami coverage was not included in pol-
icies at the time of the disaster. On the other hand, we found that only four out of 
the 17 business managers we spoke to actually had insurance at that time. Two 
out of the 13 that did not have insurance wanted it, but could not afford the costs, 
while five respondents now have insurance following the Tsunami, but did not 
9 This was the case for six respondents.
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have it at that time. The remaining six had never been insured, and had no inten-
tion of getting an insurance policy. 
Nearly all respondents had the urgent need of capital or/and access to credit 
after the Tsunami in common. Some received financial assistance from the Ham-
bantota District Chamber of Commerce (HDCC), but these amounts were generally 
too low by themselves to restore their businesses. 
The respondents’ answer to the question on their engagement in disaster, risk 
reduction activities after the disaster varied. Six said they had been participating 
in such activities, while others were positive about the idea, but had not actively 
participated themselves.
On the question of external assistance in the recovery process, all the respond-
ents described the Tzu Chi foundation, a Taiwanese NGO, as the best organisation 
working for the recovery of Hambantota. Six respondents were, however, critical 
about the national and international organizations’ responses. Their main criti-
cisms regarded inappropriate database management, inappropriate allocation of 
resources, as well as irregular distribution of cash and other basic amenities. 
Analysis
The above findings suggest a strong correlation between a low engagement 
among both the local business people and the government in the development 
and recovery efforts, and an overall limited economic recovery among small busi-
ness owners. This was not only connected to efforts directly related to the Tsu-
nami. There were also many projects not related to the Tsunami that had a neg-
ative impact on the business community (see under “The post-tsunami recovery 
process and the impact of the large scale development projects”). Several busi-
ness people mentioned the negative effects of the closure of the  previous main 
road running through the centre of Hambantota (The Old Tangalle Road). This 
road had provided local small businesses located near the road with the main con-
tingent of customers. This important business opportunity disappeared with the 
closure of the road. Although the closure of the road and other urban develop-
ment schemes, e.g. the building of the seaside amusement park and moving the 
district and municipality administration three km. out of the town centre forced 
several business people out of their traditional business area, it cannot be said to 
have happened as a direct cause of the Tsunami. Challenges from other factors 
measured in the study (e.g. access to capital, poorly coordinated NGO response 
and a weak response from the government) only adds these urban development 
schemes to the pile of existing complications that retarded the development and 
recovery process for the business community. As a result, the urban development 
schemes can be said to have had a damaging effect on the overall post-Tsunami 
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business recovery process, though not as a direct consequence of the concrete 
post-Tsunami recovery projects themselves.
Legal issues
The government behaviour in response to the business recovery efforts, and 
the policy behind the urban development projects, are legally questiona-
ble. The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (2011) 
Article 27 (2)(e) mentions how “the equitable distribution among all citizens of 
the material resources of the community and the social product” must benefit 
“the common good”, and the concurrent list III (7:1), (7:2), (7:3) specifies a focus on: 
“i) Relief, rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons; ii) Relief of distress 
due to floods, droughts, epidemics or other exceptional causes and rehabilitation 
and resettlement of those affected; iii) Restoration, reconstruction and rehabili-
tation of towns, villages, public institutions and properties, industries, business 
places, places of worship and other properties destroyed or damaged, grant of 
compensation or relief to persons or institutions who have sustained loss or dam-
age and the reorganization of civil life.” 
According to the findings from this study, small business owners were experi-
encing circumstances that may amount to breaches of their constitutional rights. 
Legal contradictions that prevent an effective safeguarding of businesses and busi-
ness recovery, especially with regard to Hambantota with significant coastal activ-
ity, can be seen in the following legislation: The Coast Conservation Act (No. 57 of 
1981), which in its section 42 defines the coastal zone as “three hundred meters 
landwards of the Mean High Water Line and a limit of two kilometres seawards of 
the Mean Low Water Line.” Any development within this area has to be consistent 
with Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP), which means it must not have an 
impact on the stability, productivity, and environment quality of the coastal zone. 
These two above points clash with section 2(b)1 & 4A of the Reclamation and 
Development Corporation Amending Act (RDCAC No. 52 of 1982 because they are 
poorly enforced (Jayawardane. 2010: 3). Further, caution with regard to business 
development and recovery fails to be addressed by the derogations found in sec-
tion 31 of the Mines and Minerals Act (No. 33 of 1992), which, in turn, also clashes 
with Coast Conservation Act (No. 57 of 1981).
Post-tsunami recovery and the impact  
of the large scale development projects
Since 2007, Hambantota District has been engaged in large-scale development 
activities, some of which were discussed as far back as 1998, when it was known 
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as the Ruhunapura project. Seven out of 17 business managers interviewed 
expressed frustration that the district had failed to involve the community in the 
planning of these major infrastructure projects. A partial list of these develop-
ment projects include a new seaport meant to compete with Singapore, an inter-
national airport, a highway, a railway, the largest conference hall in South Asia, 
an international cricket stadium, an administration complex, a new hospital and 
a wind-power plant. Most of these large-scale projects have been funded with 
loans from China. The respondents explained that they did not see the bene-
fits for the townspeople in these developments, and that they did not have the 
opportunity to express their concerns because the projects were never presented 
in a public forum. The most significant effect of these development projects for 
the business people was by far the harbour project, which necessitated the clos-
ing of Old Tangalle Road in 2007, and the relocation of businesses there.
One respondent said he was angry at the projects in general because they 
were not what businesspersons needed at the present time, and he could see how 
much was being spent on the activity. Another added that he believed the pro-
jects had made the overall business climate worse in Hambantota. A bank manager 
responded that they had observed the negative effect on their customers, who 
now have less money. He said that over the past three years, he had observed a 
downward trend in deposits, and that the bank had to reduce their lending rates 
from 16% to 6% to attract borrowers. 
A respondent said the infrastructure projects were hurting 75% of the busi-
nesses in town. One respondent owning a construction business reported that he 
had been chosen as a supplier for one year on the harbour project, but after expe-
riencing what he described as frustrating “political problems”, he had chosen not 
to seek contract renewal. One respondent, who was not a  businessperson, pointed 
out the benefits of the airport, which he said would be convenient for Sri Lankans 
living in the four southernmost provinces in Sri Lanka.10 
Other respondents reported that they expected long-term benefits through bring-
ing in more business from outside the community. A respondent from the municipal 
planning department echoed this statement. He believed the eventual effect of the 
development efforts would be very positive, though he could understand how local 
business people were unable to see the immediate benefits as their businesses strug-
gled in their present situations. “Construction takes time,” he said. 
A respondent who had seen increased business while servicing construction 
vehicles accepted the benefits of the project, but said he was very aware that such 
benefits would be short lived. He said he expected as soon as the construction was 
finished, this additional business would go away. The Hambantota salt farm, which 
relies heavily on manual labour, might have to adjust its pay scale if thousands of 
10 In June 2015, this new airport was closed down due to lack of passengers. 
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service jobs coming into the area cause an increase in average wages. In an indus-
try with so many labourers, this could have an impact on their overall business or 
pricing model. Another respondent said he was “happy” about the harbour devel-
opment project. 
Relocation of Town Centre
One frequent theme from the interviews included references to the relocation of 
the town centre with the new Hambantota District and Municipality complex as 
the hub. The Hambantota District Secretariats and the Hambantota Munici pality 
Secretariat are now relocated several kilometres from the existing town centre, 
near to the other new infrastructure projects. 
Several respondents who received new homes from either the government 
or NGOs are now located in new villages, closer to the centre of the new town 
being built closer to these newly constructed public assets. A planning department 
employee who was interviewed described how they had for a long time been in 
the process of moving the city, and that the disaster provided an opportunity, after 
some re-zoning work was done, to actively move some people in the direction of 
the new town centre. 
Broken promises to shopkeepers and the beach volleyball complex
One recurring frustration among many of the shopkeepers that we spoke to was 
that they were promised an attractive market space along the beachfront in down-
town Hambantota. Many had already relocated from Old Tangalle Road to the 
beachfront market location. However, between 2009-2011, a decision was made 
in the municipal council to construct a beach volleyball stadium at this attractive 
location, and all shops were abruptly demolished. 
A new attractive space was promised to the shopkeepers who were evicted 
from the beachfront market, but it was never delivered. The respondents reported 
that a shopping space was actually created, but not in an attractive location as 
there was little commercial appeal in the location provided. Other respondents 
added that the new, less attractive location was not large enough to accommo-
date all the sellers who had previously occupied the selling spaces close to the 
beach. According to some respondents, the beach volleyball comp lex was used for 
an event approximately once a month.
More than one-third of the business people in this study had been relocated 
from Old Tangalle Road to the seaside shopping centre that was eventually 
demolished. Some described the events in dramatic language: “It was like I got 
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hit by three Tsunamis: first the real one, then when they made me close my shop 
in 2007, and then when they demolished the market in 2011 (Interviewee).
The constant trend of what seemed to the business people as a total disregard 
for their livelihoods had the effect of wearing down their economic resili ence. The 
same respondent commented, “I felt like I had been thrown away.”
Economic recovery 
This study reveals that, out of 17 business managers, six are fully economically 
recovered, one businessman is not yet fully recovered, while the rest are strug-
gling to reach the same level they were ten years ago. It took three to four years 
for most of the businesses to recover. For instance, a furniture factory owner 
said: “A loan from Hatton National Bank (HNB) with 6% of interest rate and 
one year grace period was an immediate relief for me. That is what made me 
recover in four years”. 
Similarly, a Tuk-tuk repair owner said about his recovery that ”I got a large 
amount of turnover immediately after the Tsunami because there were 110 
damaged Tuk-tuk’s out of which I repaired 90, and I have a monopoly now. An 
NGO paid for all those services and my supplier supported me strongly”. 
But the case was certainly not like the Tuk-tuk mechanic’s shop for all. Some 
did not find customers for a long time due to lack of money and demand. Some 
were dislocated, and the NGO’s assistance with food and clothing hit against 
some of the micro and small and medium businesses after just a few weeks 
as people received consumer goods for free. A textile trader said: ”I did not 
have any business immediately because I did not have any stock to sell. Once 
I had some stocks in the new location, due to NGOs’ assistance, people didn’t 
demand clothes”. 
Eleven respondents revealed that the Tsunami had damaged their busi-
ness. The rest of them said that their businesses were partially destroyed. For 
instance, a respondent owning a hardware shop said, “my business was par-
tially destroyed, however I got some loans from HDCC and it took ten years to 
recover and be in this position”. 
In the economic recovery process of the Hambantota business community, 
most of the respondents disclosed that it was the large-scale development pro-
jects executed after the Tsunami that had destroyed their businesses, and very 
few respondents linked the long-term development projects to positive hopes 
towards their future. A significant proportion of respondents considered money 
as the main challenge in the recovery process, and the first priority to manage. 
The second aspect was networking and relations. A lubricant shop owner said 
“I posted in the newspaper to let people know that I am still alive and doing 
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my business in another location.” Some of the respondents expressed that the 
closeness within the business community now was economically weaker, while 
some said it was stronger. 
For instance, a construction contractor said that due to new technology, 
competence and new products in the market, the economy has recovered. 
However, the furniture factory owner said due to lack of a proper location 
and customers with decreasing purchasing power, the business community is 
weaker. He said, “Everything is going to the new town even the town adminis-
tration.” 
Role of HDCC before, and after the Tsunami
The Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce (HDCC) have for more than 20 
years provided business development services to promote business in  Hambantota. 
Some other roles of HDCC are investment promotion, counselling services, publi-
cations, human resource supply to the business community, E-commerce services, 
business information systems, awards, lobbying and networking (interview with 
HDCC staff).
Immediately after the Tsunami, HDCC mapped 549 as severely affected busi-
nesses (HDCC, 2005: 14). The report said that one and half million Sri Lanka rupees 
(LKR) were distributed to 102 micro enterprises, while seven and half million rupees 
were distributed to 212 small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. HDCC coordinated 
their efforts with national and international organizations to provide loans and 
capital of LKR 15 million to 225 businesspersons. Despite these efforts, the majority 
of the severely affected business community initially received little or no financial 
aid (HDCC, 2006:17). 
After the Tsunami, the first thing the HDCC did was to prepare indivi dual 
reports on businesspersons and direct them to concessionary loan schemes at 
vari ous banks. On this scheme, 64 businesspersons were granted LKR 88.3 million 
in loans (HDCC, 2005: 14). Similarly, 50 shops and 50 houses were constructed to 
support Tsunami affected business people and their families. Ten Awareness pro-
grams were conducted to re-commerce the affected businesses, and norma lize the 
usual trading. This included, for example, replacing fishing boats, nets, engines and 
fishing gear. 
However, our observations from the study revealed that there had been some 
mismanagement of data bases that resulted in not serving the appropriate scheme 
for each appropriate person. Gunasinghe (2012: 10) confirms that the compensation 
distributed was inadequate and in an irregular manner. Another issue we repeat-
edly came across was lack of credit. Several business people revealed that credit 
was one of the biggest challenges they faced, which often remained unaddressed 
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in the recovery process. The HDCC identified the lack of access to capital early on in 
the post-tsunami business recovery process. Concrete action was taken, i.e. plans 
for a credit guarantee fund was pursued for a period of five years (pers. comment, 
HDCC staff). The plans were coordinated with the Norwegian Embassy as the donor, 
a process that was finally approved after extensive modifications. Unfortunately, 
the program failed to launch due to undisclosed legal complications. Nonetheless, 
this shows that HDCC’s strategy appears to be consistent with our findings in terms 
of the identified need for guarantors of loans for capital investment in the business 
community. Businesspersons who had seen their properties, homes and invento-
ries decimated were sometimes refused loans due to lack of collateral for which to 
secure the loan upon. This led to the question of loan guarantees, which the HDCC 
had identified as a priority issue, but had not been able to solve. A third issue was 
the detachment of the business community from the political/governance system. 
As a consequence, a new trade association had been formed in competition with 
the HDCC. 
Trade-associations and NGOs response
In total, six out of 17 Tsunami affected small-scale business owners were critical of 
the NGOs response in the relief and recovery process. Some said that some NGOs 
came in and “threw money at people.” This made the situation on the ground even 
worse as it caused inflation for a period. However, four respondents acknowledged 
having received a house from an NGO. Dissatisfaction with the NGO response is 
also perceptible in the existing literature: 
“There was a large influx of local and international NGOs to conduct recovery opera-
tions who were in competition with each other and worked under pressure to  achieve 
fast results in an uncoordinated manner resulting in a disjointed recovery effort”
(Boano, 2009; Khasalamwa, 2009; cited in Mannakkara . & Wilkinson . 2013, p. 114). 
One NGO has, however, distinguished itself by the quality of assistance provided 
to victims of the Tsunami. Tzu Chi Foundation was positively described by several 
respondents that appreciated the effectiveness and the appropriateness of their 
interventions. Their modus operandi was that they first interviewed the victims 
and identified their needs before responding accordingly. In 2005, they began 
building and a village of 649 homes, 100% free of charge, finishing in 2008 with 
full occupancy. The village includes a community centre, a school, a medical centre 
and a vocational clinic. 
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Strength of the business community 
The study revealed that only six out of the total 21 respondents considered the 
business community cohesion in Hambantota to be stronger now than it was prior 
to the Tsunami. This study cannot give any clear indication that the reasons for this 
were related to the Tsunami. However, 11 people said they are currently suffer-
ing from the negative economic consequences due to the seaside development 
project (including the closure of the old main road), which demolished their busi-
nesses. In addition, six people responded that the current, large, scale construction 
schemes are poorly coordinated, with negative consequences for local businesses. 
After analysing the data, a concern has been raised that some of the intended 
meaning behind the question: “Do you consider the local business community to 
be stronger now than prior to the 2004 Tsunami?” got lost in translation. The rea-
son behind this suspicion is that many of the respondents seemed to be unified 
in their critique of both the aid received after the Tsunami, as well as the afore-
mentioned development projects. There were also eight people who had positive 
feedback about HDCC’s “Back to Business Workshop”, which also focused on build-
ing stronger networks within the local business community. 
Conclusion
This conclusion will answer the research questions identified at the outset of this 
report, by reflecting on the main findings and analysis. 
First, the failure of the government to address the local business community’s 
needs and ignoring them in the recovery, planning process was the factor given 
the highest attention throughout the report. It has been argued that these find-
ings, which are supported by secondary literature, have had a negative impact on 
the recovery of the business community. 
Secondly, the report suggests that the financial infrastructure was inadequate 
to meet the needs of the business community, especially in the first years of the 
post-tsunami recovery process. Still, it is not completely deficient; several respond-
ents show how banks supported the business recovery process with personal 
guarantees, low interest rates and longer repayment plans. Yet, without the central 
element of loan guarantees to provide for those who had lost their security, the 
analysis shows that these efforts were insufficient, short-term  solutions. 
Third, the NGO and civil society responses have been varied. Generally, with 
some exceptions, the NGOs involved in the recovery process had largely failed to 
coordinate their activities, and as the report has demonstrated, this has negatively 
affected the business recovery. However, the NGO’s role remained vital throughout 
the recovery process. Hence, the broad criticism of NGOs is not fully justified, due 
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to misinterpreted responsibilities and low capacity. NGOs were under pressure to 
act quickly, but most did not invest in bottom up business recovery work in a long-
term perspective. This could have strengthened the self-sustaining abilities of the 
Hambantota business sector.
In sum, these three factors, which represent the main challenges that the busi-
ness community have experienced, lead to the conclusion that the business com-
munity has not fully recovered ten years after the Tsunami. But, here it must be 
added that many businesses have been negatively impacted by the huge govern-
ment initiated development projects which have constrained the local business 
sector without creating the positive effects promised. Not only were many busi-
nesses damaged during the Tsunami, but also many have sustained new impacts 
after the Tsunami from e.g. closing the main road to make the area available for the 
new harbour construction, and tearing down the shops and businesses on the sea-
side of the town to clear the area for an amusement park and a volley ball ground. 
The factors that crippled business recovery efforts have continued to retard both 
short term and long-term business recovery and development. 
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Appendix:  
A Case study of a Hambantota businessman ten years after the Tsunami
Case study: Textile business owner
The subject case is a member of HDCC and engaged in small textile 
trading. He is 44 years old and started his business before the Tsunami. 
He is living in the city cent, behind a Hambantota mosque, with his par-
ents and three children in the home. He is the only breadwinner in the 
family, and his business enterprises are vulnerable. 
He was at his home when the Tsunami waves hit Hambantota city. For-
tunately, he did not have any casualties in his home, but his business was 
totally knocked out by the Boxing Day Tsunami of 2004. The Tsunami 
affected his existing customers, suppliers and nothing remained of his 
inventory. A well-off businessperson was suddenly without customers, 
money, location, stock or suppliers. He could not reopen his business 
immediately because institutions were primarily assisting people with 
clothes. Now, after ten years he says: ”I couldn’t recover my business 
from my Tsunami losses”. 
He was affected not only by the Tsunami, but two other government 
mega projects in the last ten years, which seems to be the major factors 
influencing his business recovery. Loss of customers due to the demo-
lition of his location was a significant loss in 2007 because of the sea-
port construction under the Greater Hambantota development project. 
However, he stated that business communities were told to believe that 
new jobs and better location would be provided by these projects. He 
did not have enough money to import the same products, so with a 
personal loan he imported used products from the USA and other coun-
tries. He was surviving with his reduced business, but due to the seaport 
project, he was again forced to move to a new location. He then moved 
to a popular marketplace near the ocean with his small inventory. But, 
once again, this area was demolished due to the beach volleyball park 
project. He was promised a place to relocate, but it was never delivered. 
His shop is now a small table in his home. He is a dislocated busi-
nessperson now because he did not get support from any organization 
to recover after the Tsunami. 
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Money was the primary challenge during the recovery process, as he did 
not get any financial support from any institution. He said that HDCC 
essentially represented only the larger businesspersons in town, but he 
appreciated the emotional healing and inspiring role of HDCC through 
their “back to business” program. However, he says there were many 
businesspersons suffering from lack of collaterals, guarantees, or re- 
investment funds. These businesspersons are the potential entrepreneurs 
of the business community of Hambantota, but they have the same list 
of challenges that he has, which could be making the community weaker 
than it was before. But he said the business community is stronger than 
before due to a new trade association and high registrations in the 
HDCC. He said he had applied for a loan at the HDCC, but was not 
eligible for the loan because he was too old. Today, he is not able to 
feed his family with the textile business, so he began installing electrical 
lamps in his village of Kirinda11 under a reduced payment scheme. 
He is aware of Tsunami risks now, and prefers to hold an insurance. Speak-
ing from his present site of employment in the village of Kirinda, he had 
some interesting observations regarding future risk reduction activities. He 
did, for instance, point out that there are certain questionable issues con-
nected to the new Tsunami siren that has been installed at the new school, 
such as, for instance, language and ignorance. Regarding language, police 
issue warnings in Singhalese after the siren, but there are many families 
in the community who do not understand Sinhalese as Malay and Tamil is 
very common in Kirinda. Regarding ignorance, on several occasions people 
ignore the test alarm, believing that as it is only a test they do not respond 
to it at all. These conditions make it a less effective mechanism for disaster 
risk reduction in the community. 
11 Kirinda is situated about 25 km from Hambantota town and is a part of Tissamaharama 
municipality.
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How do findings from the Ten Years After study  
compare with the international and national evaluations  
of the disaster response and recovery process  
after the Indian Ocean Tsunami (IOT) 2004?
Arne Olav Øyhus
Evaluation of the IOT  
relief and recovery assistance:  
The general level 
In the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami a lot of international reports were writ-
ten covering various aspects of the relief and recovery activities conducted by 
national and international agencies (Birkmann et al., 2006; Fritz Institute, 2005; 
UNOCHA, 2014; Telford et al., 2006). 
Several reports were critical about both the governments and the agen-
cies’ post-tsunami recovery activities. One often mentioned critique in these 
reports was that recovery poses a particular problem for agencies normally 
working with relief, among which a huge number were attracted to the scene 
of the Tsunami. As Telford et al. (2006) notice, whereas the goals of relief are 
usually more direct, explicit and measurable, intending to save lives, alleviate 
suffering and maintain human dignity during, and in the aftermath of disas-
ters, recovery concerns post-disaster development activities with a broader 
perspective, and with a more vague goal of restoring a population to at least 
its pre-disaster situation. 
Among the international reports, perhaps the most authoritative and 
influential, are the various reports coming from the Tsunami Evaluation Coa-
lition (TEC), comprising five thematic reports, and one synthesis report 
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( Telford et al., 2006)12 reflecting the most important findings from the 
 thematic reports.
The synthesis report (Telford et al., 2006), was written 11 months after the 
Tsunami. It raised and discussed a series of items and issues regarding the relief 
work during the emergency period, and the following period of recovery activ-
ities. Although revealing a great number of failures, weaknesses and shortcom-
ings, we have to recall that the complexity and scale of constraints that the local 
people, national authorities and international agencies and organisations had to 
face were enormous. One serious weakness that has been pinpointed on several 
occasions was the lack of disaster management capacity and competence both 
among national authorities and local communities before the on-set of the event. 
Of particular importance was the complete lack of early warning systems: “Unlike 
the tsunami warning system in the Pacific, set up after a tsunami killed 159 peo-
ple in Hawaii in 1946, no tsunami warning system had been installed in the Indian 
Ocean” (Telford et al., 2006, p. 40). It took more than an hour and-a-half after the 
earthquake happened before the shores of Sri Lanka were hit, more than enough 
time for a warning message to reach the threatened areas, but nothing happened 
(Telford et al., 2006, p. 41). 
For the international agencies involved in the relief and recovery process, a 
large number of activities and efforts were needed: taking care of the victims, con-
struction of shelters, risk reduction and livelihood recovery work. Under the pre-
vailing circumstances, such activities were necessarily both slow and complex, and 
frequently involving factors outside the organisations’ control. In addition, many 
agencies had neither the technical, social nor cultural competence needed. What, 
therefore, appeared on the ground was a fragmented approach comprising a great 
variety of international agencies with various structures, competences, ideologies 
and approaches. This limited the effectiveness of the recovery activities (Telford et 
al., 2006, p. 17).
Despite these limitations, an enormous amount of aid supplied the impacted 
communities with resources to rebuild their societies, structures and institutions. 
Within some months, there were clear signs of recovery in many areas. Children 
were back in school and health facilities were back in service. Economi cally, it could 
be observed that in Sri Lanka, more than 80 percent of damaged fish  markets, 
12 The TEC synthesis report was prepared by J. Telford, J. Cosgrave and R.  Houghton 
(2006), with the title: Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian 
Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report, Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), London. 
The synthesis report is based on five thematic reports: (1) TEC Funding Response 
Report (2006); (2) TEC LRRD Report (Links between relief, rehabilitation and 
develop ment in the tsunami response) (2006); (3) TEC Capacities Report (2006); 
(4) TEC Coordination Report; (5) TEC Needs Report. TEC is a multi-agency initiative 
in the humanitarian sector established in 2005.
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boats and fishing equipment were rapidly restored, and over 70 percent of affected 
households report that they have regained a steady income (TEC Capacities Report, 
2006, ref. in Telford et al., 2006). 
A very important fact emerging from the post-disaster evaluation reports is 
that the disaster response directly following the event was mostly conducted by 
the local people in the affected communities themselves. Almost all immediate 
life-saving actions and emergency support in the first couple of days after the 
disaster was provided by local people: “In Sri Lanka and Thailand, life-saving and 
immediate relief during the first two days was led almost entirely by the gene ral 
public from adjacent areas (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, ref. in Telford et al., 2006). 
Few, if any of the international agencies, managed to save significant numbers of 
lives. As an example; in the Aceh province, Indonesia, it took one week before the 
first international relief operation was received (Telford et al 2006, p. 55). At that 
stage the acute situation was over, diseased people  buried, wounded under treat-
ment, and under ad-hoc shelters. A lesson learnt was that the role of local response 
and host families is often both under-valued and overlooked. The quality of the 
international response was most effective when enabling, facilitating and support-
ing local actors.
A typical feature during the relief phase was the pressure among inter national 
agencies to spend money both quickly and visibly. This was, however, not effective 
regarding the best utilization of local and national capacities. Few international 
agencies lived up to their own standards with regard to the respect for and support 
to local and national ownership: “Local ownership…was undermined and some 
local capacities were rendered more vulnerable” (TEC Capacities Report, 2006, ref. 
in Telford et al., 2006). The post-tsunami situation was characterised by the fact 
that activities, knowledge, and capacities of locals and nationals were largely mar-
ginalised by a flood of international agencies (as well as hundreds of private indi-
viduals and organisations) controlling enormous amounts of resources. It was an 
uncontrolled growth of international agencies involved in relief activities. “Well-re-
sourced agencies and very small ones, competent and incompetent, well prepared 
and unprepared, secular and faith-based, reputable and disreputable, household 
names and unknown, ambitious and humble, opportunistic and committed, gov-
ernmental and non-governmental, national and international, bilateral and multi-
lateral, well-established and just-formed – they all turned up” (Telford et al., 2006, 
p. 55). 
The TEC LRRD Report (2006, p. 10) notes: ‘A tragic combination of arrogance 
and ignorance has characterised how much of the aid community…misled peo-
ple .’ (p83); Some…interventions may actually undermine future development [.] 
For instance, lack of information to local community’s about reconstruction plans 
greatly limited their capacity to proceed with their own LRRD projects’ (ref. in Tel-
ford et al., 2006).
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A lot of assistance was ‘supply-driven’, and not in accordance with local needs 
and demands, for instance inappropriate housing designs and livelihoods solu-
tions. Some groups and categories were discriminated and neglected, for instance 
women, fishermen, small farmers and small entrepreneurs. The consequences 
were greater inequalities, gender- and conflict-insensitive programming, cultural 
offence and waste. Quite often local authorities, local communities and local 
organisations were brushed aside. Local competent staff were sidelined, while 
poorly trained international staff with no, or little, local competence were given 
power and authority. It was a ‘misrecognition’ of local capacities resulting in inef-
ficient implementation of project activities, ‘poaching’ of staff from national and 
local entities, and limited participation of the affected-population. (Telford et al., 
2006). Local people frequently complained that NGOs dealt only with village offi-
cials and that poorer people were marginalised. At best, the international response 
restored the status quo before the tsunami; at worst, it strengthened those who 
were better off and/or more articulate.
According to the TEC Report 2006, the 2004 Tsunami disaster response was the 
most rapidly and generously funded disaster response in history. An amount of 
more than US$13 billion was pledged or donated internationally for emergency 
relief and reconstruction; including more than US$5.5 billion from the general pub-
lic in developed countries. This funding was too much to handle properly and cau-
tiously for the international aid system. One effect was that new and inexperienced 
NGOs were attracted to the scene of the disaster, a scene where they had no, or 
limited, competence (Telford et al., 2006). Governments and international agencies 
from several countries failed to ensure that their activities and funding were based 
on local needs. The result was imbalances, assistance not driven by local demands, 
and also supporting NGOs based in a donor’s own country, regardless of whether 
they had any competence or not. “Poor ‘end-user’ traceability and inadequate mon-
itoring were evident among official donor responses” (Telford et al., 2006).
Evaluation of the IOT relief and recovery assistance: Sri Lanka
Several post-disaster studies conducted in Sri Lanka report that it was a general 
satisfaction among Tsunami affected communities for the assistance received dur-
ing the initial, relief stages of the Tsunami response. It seems, however, that the 
satisfaction with the relief phase changed during the recovery phase. This was pos-
sibly a consequence of people’s expectations that now moved away from the allo-
cation of relief-items to longer-term recovery opportunities. After only some few 
months, it became clear that moving away from relief operations to a broader and 
more encompassing reconstruction process was not that simple, bringing forth a 
complex set of non-anticipated challenges. Many reports from the recovery pro-
cess indicate that there was a growing frustration among people with the speed 
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and direction of efforts, but also lack of local participation. In a dissertation written 
four years after the Tsunami, Kamal Hoshi Kapadia argues that the post-tsunami 
reconstruction efforts in Sri Lanka have failed as it has not reduced economic vul-
nerability and poverty, that coastal poverty is on the rise, and that the Tsunami 
affected people are still largely worse off, economic wise, than before the Tsunami 
(Kapadia, 2008:20). It has also been argued that aid was used mainly on the rich. 
Naomi Klein (2007) argued that the Tsunami gave big business the opportunity to 
take over the Sri Lankan coastline.
Most of the critique in Sri Lanka has not primarily been directed against the 
international assistance. For example, a claim-holder survey conducted in Sri Lanka 
indicated that affected communities felt that their local leaders had failed them in 
ensuring equity and inclusion (Telford et al., 2006). The Fritz Institute found that 
“85% of the affected families surveyed ranked international NGOs highest in terms 
of quality, maintenance of dignity, and fairness in distribution of aid” (Fritz Institute, 
2005: 7). 
The main target of the criticism was the government of Sri Lanka. Possibly, the 
most important piece of criticism, especially from international quarters, was the 
lack of an early warning system. Information of the impeding catastrophe was actu-
ally available, but could not be utilized due to lack of a system for analysing and dis-
tributing the warning messages. Athurkorala and Resosudarmo (2005) write that 
already at 7.05 hrs in the morning of the disaster, seven minutes after the earth-
quake erupted, a tremor was felt by the Director of the National Geological Survey 
and Mine Bureau (GSMB). A seismological station transmitted the data one minute 
later, but the GSMB did not have the capability of analysing the data. At around 
10.00 hrs, GSMB received the necessary analy sis of the data from the University of 
California and the US Geological Survey (USGS), but by then it was too late. Govern-
mental failures did also characterise the later recovery activities. A household study 
performed in Ampara and Hambantota by Duyne Barenstein (Barenstein, 2013), 
states that post-tsunami recovery activities increased inequalities both between 
people and regions. An important issue in this context was connected to the gov-
ernment’s resettlement programme. Originally, the government decided that no 
new reconstruction would be allowed within a 100-200 metre buffer zone from 
the coast in order to reduce the vulnerability of the coastal communities for future 
disasters. Very little consideration was given to the people depending on the beach 
and the coast for their livelihood. Due, however, to practical difficulties, finding the 
right amount of land, but also due to the negative sentiments among local peo-
ple, the government reduced the buffer zone to 55-100 metres from the sea. There 
are many NGOs and civil organisations that have questioned the real motive for 
the government to enforce this policy, as they saw that the consequence of this 
policy was that while poor, coastal communities had to leave the very valuable 
beaches, the luxury hotels were allowed to remain (Barenstein, 2013). Accor ding 
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to this author, “Sri Lanka’s reconstruction policy was characterized by continuous 
amendments and lack of transparency” (Barenstein, 2013: 220). Lack of institutional 
continuity, clarity and accountability was utilized by politi cal leaders and powerful 
persons to forward their own interests. They forced, for instance, local administra-
tors to include on the list of people needing assistance persons who were neither 
poor nor residents of the area. “We also learned that, in several settlements, mem-
bers of parliament had forced agencies to give at least 20% of the houses to their 
supporters” (Bernstein, 2013: 220). 
The problem with a plethora of humanitarian agencies, a great portion of them 
lacking both local knowledge and experience, and operating more or less on their 
own, was also an important constraint for Sri Lankan recovery process. The gov-
ernment allowed an enormous amount of humanitarian agencies to take on huge 
reconstruction projects, but there was little or no mechanism for coordinating the 
activities between the agencies, or between the agencies and their own activities. 
”Thus a mismatch between the GO and the NGO actors emerged” (Ahmed and 
Charlesworth, 2015: 432). Many of the NGOs, both national and international, were 
– due to their lack of experience – rather powerless against political interference. 
While some of them adapted to the claims from the political actors, others with-
drew from Sri Lanka before comp leting their projects. 
Evaluation of the IOT relief and recovery assistance: The Local Level
To properly and adequately assist disaster-affected communities, it is of funda-
mental importance to understand the affected communities’ structures and insti-
tutions, and also the local people’s knowledge, their cultural and religious beliefs. 
The Ten Years After (TYA) study gives us some important facts in this regards, for 
instance that the fishermen in Hambantota, who are mainly Muslims, strongly 
believed that the Tsunami, and everything that takes place on earth, is an act of 
Allah. We see similar aspects among the Buddhist population who referred to 
Karma when explaining why the misfortune of the disaster affected some more 
than others. Some months after the disaster, I did an interview survey in some vil-
lages close to the southern town of Matara, about 50 km west of Hambantota. One 
of the interviewees was a man whose family was very much hurt by the disaster. 
He told in detail how the waves came upon them, how they tried to flee, and when 
the wave caught them how he tried to hold on to his youngest daughter’s arm 
while trying to climb up on a roof. Eventually he lost his grip and had to see that 
she was caught by the waves and washed away. When I asked him why he thought 
that exactly this daughter had this destiny while his other children survived, he 
answered with one word: Karma. During this survey, and the Ten Years After study, 
this explanation was repeatedly given, underlining that from a local perspective, 
cultural and religious factors are crucial for explaining both the causes behind dis-
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asters, but also who will suffer. This understanding must be in place in the planning 
and management of future disaster and risk reduction activities.
Lessons learnt from the case studies
Hambantota Fishermen
But there are other important lessons that have been learned as well. The fisher men 
had, both before and after the Tsunami, a general lack of trust towards government 
authorities. This attitude had in many ways been strengthened by what took place 
during and in the direct aftermath of the disaster. One example is when the fish-
ermen were asked to fill in forms to report their losses. Many of them did not so 
because they were not sure how this information would be used. 
Seen from the fishermen’s perspective, the relationship between the aid agen-
cies and the local fishing communities was characterised by lack of communica-
tion and local participation, the agencies’ lack of competence and use of corruptive 
practises, resulting in a situation where the assistance rendered to the fishing com-
munity was quite often misplaced, for instance by distributing the wrong types 
of boats and equipment. In addition to the aid delivery being disorganised, it was 
also distributed unequally and unfairly. The fishermen sincerely believed that aid 
was primarily given to certain persons in high positions, relatives to the people in 
charge of the distribution, and so on. They were also very displeased with the relo-
cation of their new post-tsunami homes as this process did not take their livelihood 
situation into consideration, and also made everything much more difficult and 
expensive for them. 
When interpreting the views and perspectives of the fishermen, we must 
understand their position in the society. Sri Lanka is still in many respects a cast 
society, and the fishermen cast belongs to the lowest levels in the cast hierarchy. 
Still, some fishermen can be rather well off economically. In Tangalle, for instance, 
there are rich fishermen owning ocean-going trawlers. But the great majority of 
fishermen in Hambantota town are small and rather poor fishermen, living mainly 
from a hand to mouth basis. In addition, these fishermen are mainly Muslim with 
a Malay or Moor origin. Hence, both religious and ethnic wise, they belong to a 
small and marginal minority, comprising between 2-3 per cent of the population in 
Hambantota District although comprising a much larger segment of Hambantota 
town, percentage wise. As they feel discriminated against by government authori-
ties, they also look upon these authorities with suspicion. Concretely, they believe 
that they are over-ruled by government authorities regarding the price on fish, 
which they think are set all too low on purpose in order to supply urban people 
with cheap food. 
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Very much in correspondence with the TEC Report (2006), the fishermen 
claimed that emergency activities were planned and organised over their heads, as 
there was no participation of local people in planning and implementing recovery 
activities. In many ways, we must admit that this was a two-sided concern: there 
was a lack of initiative to involve local fishermen to participate in emergency activi-
ties, but it was also a lack of interest among the fishermen to involve themselves in 
communal emergency activities, or activities beyond their local families and neigh-
bourhoods. Applying the concepts of bonds and bridges (Nayaran, 1999; Newman 
and Dale, 2005) for the fishing community in Hambantota town, the bonds – for 
instance family ties – were very important both in the emergency and recovery 
phase, whereas the bridges were shaky and narrow. 
The village of Kirinda
The situation was quite different in Kirinda where the local people, the majority 
being Muslims, organised themselves and established a communal coordination 
committee to be a part of the emergency work. Perhaps the fact that the Muslims 
are a majority population in Kirinda can be an explanatory factor for this communal 
engagement, but also the “class” system could have had an impact in Kirinda. Kirinda 
is basically a fishing village, but the fishing fleet consist of many bigger boats; boats 
that are rare among the Hambantota fishermen. This leaves the impression that the 
people in Kirinda, are living at a higher socio-economic level. 
Kirinda represents a very interesting case regarding the emergency phase after 
the Tsunami as a coordination committee was quickly established. Why exactly this 
happened here is not known, but it seems that there were a couple of civic “entre-
preneurs” who took the initiative, among them the schoolmaster at the time. By 
forming this committee, they managed to have a say in the emergency and recov-
ery work. We may say that they managed to utilize bonds comprising local insti-
tutions and networks to create a fund of social capital used in the construction of 
bridges to external agencies. Here, we must admit that it is not easy to define where 
bonds end and bridges begin, for instance regarding the ties to their neighbours 
in the town of Tissamaharama. Kirinda got a lot of support in the first instance after 
the Tsunami from individuals and groups from Tissamaharama (most often called 
Tissa), laying some kilometres into the interior – and spared from the waves. This 
assistance was not in any respect connected to religious favouritism, as the people 
of Tissa are mainly Buddhist. The people from Tissa and other surrounding areas did 
a great job, bringing food and water, organising rescue operations both at sea and 
on land, comforting people in deep grief, etc. 
The fact that the people of Kirinda managed to establish a local coordination 
and consequently participated in the emergency and recovery activities, does not 
imply that they felt that they were in control of the situation The general opin-
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ion we could detect among local people was that when the outside organisations 
and agencies entered the scene, they themselves were more or less brushed away. 
During the relief operations, the committee was, to a certain extent, listened to, 
and it was also participating in the relief distribution. But later, especially when the 
government authorities were in position, and the NGOs and INGOs really launched 
their operations in full, the committee become more and more marginalised. 
According to the local people’s perception, many negative things then started to 
happen, for instance that many representatives from the local, public authorities 
did their best to exploit the situation for their own advantage. They distributed 
relief, money, boats and equipment, and houses unequally and unfairly. The local 
people’s trust in the government came to an absolute low. 
The NGOs fared much better: at least most of them did. Even though the 
NGOs, in general, did a good job, they also committed many failures, most of 
them because they communicated rather poorly with the local people, did not 
respect the local culture, and because they were rather reluctant to open for local 
participation. Due to this, the NGOs started projects and activities that were 
not adjusted to local material and immaterial conditions, and which, in the long 
run, could be counter-productive to a sustainable development process. A vital 
concern for the community was that the various NGOs treated people differ-
ently, e.g. various NGOs did various things for various people. If you were so 
lucky enough to be in the “colony” of a well-functioning and prosperous NGO, 
you could get a very nice house and many other valuable items. But then it was 
visa versa for people belonging to poor and ill-functioning NGOs. This implied 
that people in this community, a community that to a certain extent could be 
characterised as homogenous and harmonious before the disaster, were treated 
unequally and unfairly. Families who were not very much affected by the disas-
ter, and thus did not “deserve” a lot, got plenty, whereas families who had lost 
almost everything, and therefore deserved a lot, got almost nothing. Here, we 
must add that we should not exaggerate the aspect of homogeneity and harmony 
in the disaster affected communities, neither before nor after the disaster. All of 
these communities were heterogeneous regarding power, wealth, gender, age, 
religion, family relationships etc. before the disaster struck, and also ten years 
after. Even if we saw that individuals and families were fighting for their own 
interest, this did not, however, exclude the communal sentiment, and a sense of 
justice and fairness. The social capital created to a large extent by the network of 
bonds, did absolutely not serve everybody equally, but still played an invaluable 
role in the local setting, both directly after the disaster, and ten years after. 
Kirinda, due both to internal motivation and hard work and a strong influx of 
external assistance, has today been completely rehabilitated, even at a substan-
tially higher standard regarding such issues as education, health, housing and 
infrastructure facilities. Some even call the Tsunami “a golden wave”. But perhaps 
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this golden wave can be a blessing in disguise, because what one can be a bit more 
uncertain about is the invisible structures and conditions. We know for sure that 
many people are struggling with mental issues after the Tsunami. Many fishermen 
are afraid to go out for fishing when the sea is rough, even if they now have bigger 
and better boats. Several people mention that their mental condition has not been 
healed. This we can rather easily understand. Despite this negative aspect, I believe 
that the most significant feature of the Kirinda recovery process is the role of the 
bonds. It was the networks and relationships between neighbours, friends and 
families that came to the rescue on December 26th 2004, proving their strength 
and effectiveness. A central question we have to ask is if these bonds are as strong 
today, or have the incidents and events that took place in the relief, recovery and 
rehabilitation phases after the Tsunami weakened these life-saving networks and 
relationships. The short answer is, we do not know, and quite possibly, only a gigan-
tic disaster in the future can give an answer to that question.  
Tangalle tourist industry
The town of Tangalle, the most important beach tourist destination in Hamban-
tota District, was damaged enormously by the Tsunami. Hundreds of people died, 
several hundred were injured, and many thousands were left homeless. Not only 
was the big fishing harbour destroyed – with big trawlers found seve ral hundred 
metres inland, but also the whole town centre was destroyed, as was also the case 
with almost the entire tourist industry. 
Quite interestingly, the hotel industry has proved to be highly resilient. The pro-
cess of rebuilding the tourist industry was a task that most of the hotel and restaurant 
owners managed to complete within two to three years. But it was not before the end 
of the civil war in 2009 that the hotel industry was in full swing, with a much higher 
level of guests than ever before. As with the gene ral, material situation in Kirinda, the 
tourist industry in Tangalle came back with an improved standard compared with 
the conditions before the Tsunami. Hotels were moder nised and expanded, and built 
with higher quality materials. In most ways, this is a success story. But here there 
are also lessons to be learnt. Perhaps the most interesting lesson is that according 
to the majority of hoteliers, the most important obstacle in the recovery and reha-
bilitation process has been the government with its rules and regulations. The gov-
ernment made laws that were impossible to follow if you wanted to continue your 
business, for instance the 100-200 meter buffer zone law. According to this, you were 
not allowed to build the new hotel at the same site as before, as previously there 
had been only a 30-metre buffer zone regulation, i.e. the hotel buildings had to be 
a minimum of 30 metres from the seashore at tide. With the 100-200 metre buffer 
zone, the hotels were to be built on land that the hoteliers did not own, and where 
there was no infrastructure, for instance there were no roads. Obviously, the hoteliers 
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could not abide by this regu lation, but tried to build as far from the shore as possible, 
but within the  limits of their property. This meant that some built almost at the same 
site as before, while some pulled back to about 60 metres if their property extended 
that far. In doing this, they have been threatened by the government, who have said 
that their hotels would be demolished. This has not yet happened.
Also, it was a general complaint that the government has not contributed with 
infrastructure; mainly roads, from the main road and out to the hotels at the beach. 
In addition, the government did nothing to train people so that they would be 
suitable for employment at the hotels, and it was impossible to get a license to sell 
alcohol to tourists, which of course was a necessity if you wanted to survive. This 
meant that beer and wine had to be served in secret. Several hoteliers said that the 
only way to acquire a license for selling alcohol was through bribery.
Then again, the hoteliers felt positively about the role played by both national 
and international NGOs, both. Not only were the NGOs important agencies in the 
general recovery and rehabilitation process for Tangalle as a town; they also car-
ried out an important job for the hotel owners, for instance by contributing with 
both grants and loans. Since they also made use of the few hotels that were not 
destroyed to stay in during their recovery operations, it meant that they brought 
some important income as guests as well. Quite interes tingly, the people most 
negative to the NGOs, arguing that they were corrupt and used money for their 
own benefit, were not hotel owners, but workers. Perhaps this attitude was con-
nected to the fact that they personally received few benefits from the NGOs. 
Hambantota business community
The business community in Hambantota town had, understandably, many of the 
same grievances as the hotel owners in Tangalle as they were generally in the 
same situation. They were almost unanimous in their criticism of the govern ment. 
Not only were they denied loans to rebuild their businesses after the Tsunami, the 
government also promoted a lot of efforts and projects after the Tsunami that ran 
against the interest of the business community. Very importantly, here was the 2009 
closure of the New Tangalle Road, the main road through Hambantota where a lot 
of businesses were situated. The closure of the road was done in order to enable the 
construction of the huge seaport, a project none of the business people saw as of 
value to for their own businesses. Then later, after they had moved away from the 
closed New Tangalle Road and established themselves along the seaside of Ham-
bantota town, they again had to hastily evacuate, as all buildings at this site were to 
be demolished to open the area for an amusement park and a volleyball pitch. For 
both these incidents, the business people were promised compensation, and new 
premises to open their businesses, but none of this ever materialised. The business 
people felt that small businesses were of nil value to the government, even if they 
gave employment to many people. 
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The business community felt that they had received very little support from the 
government during and after the disaster. They were, however, as were the busi-
ness people in Tangalle, much more satisfied with the assistance they had received 
from NGOs, including the local Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce (HDCC), 
which in many ways acted as a representative for the business community in the 
whole district. Besides giving both financial and practical assistance on their own, 
HDCC often operated as a mediator between national and international NGOs and 
the local business community. There were, of course, also business people that 
were not entirely satisfied with the role played by either the NGOs or HDCC perhaps 
because they felt that the assistance they received did not live up to expectations. 
Some were also sceptical about HDCC’s “neutral” role in distributing relief and loans. 
This was most probably the main reason why a new business association was estab-
lished in competition with HDCC.  
Summary of findings
The ten years recovery process has in most instances been a success. The commu-
nities are basically back on their feet, most of them at an even higher material level 
than before the disaster. New roads, new schools, new hospitals have been erected 
in many communities. But there are individuals and groups who are still strug-
gling, for instance business people. While we can see that the hoteliers in Tangalle, 
in general, have managed to re-establish their businesses, many even at a higher 
level than before, many business people in Hambantota are still struggling. But here 
we can not only refer to the post-tsunami recovery process. Whereas many Ham-
bantota business people have been negatively affected by the government’s huge 
infrastructure projects, the Tangalle tourist sector experienced a substantial boom 
after the end of the civil war in 2009. Also, the Hambantota fishing community is not 
that happy with their present situation, feeling that they are in a more difficult posi-
tion than before. But again, this is not only connected to the recovery process. The 
government’s price policy, combined with lesser catches and high fuel prices, have 
made their living conditions more vulnerable.
The Ten Years After study reveals that the general perception among local 
people in Hambantota district is that the government was the weak partner in the 
recovery process, some were also of the opinion that the government’s activi ties 
were counter-productive. The study ca not state clearly if this perception is mainly 
directed towards policies and activities of the national government in Colombo, or 
the district or municipality councils, or if it is a consequence of some government 
officers and servicemen that did a poor job. It could also be that the expectations 
were too high. We did, however, discern a common feeling of mistrust towards gov-
ernment authorities, both at the national and the local level. Very often, we heard 
in conversation with local people that the government was plagued by corrupt 
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practices, practices that you can also frequently read about in the national news-
papers. It was a general sentiment that during the recovery process, people work-
ing in the government apparatus were utilizing their position to take substantial 
portions of the incoming aid for their own benefit. And, obviously, knowing about 
all the privileges accrued by the members of the parliament and in government 
offices, you can easily understand people’s feelings. Future governments have to 
make some extraordinary achievements if they want to overcome what we could 
call the “public-private” divide, and create synergies between themselves and civil 
societies for a more sustainable development of the country. 
The Hambantota people, in general, recognised the positive role played by 
civil organisations, mainly those we call NGOs (or INGOs). Some of them did 
a very good job, for instance the Tzu Chi Foundation from Taiwan, while many 
others were recognized as giving aid and assistance that really benefitted the 
communities. However, there were some that should never had been allowed 
to take part in the recovery process due to their lack of local knowledge, com-
petence and skills, interest, motivation and funds. The main criticism raised 
against the NGOs was that there were quite often (more often than not) a lack 
of communication with local people or institutions both in the emergency and 
the recovery phases after the Tsunami. This had two main negative effects. 
Firstly, many projects were misplaced, poorly planned, or did not take into con-
sideration local cultural, religious, social or environmental concerns. Therefore, 
they were not as time and cost effective as they could have been. Secondly, aid 
and assistance distributed was sometimes unjust, unfair and unequal. Houses, 
boats and other goods were often distributed to people who did not “deserve” 
it since they were not that much affected by the event, while others that really 
“deserved” it were given little. With limited communication, there was also a 
limited local participation. Even the ad hoc coordination committee established 
by the local people themselves in Kirinda, and which played a certain role in 
the relief phase, was gradually put aside when the bigger recovery projects were 
planned and implemented. 
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The role of faith
In a summary of findings from this study, it is not possible to avoid the issue of 
faith. During the discussions with the victims of the disaster, it soon become clear 
that faith was not only important, faith was fundamental. It seemed that faith 
could rationalize, explain, and even give meaning to the seemingly meaning less. 
Two of the groups we studied were mainly Muslim (the Kirinda village and the 
fishing community in Hambantota) and mainly Buddhist (the Tangalle tourist 
sector, and the Hambantota business community). Although religion and faith 
were not major ingredients in our study, their importance always shone through. 
Among the Hambantota fishermen, this was very explicit, as – according to their 
perception – the Tsunami was an act of Allah. The role of faith does not only 
have an impact on how people interpret events, such as disasters, it also explain 
why they take place, and what can be done to avoid them, or actually, why 
disasters are unavoidable. Allah uses disasters to inform people about his will 
and his powers, and if Allah wants to cast a disaster over us, there is nothing we 
can do to escape it. The only protection we may try to build is to be faithful and 
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follow his commands, but even that is not a guarantee against unlucky events. 
Even faithful, strong believers can be exposed to disasters, if Allah wants it so. 
When raising the issue of faith with Buddhists, the situation was somewhat the 
same, but also somewhat different. Buddhists do not have a God. Lord Buddha is 
a teacher, a messenger, a purified human being. His teachings can allow us to live 
according to the highest principles. We should not be so occupied with earthly 
activities, but try to live a full, ethical life. We have to look into ourselves, and try our 
level best to avoid thoughts and activities that can negatively impact on ourselves, 
or others. Here, Karma is important. Karma is basically connected to morality; it 
explains that the inequality between people has a moral causation. When some-
thing good happens to a person, it has a moral foundation, the same if something 
evil happens. In this sense, Buddhism is very individualistic or personalised. Noth-
ing happens to a person, good or bad, which that person does not deserve. The 
cause for this happening can be more or less invisible, and is not only confined to 
how the person has lived his present life, but also how he has lived his former lives. 
Karma is the accumulated result of actions in past and present lives. In this way, it 
is we, each and any of us, who are responsible for our own destiny, our own happi-
ness or sorrows. We can create our own heaven, but also our own hell.
In the same way as with the belief in the act of Allah, the belief in Karma gives 
to Buddhist a perfectly rational explanation of the “destiny” of the people affected 
by the Tsunami: why some died, some survived, some were injured, and some were 
completely unharmed. According to our interpretation of the responses from the 
Tsunami affected people, people’s faith makes it is easier to tackle life after a disas-
ter, as what happens to you or your dearest is explainable. If this interpretation is 
correct, it will be essential to incorporate such beliefs in future disaster risk reduc-
tion programmes as they will have a bearing on how they should be planned and 
organised according to a community based approach. As Cannon (2008) argues, 
we must understand people’s cultural and psychological factors to understand the 
insiders’ perspective. Since a society’s vulnerability to disasters, such as the Tsunami, 
is socially constructed, we must understand people’s values and choices to see how 
vulnerability can be reduced. These values and choices will always, although to a 
higher or lesser degree, be faith based.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most important lesson from the Ten Years After study regards the role 
and importance of local communities themselves, individuals, structures, networks 
and institutions, what we often denote as social capital. In the villages along the 
coast, from the moment when the first wave hit their shores, and for the first two- 
to three days later (for some communities even up to a week) the local people, 
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struck by an event beyond any imagination, were more or less left on their own. 
Many people had been carried away far into the sea, others carried away to the hin-
terland, death, and dying people everywhere. All over, there were people scream-
ing, people in deep shock, people running around and calling for their loved ones. 
It was a completely terrible situation, not possible to describe. But help was to 
come, and very fast. Local people less harmed started to carry people found in 
sea, dead or alive, into safety. They started comforting people in grief, carried the 
wounded to schools, temples, mosques and churches not destroyed by the waves. 
They brought what amount of food and water they had to the injured and cooked 
for them. Then, less than an hour later, people from adjacent communities started 
to appear, running to the zone of disaster as fast as their feet could bear them. They 
did whatever they could to help the hurt, injured and harmed. 
The waves came cracking down on them an early Sunday morning. Two days 
later, except for enormous amounts of debris, mud, broken trees, and rubble, 
stones, glass and pieces of furniture from the broken houses, the scene was very 
much improved. Dead people had been buried, injured people had been brought 
to safe places, wounds had been treated to the best of their ability and the availa-
bility of medicines and other health care products, broken limbs had been prelimi-
nary mended. Individuals with dead family members were consoled. People suffer-
ing mentally were taken care of. When I, in my 2006 survey, visited a small village 
close to Matara, I asked a local person who had lost seve ral family members: “what 
about the local government, what did they do?” He replied that an officer from the 
local government came on a motorbike, had a look around, and then left again. 
But what in actual fact could the local government do? The situation was so over-
whelming, and their resources so few. This was only a small community, a village, in 
the midst of a great number of other small communities, and many bigger towns. 
In the bigger towns, the situation was quite different. As the damages were 
so massive, the local people were not able to cope with the situation, but they 
did what they could do. Luckily, however, several groups of volunteers, individu als 
and organisations, local as well as non-local, came and started rescue operations 
within a couple of days. The towns had institutions that could be activated quickly, 
such as hospitals, fire squads and police forces, but also private companies and 
civic organisations could be engaged, and they were. According to my understand-
ing, listening to people, reading books and seeing photographs and videos, the 
synergy between the local people and these organisations, i.e. the combination of 
bonds and bridges, was the success factor salvaging the situ ation in the Tsunami 
affected towns of Sri Lanka. 
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Managing natural disasters  
and sustaining local development:  
The importance of building robust communities  
– a quest for human security 
Arne Olav Øyhus and Kim Øvland
Introduction
The Indian Ocean Tsunami came as a shock. Even Indonesia, where natural disas-
ters such as earthquakes, floods and volcano eruptions are regular features almost 
on a daily basis, was caught by surprise by the magnitude of this hazard. Both the 
human and socioeconomic costs of the disaster were so enormous that they were 
far beyond imagination. Even though the immediate effects were of a catastrophic 
nature, the damaged societies are today largely “materially” restored, but there 
are deep cutting psycho-social effects that most probably will never be resolved 
among the present population. The problem is that such disasters are bound to 
re-appear, but we do not know where and when. What we know is that the impacts 
of such disasters can be reduced. 
As a point of departure, we must accept that about half of the present 
global population lives in areas that are exposed to natural disasters, and the 
number of people affected by natural disasters has increased year by year for 
the last 20 years. From 1994 to 2013, EM-DAT recorded 6.873 natural disasters 
worldwide causing 1.35 million deaths, an average of almost 68.000 deaths per 
year. In addition, 218 million people were affected by natural disasters on aver-
age per year during the same period. While the frequency of geophysical dis-
asters (earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions and landslides) were almost 
constant in this period, there was a steady rise in climate-related events (mainly 
floods and storms), increasing the total number of natural disasters significantly. 
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Since 2000, EM-DAT have recorded an average of 341 climate-related disasters 
per year, a 44% rise from the 1994-2000 average, and well over double the level in 
1980–1989 (CRED, 2015).
It is generally accepted that natural disasters have an adverse effect on devel-
opment gains, and that they are most damaging for poor and vulnerable commu-
nities (UN, 2004; WB, 2006). To reduce the impact from disasters, it is important to 
make the disaster-exposed communities more robust. This can be done by apply-
ing various mitigation measures aimed at local communities, and by an increased 
support for community based disaster management (CBDM) activities. Local com-
munities can potentially be the main actors to manage both acute disasters and 
long term sustainable development. In many respect the Tsunami was a disaster 
completely beyond the imagination of both the Sri  Lankan authorities and the 
public, but still simple precautions such as a functioning early warning system and 
communities prepared for disasters could have reduced the impact of the disaster 
profoundly, and saved many lives. Improved mitigation and preparedness systems 
would also have made the reconstruction process more effective. In this respect 
it is disappointing to read a UNDP report that while UNDP assisted the Disaster 
Management Center (DMC) to design and implement many activities, including 
early warnings systems and prepared ness plans, ‘little attempt has been made to 
maintain those activities’ (UNDP, 2011: 6).
The present global scenario
As indicated by Webster et al. (2009) the increasing interconnectedness of world 
economic and political systems and the effects of climate change on natural pro-
cesses have made disasters more complex and destructive than ever before. In 
the Bali Action Plan, the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change have identified disaster risk reduction strategies as tools 
for adaptation and mitigation (UNFCCC, 2007), and these tools are meant to 
pay special attention to the poorest most vulnerable communities (UN/ISDR, 
2007c). This means that investments in mitigation and preparedness efforts 
should be made so that they provide for the long-term welfare of poor com-
munities (Somers and Svara, 2009:181). This is very much in accordance with 
UNDP’s recommendations for DMC’s DRR activities in Sri Lanka, arguing that 
disaster management should be linked to the development and promotion of 
local people’s livelihood patterns that could empower disaster-prone commu-
nities to cope with natural hazards and help poor people to survive disasters. 
This item was, however, not adequately considered in the projects implemented 
between UNDP and DMC (UNDP, 2011, 48).
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According to Webster et al., the intensity and frequency of disasters will 
increase, hence far more resources will be required to maintain even the exist-
ing levels of preparedness and response, which is only about 50–70% of what 
is actually appealed for (Webster, 2009:20). In addition to more resources, 
future disaster management needs to be more efficient, flexible, holistic and 
participatory. This means that both present and future high-risk countries and 
communities need to increase their coping capacity to put in place effective 
measures to reduce risk, such as early warning systems, community based disas-
ter management activities and sensitive local development plans (BCPR/UNDP, 
2009). This could be done in different ways, e.g. through multi-scalar, multi -
-sectoral or multilateral processes, with crucial emphasis on local involvement 
and participation. In Sri Lanka, the government has now developed structures 
and policies along this line. In May 2005, they enacted the “Sri Lanka Disaster 
Management Act No. 13 of 2005” establishing the foundation for a Disas-
ter Risk Management (DRM) system in the country, simultaneously the Act 
establishes the National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) chaired 
by the president. They have established a Ministry of Disaster Management, a 
Disaster Management Centre (DMC) with the mandate to implement disaster 
management programmers in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action, and a 
National Disaster Management Coordination Committee (NDMCC). NDMCC 
is a multi-stakeholder committee comprising people from the government, par-
liament, universities, civil societies, etc., with the aim of mobilizing knowledge, 
skills and resources to strengthen disaster, risk reduction activities (NDMCC, 
n.d). NDMCC are pointing to climate change as the main cause behind possible 
future disaster risks, emphasizing the possibility for an increased frequency and 
intensity of climate related disasters, and sea level rise. In collaboration with 
the UNDP the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) in December 2005, pub-
lished a comprehensive report called “Towards a Safer Sri Lanka: Road Map 
for Disaster Risk Management” only one year after the Tsunami. The Road 
Map incorporates seven thematic components that will support plans both in 
disaster risk management and development planning. Among the seven compo-
nents we will mention the following three strategical areas; Multi-hazard Early 
Warning System; Mitigation and Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 
into Development Planning; and Community-based Disaster Risk Management 
(DMC/UNDP, 2005: xiv). Quite interestingly, the Road Map argues: “Commu-
nities bear the primary impact of disasters, yet the first and continued response 
to disasters comes from community members. Well prepared and protected 
communities are the first line of defence against disasters and a key to reduc-
ing vulnerability and increasing disaster resilience” (DMC/UNDP, 2005: 47). 
Along similar way of thinking we find the following three propositions among 
ten from the UN’s Special Envoy for the Tsunami Recovery, former president 
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W.J. Clinton: Proposition 1: Governments, donors and aid agencies must recog-
nize that families and communities drive their own recovery; Proposition 2: 
Recovery must promote fairness and equity; and Proposition 3: Good reco-
very must leave the communities safer by reducing risks and building resilience 
( Clinton, 2006). 
Community Based Disaster Management 
The importance of local community involvement  
in disaster management activities
According to the Yokohama strategy (UNDP, 1994) preventive measures should 
involve local community participation in disaster risk reduction activities. In prac-
tice, however, CRED argues that the dominant approach has been to focus on the 
post-disaster phase. Little funding and policy priority have been given to issues 
such as community preparedness. This is true of both national govern ment activi-
ties and policies, and the policies and practices of UN and other development insti-
tutions (Guha-Sapir et al., 2004).
National models of mitigation and preparedness have often been too top-
down and technology driven to make much impact on local vulnerability reduc-
tion (IFRC, 2002), and central governments in developing countries often  possess 
narrow power structures with limited concern for local issues. This was also very 
much the case in Sri Lanka. Silva (2009), for instance, claims that funds for the dis-
aster-affected people were seriously mismanaged by political interference at vari-
ous levels. Comparing the Muslim dominated Ampara along the eastern coast and 
the Sinhala dominated Hambantota on the southern coast, he argues that while 
Ampara suffered 24% of total homes damaged, they only received 14% of total 
pledges, whereas Hambantota, the home district of the then president, received 
almost five times the requirements, and that in one housing scheme more than 
30% of the recipients were political nominees of the president not at all affected 
by the Tsunami (Silva, 2009: 70). Regarding Sri Lanka, Silva also supports the sug-
gestion that disaster management has often been too top-down and technology 
driven, as it does not build on existing social processes, or “leave behind any viable 
entities that add to the resilience and coping mechanisms of the affected popula-
tions” (Silva, 2009: 71). 
According to Somers and Svara (2009) there is also a chance that local govern-
ment leaders will pay more attention to other issues when the prospects of a crisis 
seem remote, meaning the need for disaster management does not become obvi-
ous before a crisis occurs. 
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Presently, among agencies working with disaster management, priority is 
given to increased support for more community-based approaches to disaster 
management, supporting the suggestion to let community-driven projects and 
programs developed by NGOs be the main contributor of local disaster mana-
gement initiatives. “Such an approach to risk management is not guaranteed to 
be comprehensive, but applies directly to identifiable needs and the empower-
ment of local populations” (Freeman et al, 2003: i). What is important when 
one talks about empowerment, or agency, is that the participation that takes 
place should focus not only on processes but also on content, meaning local 
communities should not only follow a process but also be enabled to shape the 
process. This will create a greater sense of ownership for the disaster mana-
gement activities, which is important for a lasting impact and sustainability. 
Regarding the post-tsunami recovery process in Sri Lanka, UNDP (2011) for-
wards the same message regarding Sri Lanka, arguing that since communities 
are the lowest and most basic and effective entity for disaster management in 
any society, there are inherent strengths in these communities. They have local 
knowledge and networks (bonds), they are aware of locally available resources, 
material as well as spiritual. In other words, they can command the social capi-
tal that can be utilized to form the basis a functioning disaster management 
system. In a majority of disasters, the local communities proves their agency in 
the sense that they are utilizing their networks to respond, and they have the 
best knowledge of local risks and vulnerabilities, but also of available capaci-
ties and coping mechanisms. The local communities prove that they have the 
social capital necessary to enact agency, i.e. the possibility to engage actively in 
emergency activities (Newman and Dale, 2005). Regrettably, neither the social 
capital, nor the agency of the local communities and authorities, have been 
properly involved in the disaster management structures and systems of Sri 
Lanka (UNDP, 2011). The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), citing several 
influential organisations, e.g. the World Bank (2006), UN/ISDR (2007), and 
IFRC (2004) advocates for the view that decisions that can be made and actions 
conducted close to the individual- and community-level have more immediate 
and significant effects than do more distant ones. This implies that the appropri-
ate management level for certain kinds of disaster management activities should 
be at the local level. Among the various actors at this level, we may find civic 
organisations such as fishing and farming associations, faith based organisa-
tions, women’s groups, small business cooperatives, etc. These organisations 
possess local social-, demographic- and economic knowledge and can easily 
spread information, and thus they have the possibility to identify and share 
information regarding projects and activities that may increase or decrease 
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 hazard vulnerability. By utilizing both the bonding and bridging relationships 
existing among the civic organisations emergency and recovery activities can be 
both broader and better, and, hence, more efficient. Then you have local govern-
ment institutions, and well-functioning local government institutions will have 
experiences related to local structural and management issues as well as an 
understanding of local conditions that can guide local vulnerability reduction 
efforts through policies and technical assistance. The last type of organisations 
we can mention that belong to this local context, is locally established and 
based disaster committees. Given the “bonds, i.e. their local ties, networks, and 
knowledge, local disaster committees represent an important form of social 
capital that can be utilized for implementing plans and activities described by 
national and international disaster organizations in a more context specific and 
appropriate way than organizations anchored at higher levels. 
The Sri Lankan government do, at least rhetorically, adhere to such a local com-
munity approach. One of the “Primary Activities” of NDMCC is to “Initiate the Com-
munity Based/led Disaster Management” (CBDM) approach at the national level 
to strengthen community’s decision-making processes and implement CBDM. 
Despite this promising attitude, we learnt from the Ten Years After case studies 
from Hambantota district that the local people were not very much acquainted 
with this government policy. This may reflect that it is a long way from theory to 
practice, or from politics to implementation. 
According to Bristow (2004), heightened communication with first respon ders 
and communities at risk is one of the most important ways to minimize the effects 
of a disaster (cited in Kapucu, 2008: 247), and conducting this communication 
prior to a disaster is a key aspect of truly effective community preparedness and 
response (Tobin and Montz, 1997). The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), 
of which Sri Lanka is a member, emphasises the importance of CBDM as:
• Community people are the first responders therefore they must be equipped 
to respond
• Community people have local knowledge and experience
• Community people know local norms and societal relationships
• Community people are important for the implementation of mitigation mea-
sures and action plans
• Community people’s participation and contributions make CBDM more cost 
effective as this generates additional resources 
(Torrente, E., Zhang, J. and T. Le-Huu , 2008: 9–10).
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Based on their post-tsunami experiences from Sri Lanka and Aceh, Kennedy 
et al. (2008) also discuss the necessity of community involvement in relief and 
reconstruction, emphasizing the importance of communication between the 
agencies and the local communities. For them, community involvement implies 
that communities inform and are informed about resources available for recon-
struction options and the consequences of choosing each option. The basic prin-
ciple of community involvement is to exchange information necessary for relief 
and reconstruction. They present a very important point of view when they 
argue that inadequate communication on issues such as resource availability 
and timeframes led the Tsunami affected people to have too high expectations 
of settlements and shelter, expectations that were not possible to meet, leading 
to frustration and tension among the victims (Kennedy et al., 2008). 
The importance of disaster resilience for a robust community
If a community is to become more robust, one must map and acknowledge its 
risks and vulnerabilities and try to reduce them, and at the same time utilize and 
strengthen its capacities, i.e. its agency. This is not an easy task, but it is necessary in 
order to make the community more resilient. It is the relationship between a com-
munity’s vulnerability and its coping capacity that establishes the community’s 
ability to cope with stress, and sets its level of resilience, and – in the last instance 
– determines whether a hazard will turn into a disaster or not.
Elements of a disaster






and assets to lose 
Possible effect-
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a society 
If disruption exceeds 
community coping 
ability
Source: UN/ISDR, 2004a; Freeman et al., 2003. 
Resilience; a question of vulnerability
Westgate and O’Keefe (cited in Jeffery, 1982:38) were among the first to recog-
nize the importance of vulnerability by defining disaster as “the interaction 
between extreme physical or natural phenomena and a vulnerable human group”. 
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Vulnerability may be described as the conditions which increase the susceptibi lity 
of a community to the impact of hazards. These vulnerable conditions are deter-
mined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors (UN/ISDR, 2004a). 
This makes vulnerability one of the key determinates of disaster ( Alexander, 
1997), one which is often correlated with underdevelopment and poverty (Blaikie 
et al., 1994). According to David Alexander, however, natu ral disasters are less 
salient problems for those really poor people than for people who are not so poor. 
The reason for this is that poor people have a higher total vulnerability given their 
“precariousness of life in general” ( Alexander, 1997:292), and disasters will not 
fundamentally change poor people’s situation, they merely magnify the existing 
social and economic trends (Kates, 1977), which again obviously undermines any 
existing development activities and makes it less sustainable. 
The IFRC (2005) suggests that instead of focusing on needs and vulnerabilities, 
one should focus on building capacity and resilience, i.e. strengthen agency. This 
means putting emphasis on the strengths and capacities rather than the weak-
nesses and vulnerabilities of a community (Twigg, 2007). No community can be 
totally safe from hazards, but its capacity to absorb stress and destructive forces, its 
capacity to maintain and manage community functions and structures, and its abil-
ity to ‘bounce back’ after a hazardous event, describes its level of resilience (Twigg, 
2007:p.6). A disaster resilient community may be described as “the safest possible 
community that we have the knowledge to design and build in a natural hazard 
context” (Geis, 2000). In their discussion on ‘building back better’ in Sri Lanka (and 
Aceh), Kennedy et al. (2008) are very explicit on the importance of capacity building 
as they claim that the only way to address natural hazards is in the wider context of 
building sustainable communities. Many organisations working with post-tsunami 
relief and recovery projects in Sri Lanka did not build local capacities for planning 
and decision-making in order to ensure proper exit or hand-over strategies. Lack of 
local planning and decision-making capacities can cause a continuation of disaster 
vulnerabilities, even aggravating such vulnerabilities (Kennedy et al., 2008).
There is, however, no one-size-fits-all approach to how we can design or build 
a robust and resilient community. Preparedness, response and recovery plans must 
take into account the temporal and spatial changes in social vulnerability; if not 
the mitigation efforts may turn out to have little effect when it comes to improv-
ing local resilience to hazards (Cutter and Emerich, 2006:p.102). This means that 
whereas it is fairly easy to prepare for the physical aspects imbued by a disaster by 
studying data produced based on historic events, the temporal and spatial vulner-
ability impacting the social aspects are harder to prepare for (Cutter and Emerich, 
2006). What we should recognise is that in many developing countries shortsighted 
policies and practices may actually increase societal vulnerabilities (Holmes, 2007). 
Two researchers, Jørn Birkman and Nishara Fernando (2007), have tried to 
measure the differences in vulnerabilities between two coastal communities in Sri 
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Lanka, Galle – a Sinhala dominated town along the southern coast, and Batticaloa 
– a Muslim dominated town along the eastern coast. Their main argument is that 
sustainable recovery and development of coastal communities in Sri Lanka require 
a systematic approach for reducing vulnerability and risk. In their analysis they use 
the concept of revealed and emergent vulnerabilities, and argues that the identi-
fication and assessment of ‘most vulnerable’ areas, groups and infrastructures are 
of crucial importance, especially after a disaster, in order to safeguard a recovery 
that will be sustainable, instead of just rebuilding the structures that have proven 
to be vulnerable (Birkman and Fernando, 2007). When defining vulnerability, they 
propose that vulnerability has two main dimensions: susceptibility (the likelihood 
of an extreme event) and coping capacity (the ability to recover from an extreme 
event). Within this frame, they accept, for instance, that poor people are the most 
vulnerable (susceptible) in a disaster, but these people also have various resources 
or capacities to cope, for instance social networks (social capital). Therefore, how a 
hazard affects a society is a combination of both the negative characteristics (sus-
ceptibility) and the positive characteristics (coping capacity). In their actual study, 
the authors focused on different susceptibility factors among households and on 
different coping factors, such as, for instance, formal and informal networks. We will 
not go into details regarding the findings from their study, but will mentioned that 
that factors such as age, gender, education, employment and location were sig-
nificant susceptibility factors, whereas informal networks was the most important 
coping mechanism (Birkman and Fernando, 2007). 
Managing disasters, sustaining development: A shared responsibility
More than 20 years ago, the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World 
(UNDP, 1994: 2) claimed that, “disaster prevention, mitigation, prepared ness and 
relief are four elements which contribute to and gain from the implementation of 
sustainable development policies”. Here, the direct connection between disaster 
management and sustainable development is made explicit. The fact that devel-
opment theory has become more focused on multi -scalar partnerships and mul-
tilateral cooperation, and putting more emphasis on informal channels (Pieterse, 
2001), means that there is increased recognition that development is best achieved 
if different actors share the responsibility. But this is also a vital concern for disaster 
management. We must admit that both the causes for disasters and disaster man-
agement in itself are complex issues which must be defined in a holistic setting, 
and “new initiatives (should be) found in order to ensure that a disaster is viewed 
as a shared responsibility” (Trim, 2004:219). Various factors that are strengthened 
by globalisation, such as capitalism, marginalisation of the poor and politicised 
relief in developing countries have created more complex realities where fewer 
fixed assumptions can be permitted now than before (Alexander, 1997:299). This 
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means that we must rethink and adapt the way we conduct disaster management 
and support communities facing disasters. Increased community involvement 
is a good start. Based on their collaboration with DMC, the UNDP (2011) in their 
“Recommendations for Future Programming of DRR activities” in Sri Lanka write 
that disaster management should be linked to development activities aiming at 
promoting local livelihood patterns, structures and capacities that can empower 
disaster-prone communities to cope with hazards, and enable livelihood systems 
that will help poor people to survive disasters (UNDP, 2011: 48). To achieve this, the 
present Sri Lankan disaster management system must, according to UNDP, change 
their top-down approach to development into a more integrated and holistic 
approach that gives priority to disaster risk reduction as a development concern 
(UNDP, 2011).
In order to create a linkage between sustainable development and dis-
aster management, we may outline the following process; poverty reduction 
(a sustainable development issue) means reduced vulnerability, and reduced vul-
nerability means reduced impacts of disasters on development (a disaster mana-
gement issue) (Alexander, 1997). It is a problem, however, that theories that link, 
e.g. emergency relief and development assistance, are rarely manifested in practi-
cal situations and activities (Larsen, 2005).
According to the UN/ISDR (2005), it is important that disaster risk reduction is 
integrated into development activities, as disasters associated with  natural hazards 
are fundamentally an issue of development. How failed or unsustainable develop-
ment planning and investments contribute to development is made evident after 
each natural disaster, and the reasons for connecting disaster mana gement and 
sustainable development thinking becomes clear, as does the fact that disasters 
associated with natural hazards are fundamentally an issue of development. This 
linkage has also in principle been accepted by the Sri Lankan government, as we 
can see from the report “Towards a Safer Sri Lanka: Road Map for Disaster Manage-
ment” (DMC/UNDP, 2005). 
How people and communities, as well as professionals and practitioners work-
ing in the field of disaster management, handle the pre-, per-, and post -disaster 
phases will affect the sustainability of existing development processes in a society. 
At the same time, prospective sustainable development initiatives can affect disas-
ter management actions, both in the pre-, per- and post-disaster phases. If one is 
working with, and focusing on, pre-disaster activities, it is important that one does 
not forget or ignore post-disaster efforts, or assume that the pre-disaster initiatives 
are so well implemented and functioning so that post-disaster work is less impor-
tant. International organisations, such as the World Bank and UN, are advocating 
for the view that it is more beneficial or effective to invest in preparedness and 
mitigation, rather than focusing resources on response. This will also be the most 
cost effective disaster mana gement approach in the future, given the projected 
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increase in frequency and intensity of disasters (World Bank, 2006; UNDP/BCPR, 
2004; FIC, 2009: 21). Thinking and planning ahead is essential.
Not only are disasters and development closely linked, so also is poverty and 
environmental degradation (UNEP, 2002) and “there are clear signs that this exac-
erbates the impact of disaster” (Alexander, 1997:287), hence flawed development 
activities drives disasters (IFRC, 2002:11). At the same time, destruction by natural 
disasters typically has disproportionate impacts on the poorest and most vulner-
able populations including women, children, youth and the elderly (UNDP/BCPR, 
2004). 
If we are to experience increased resilience and sustained development for 
poor communities, facing reoccurring natural disasters, the status of such commu-
nities must be heightened (McEntire, 2001). The social, political and economic sta-
tus of poor individuals is obviously undermined, as their resources are inadequate 
when handling disasters and politicians more often than not, overlook or even hin-
der the chances of the most vulnerable to cope with the threats of disasters.
The magnitude of disaster impacts increases more in poor developing coun-
tries, than in more developed countries, and as long as preparedness and preven-
tion remains inadequate, disasters will remain a major unsolved problem for sus-
tainable development in developing countries (Basher, 2008). Natural disasters are 
not a category of events that can be separated from the broader issues of devel-
opment as natural disasters create serious setbacks to the development process 
(CRED, 2004:13). Therefore, it is important that development efforts, especially 
those initiated by the international community “aspire to promote social, political 
and economic advances and minimize the possibility that such progress may be 
nullified by disaster” (McEntire, 2001:194). 
David A. McEntire emphasises that vulnerability must be understood and 
directly addressed if the effects of disasters are to be reduced (2001). He refers 
to what he calls invulnerable development, which is a sustainable development 
thought that also encompasses the concept of vulnerability reduction in all 
development decisions and activities. At the same time as development activi-
ties should be linked to vulnerability issues, the capacity, cooperation and effec-
tiveness of people and organisations working with vulnerability reduction and 
disaster management needs to be increased, if the disastrous threat to develop-
ment is to be limited (McEntire, 2001). This underlines the need for good mana-
gement in the work towards making communities more resilient. A problem 
however is that many disaster management engagements do not have a long-
term view, but are often put aside by shortsighted initiatives aimed at economic 
growth, rather than societal stability and sustainability. This does not comply 
well with what Monday describes as one of the six principles of community sus-
tainability: “Incorporate disaster resilience and mitigation into actions and deci-
sions” (Monday, 2002, in UN/ISDR, 2004b:18). In their “build back better” 
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article on Sri Lanka, Kennedy et al. (2008) absolutely support this view, stating 
that we need to place environmental hazards into the broader context of build-
ing sustainable communities and avoid re-creating vulnerabilities. If we do not 
address the root causes of vulnerability, we may risk that reconstruction efforts 
may leave the community in the same situation as before the disaster, or even 
worse (Kennedy et al., 2008). In this regard, Shaw et al. (2012) are very much 
critical of the post-tsunami relief and recovery activities in Sri Lanka, saying 
that relatively few relief efforts were connected to the long-term development 
activities. Likewise, Silva (2009) writes that disaster response activities in Sri 
Lanka did not leave behind structures that enhanced the affected communities’ 
resilience and coping mechanisms. 
So where are we?
One of the strategic goals of the UNISDR’s Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 
(HFA)13 is the integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development 
policies and planning, and substantially reduce disaster losses by 2015. Since 
the publication of the reports Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge to Devel-
opment (UNDP/BCPR, 2004) and Disaster Risk Reduction: A Develop ment 
Concern (DFID, 2005), mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into develop ment 
planning, and that disaster risk accumulates within inappropriate development 
has gained recognition (Pelling, 2007). The Sri Lankan disaster management 
system, through the Ministry of Disaster Management has implemented the 
policies and principles of HFA.
The UNDP/BCPR14 report from 2004 focused among other things on bringing 
disasters and development together, as “a developmentally informed perspective 
on disasters lies (between) development planners and disaster risk reduction 
practitioners” (UNDP/BCPR, 2004:17). The end of the previous millennium 
and the start of the current one saw several major disasters occur in all corners 
of the world. This led to a more articulated and serious consideration of the 
disaster-development relationship and discussions surrounding the social and 
economic causes of disaster risk. The result was that reducing disaster risk was 
acknowledged as a long-term engagement with processes of international devel-
opment (UNDP/BCPR, 2004). Also in the ISDR publication Living with Risk: 
A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives (UN/ISDR, 2004b) the issues 
of disaster mitigation and sustainable development came together.
13 The Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) has now been succeeded by the Sendai Fra-
mework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 2015-2030. The main shift between the 
two is that the latter has a stronger emphasis on disaster risk reduction.
14 Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
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Disasters undermine hard-won development gains and have devastating 
effects. But through integrating natural disaster programs with overall develop-
ment objectives, governments and communities may minimize their losses (UN/
ISDR, 2007b). Because of the enormous development losses suffered around 
the world from disasters, “development banks and international assistance 
institutions now increasingly place importance on integrating risk reduction 
into development policies and practices” (UN/ISDR, 2007b). An inconvenient 
truth, however, is that development programmers often neglect the importance 
of disaster reduction due to the absence of convincing analyses of trends and 
estimated losses. There is little demand by the development sector for reliable 
and systematic data on disasters to assess their socio-economic impact over the 
short term and even less so over the long term. As a result, disaster prevention 
activities often appear costly (CRED, 2004:13)
A central question which comes to the surface when working with disaster 
management issues is; can humans reduce disasters? Vulnerability is an important 
element of the effects and outcomes of disasters, and the most probable disaster 
“cause” humans can control. Therefore, vulnerability should be a focal point when 
working with disaster management and disaster reduction in poor communities. 
Education regarding risk and vulnerabilities is perhaps the most important disaster 
management activity for disaster-exposed communities. It is emphasised by pro-
fessionals that education about disaster triggering factors and the understanding 
of vulnerability should be top priorities (McEntire, 2001); emphasizing the impor-
tance of training local people and helping them to understand and map their own 
vulnerabilities related to possible disaster triggering agents. The issue of education 
is also raised as a core issue by Shaw and Krishnamurthy (2009) who argues that 
education must play a key role in future disaster risk reduction planning, and that 
there is a need to enhance the efforts to bring disaster education into the curric-
ulum both in schools and higher education (Shaw and Krishnamurthy, 2009: 636). 
Universities should engage both in education and research on disaster manage-
ment, but make sure that this is linked with field practices to support human secu-
rity in the local communities. 
It is important to keep in mind that the experiences people have made and the 
threats they are facing vary from situation to situation. Disasters are often charac-
terized by generality rather than uniqueness (Alexander, 1997), but when it comes 
to finding ways of supporting communities in their effort to reduce the effects of 
disasters it will be important to understand the societal distinctiveness in order 
to sustain development while managing disasters. Different communities located 
nearby each other geographically, may still tell different stories and face different 
problems. This indicates that the probability for succeeding with disaster manage-
ment activities is heightened if the process is sensitive to social and cultural idio-
syncrasies since sustainable development is best achieved when the local commu-
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nity is involved as an active and influential participant, and the local natural, social 
and cultural context is taken as the point of departure. 
The quest for human security
Accepting the future scenario as presented by the IPCC, UN, the World Bank and 
other international agencies, disaster management will become one of the most 
important – perhaps the most important – global issues in the years to come. Con-
sequently, disaster management needs to be mainstreamed in all its connections 
and relationships from pre-disaster, through per-disaster, to post-disaster issues. 
Shaw and Krishnamurthy (2009) suggest that all disaster related activities need to 
include human security, a concept that is concerned with reducing and, if possible 
removing the insecurities that are threats to human livelihoods. In a sustainable 
development perspective, human security is directly concerned with the interface 
between society and the physical environment – the nature. Emphasizing human 
security implies that we cannot plan for a future sustainable development process 
without taking the management of the environment into our plans, but recognise 
the fact that such plans may be futile if we do not include plans and policies for dis-
aster risk reduction. We might argue that the quest for human security is basically 
a question of disaster risk reduction. 
Human livelihood depends fundamentally on the environment and the access 
to natural resources. We can easily see that some societies depend directly on envi-
ronmental resources for their livelihood, but even sophisticated and ultra-modern 
urban societies depend on food, water, energy, construction materials etc. to sus-
tain their livelihoods. There is always a connection between human life and the 
environment: for some societies, it is more critical and direct, for other it is more 
obscure and indirect. But as environment and human life is interlinked, so is the 
environment and disasters. Environmental degradation has an impact on both 
natural and social processes; it affects the natural resource base and increases vul-
nerability. It weakens a community’s resilience and threatens traditional coping 
mechanisms: environmental degradation enhances vulnerability and leads to a 
stronger human insecurity. According to Shaw and Krishnamuthy (2009) there is a 
need to reinforce environmental concerns in the whole disaster management cycle 
from pre- to post-disaster efforts and to integrate environmental concerns into all 
phases of disaster management planning.
Quite regularly, when a community is exposed to a huge disaster, even to the 
degree that it is almost physically eradicated – as Aceh after the Tsunami, or Kash-
mir after the earthquake in 2005 – we as outside observers cannot understand how 
this community can survive and continue without being completely reconstructed 
from scratch with the utilisation of assistance from outside agencies, be it from 
the national government or international organisations. Then we learn that after 
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some years, the community is back on its feet. During the last 30-40 years we have 
repeatedly received bad news from the African continent telling us that millions of 
people are threatened by drought and/or desertification, and that they will surely 
die if aid in sufficient amount, and at the earliest possible time, will not reach them. 
We have even experienced this personally during the great Sahelian/Ethiopian 
hunger in 1984/85. But aid never does reach the poor people in time and in suffi-
cient amounts, still people never die in millions. Why? Because communities have 
“hidden” means. In times of crisis communities manage to mobilize local resources, 
structures, systems, institutions and knowledge to tackle the crises, if not fully, at 
least partially. We have some, but very few examples during the last decades where 
a community succumbs to a crisis, but – as far as we know – never to a natural 
disaster. Sometimes a disaster-ridden community receives a substantial amount of 
outside assistance, other times only limited assistance is made available, but basi-
cally a community demonstrates strength and resilience by depending on its own 
resources. This indicates that any community has indigenous coping mechanisms, 
or what is called a “culture of coping with crisis” (Shaw and Krishnamurthy, 2009: 
636). Consequently, disaster management efforts, for instance risk assessment, 
should include the participation of local communities, and take into close consid-
eration their perceptions on vulnerability, their estimates on their coping capa-
city, and their structures and knowledge applicable to a disaster event. Since the 
community -based approaches are best suited to cover the issue of human secu-
rity, they should be given both a national and international priority, as for instance 
stated in the Hyogo Framework of Action. 
Conclusion
In the quest for human security, we cannot avoid the challenges brought about by 
climate change, implying that in the planning of disaster risk reduction activi ties 
the possible effects that climate change will imply for local communities must be 
put into consideration (Shaw and Krishnamurthy, 2009). Here, a particular emphasis 
should be given to local communities in poor, developing countries since natural 
disasters have an adverse impact on them, undermining the lives and livelihoods 
of the people in these communities. Sometimes, it can be difficult today to discern 
between a natural disaster and the impact from climate change as the impact from 
climate change can be observed and interpreted as a slow moving natural disas-
ter. When the effects of climate change lead to an increased level of poverty and 
a more vulnerable pattern of livelihood, i.e. to enhanced human insecurity, this is 
a disaster for the people affected. We have discussed how local communities have 
indigenous knowledge and traditional structures that they can utilize in times of 
need, but these items will quite possibly not be enough in a future scenario char-
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acterised by the insecurities brought about by climate change. To ensure human 
security, new knowledge, new structures and new practices are needed to adapt 
to climate change, and thereby to sustain the livelihood of the vulnerable commu-
nities.  
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